at Varna, and even the fleet at sea, to impotence. The troops were so weakened that, even in September, the five-mile march from camp to transport exhausted most of the men. Heavy weather still further delayed the start, and it was not until the 7th of September that the expedition began to cross the Black Sea. One hundred and fifty war-vessels and transports conveyed the army, which, guarded on all sides by the fighting fleet, crossed without incident and drew up on the Crimean coast on September 13th. Tactical considerations prevailed in the choice of place. The landlocked harbours south of Sevastopol were for the time being neglected, and a spot known as Old Fort preferred, because the long beach, the heavy metal of the ships’ broadsides, and a line of lagoons covering the front offered singularly favourable conditions for the delicate operation of disembarkation. Still, on this side of Sevastopol there was no good harbour, and it is quite open to question whether in this case the strategic necessities of the situation were not neglected in favour of purely tactical and temporary advantages. As a matter of fact no opposition was offered to the landing, but the weather prevented the disembarkation being completed until the 18th. St Arnaud and Raglan had at this time under their orders 51,000 British, French and Turkish infantry, 1000 British cavalry, and 128 guns, and on the 19th this force (less some detachments) began the southward march in order of battle, the British (who alone had their cavalry present) on the exposed left flank, the French next the sea, the fleet moving in the same direction parallel to the troops.
The Alma.—Old Fort was beyond the reach of Menshikov, the Russian commander, but, as the fortress communicated with the interior of Russia via Kerch and Simferopol, it was to be expected that he would either accept battle on the Sevastopol road, or cover Simferopol by a flank attack on Lord Raglan. Both these contingencies were provided for by the order of march, and in due course it was ascertained that the Russians adopted the former alternative, and barred the Sevastopol road on the heights of the river Alma. Menaced by the guns of the fleet, Menshikov had wheeled back his left, and at the same time he strengthened his right in order to cover the Simferopol road. From this it followed naturally that the brunt of the attack fell upon the British divisions, whilst the French, nearer the sea, struck to some extent dans le vide. The two commanders, after a reconnaissance, decided upon their plan. The French divisions in echelon from the right were to cross the river and force Menshikov inwards, whilst the British were to move straight to their front against the strongest part of the Russian line. Substantially this plan was carried out on the 20th of September. Owing to want of men (he had but 36,400 against over 50,000) Menshikov was unable to hold his left wing very strongly, and the French were scarcely checked save by physical obstacles; but opposite the British force the ground sloped glacis-wise up to the Russian line, and nothing but their iron discipline, the best heritage of the Peninsular War, brought them victorious to the crest of Kurghane hill. The Russians had no option but to retreat, which they did without molestation. The allies lost about 3000 men, mostly British (though Prince Napoleon’s men also suffered heavily); the Russians reported 5709 casualties.
The March on Sevastopol.—On the 23rd of September the advance was resumed, and by the 25th Sevastopol was in full view of the allied outposts. It was now that the necessary consequences of the choice of Old Fort as the landing-place presented themselves as a problem for instant solution. Whatever chance there had been of assaulting the north side of Sevastopol was now gone. Menshikov had sacrificed some ships in order to seal up the harbour mouth, and naval co-operation in attack was now impossible, while the other Russian ships could in safety aid the defenders with their heavy guns. A siege, based on the beach of Old Fort or the open roads of Kacha, was out of the question, as was re-embarkation for a fresh landing. There remained only a flank march by Mackenzie’s farm and the river Chernaya. Once established on the south side, the allies could use the excellent harbours of Kamiesh and Balaklava; this could almost certainly be effected without fighting, while in besieging Sevastopol itself and not merely the north side, the allies would be striking at the heart. But a flank march is almost always in itself a hazardous undertaking, and in this case the invaders were required further to abandon their line of retreat on Old Fort. In point of fact, the army, covered by a division opposite the Russian works, successfully accomplished the task. At the same moment Menshikov, after providing for the defence of Sevastopol, had marched out with a field army towards Bakhchiserai, and on the 25th of September each army, without knowing it, actually crossed the other’s front. On arrival at Balaklava the allies regained contact with the fleet, and the detachment left on the north side, its mission being at an end, followed the same route and rejoined the main body. The French now took possession of Kamiesh, the British of Balaklava.
Beginning of the Siege.—Thus secured, the allies closed upon the south side of the fortress. A siege corps was formed, and the British army and General Bosquet’s French corps covered its operations against interruption from the Russian field army. The harbour of Sevastopol, formed by the estuary of the Chernaya, was protected against attack by sea not only by the Russian war-vessels, afloat and sunken, but also by heavy granite forts on the south side and by the works which had defied the allies on the north. For the town itself and the Karabelnaya suburb the trace of the works had been laid down for years. The Malakoff, a great tower of stone, covered the suburb, flanked on either side by the Redan and the Little Redan. The town was covered by a line of works marked by the Flagstaff and central bastions, and separated from the Redan by the inner harbour. Lieut.-Col. Todleben, the Russian chief engineer, had very early begun work on these sites, and daily re-creating, rearming and improving the fortifications, finally connected them by a continuous enceinte. Yet Sevastopol was not, early in October 1854, the towering fortress it afterwards became, and Todleben himself maintained that, had the allies immediately assaulted, they would have succeeded in taking the place. There were, however, many reasons against so decided a course, and it was not until the 17th of October that the first attack took place. All that day a tremendous artillery duel raged. The French siege corps lost heavily and its guns were overpowered. The fleet engaged the harbour batteries close inshore, and suffered a loss of 500 men, besides severe damage to the ships. On the other hand the British siege batteries silenced the Malakoff and its annexes, and, if failure had not occurred at the other points of attack, an assault might have succeeded. As it was, Todleben, by daybreak, had repaired and improved the damaged works. Meanwhile General Canrobert had succeeded St Arnaud (who died on the 29th of September) in the joint leadership of
