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ULTRAMONTANISM
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their primacy within the Church, and in re-establishing and maintaining that primacy notwithstanding severe defeats and long periods in which their prestige sank to the vanishing point, is told elsewhere (see Papacy). A characteristic peculiarity of the process is that the claims of the Roman see were always in advance of the actual facts and always encountered opposition; though there were many periods—at the height of the middle ages, for instance—when the voices raised in protest were only timid and hesitating. To the curial system, so evolved, and continually fortifying its position in the domains of theology, ecclesiastical law and politics, the episcopal system stands in diametrical opposition. This system admits that the pope represents the unity of the Church, and acknowledges his primacy, but only in the sense that he is primus inter pares; while at the same time it claims on behalf of the bishops that, in virtue of the divine ordinance, they possess an inalienable right to a share in the government of the Church (see Episcopacy). This theory of the independence of the episcopate with regard to the Roman bishop was first propounded by Cyprian, in his treatise De unitate ecclesiae. In the 15th century it received its classical expression in the resolutions of the ecumenical council at Constance; its principles were developed and amplified by Gallicanism, and, finally, in the 18th century, was restored in a modernized form by “Febronius” (Nikolaus von Hontheim, q.v.) and in the Punctation of Ems (see Febronianism). The struggle between these two systems continued well into the 19th century; and, though episcopalism was not infrequently proscribed by the curia, it still survived, and till the year 1870 could boast that no ecumenical council had ventured to condemn it. This was done for the first time, in 1870, at the Vatican Council (q.v.), whose decrees, recognizing the universal episcopate and the infallibility of the pope, marked the triumph of that ultramontane doctrine by which they had been long anticipated.

In 1865 Döllinger wrote: “The Ultramontane view can be summarized in a single, concise, and luminous proposition; but out of this proposition are evolved a doctrine and a view that embrace not merely religion and the Church, but science and the state, politics, morals and the social order—in a word, the whole intellectual life of men and nations. The proposition runs: The pope is the supreme, the infallible, and consequently the sole authority in all that concerns religion, the Church, and morality, and each of his utterances on these topics demands unconditional submission—internal no less than external.” History, since the Vatican Council, has shown this judgment to have been correct. The Roman Catholic Church, in all countries, has become more and more dependent on the Curia: the bishops have lost their autonomous standing, and their position is little more than that of papal delegates, while all important questions are referred to Rome or settled by the nuncios.

A second peculiarity of Ultramontanism is its confusion of religion with politics; it claims for the Roman Catholic Church the functions of a political power, and asserts that it is the duty of the secular state to carry out its instructions and wishes. Ultramontanism regards the state, not as a divinely established order but, like its ancient prototype, as a profane institution and, for that reason, not co-ordinate with, but subordinate to the Church.

Since the conditions of the age no longer allow the pope to depose a temporal sovereign, the practical application of this conception of the relationship between the spiritual and temporal powers has taken other forms, all of which, however, clearly show that the superiority of the Church over the state is assumed. This may be seen in the attitude of Ultramontanism towards secular law. It assumes that God has conferred on the individual and on society certain rights and competences as inalienable possessions. This “natural law” ranks above all secular law, and all state legislation is binding only in so far as it is in harmony with that law. As to the provisions of this natural law, and the consequences they entail in individual cases, these can be decided only by the Church, i.e. the last resort, by the pope. This is to assert the principle of the invalidity of all legislation conflicting with ecclesiastical interests and rules. This was the attitude of Innocent III. when he annulled the English Magna Charta; of Innocent X. when he pronounced the treaty of Westphalia null and void; of Pius IX. when he condemned, the Austrian constitution (1868) and the ecclesiastical laws of Prussia so far as they affected the circumstances of the Roman Catholic Church (1875). Thus, too, even at the present time, the opinion is very clearly expressed in Ultramontane quarters that, in the event of the state issuing laws contravening those of nature or of the Church, obedience must be refused. The attitude of Ultramontanism, for instance, towards the right claimed and exercised by the state to make laws concerning marriage is wholly negative; for it recognizes no marriage laws except those of the Church, the Church alone being regarded as competent to decide what impediments are a bar to marriage, and to exercise jurisdiction over such cases. Thus Ultramontanism disclaims any moral subjection to secular authority or law, and will recognize the state only in so far as it conforms its rules to those of the Church. An instance of this interference with the duties of the individual citizen towards the state may be found in the fact that, till the year 1904, the Catholics of Italy were prohibited by the pope from taking part in any parliamentary election.

Since Ultramontanism cannot hope to realise its political ambitions unless it succeeds in Controlling the intellectual and religious life of Catholic Christendom, it attempts to extend its sphere of influence in all directions over culture, science, education, literature and the forms taken by devotion. This endeavour is the third great characteristic of Ultramontanism. Wherever its operations can be traced, they are dominated by the conviction that all stirrings of independence must be repressed, and any advance beyond the stage of immaturity and nonage checked at the outset. That science must be left free to determine the aims of her investigation, to select and apply her own methods, and to publish the results of her researches without restraint, is a postulate which Ultramontanism either cannot understand or treats with indifference, for it regards as strange and incredible the fundamental law governing all scientific research—that there is for it no higher aim than the discovery of the truth. This ignorance of the very nature of science leads to under-estimation of the elemental force which science possesses; for only thus can we explain the pertinacity with which Ultramontanism, even at the present day, strives to subject her work to its own censorship and control. Nor are its criticisms limited to theology alone: its care extends to philosophy, history and the natural sciences. Even medicine has not escaped its vigilance, as is proved by the prohibition of certain surgical operations. The development of these efforts may be easily traced from decisions of the Congregation of the Index and the Holy Office in Rome. Ultramontanism, too, labours systematically to bring the whole educational organization under ecclesiastical supervision and guidance; and it manifests the greatest repugnance to allowing the future priest to come into touch with the modern spirit. Hence the attempts to train its growing manhood in clerically regulated boarding-schools and to keep it shut out from the external world in clerical seminaries, even in places where there are universities. Again, it works zealously to bring the elementary schools under the sway of the Church. Since it regards the training and instruction of childhood as inseparable, and holds that the former is essentially the work of the Church, it contests the right of the state to compel parents to send their children to the state schools and only to the state schools. In logical sequence to these tenets it seeks to divorce the school from the state—a proceeding which it terms educational freedom, though the underlying motive is to subordinate the school to the Church. In the domain of religion, Ultramontanism tends to foster popular superstitions and to emphasize outward forms as the essence of religious life, for it can only maintain its dominion so long as the common people remain at a low spiritual level. If any one desires to appreciate the intellectual plane—