by the War Office for the services which were performed for them by the Local Government Board in general, and Dr. MacFadden and all his officers in particular. The Local Government Board also undertook to send specially qualified Health Officers abroad to see that the quality of preserved meat being manufactured in both the United States and S. America was kept up to the highest possible standard.
It is unnecessary to go in detail into the very slow but gradual improvement of the soldier's ration in war. The appalling mistakes and lack of suitable feeding for the British armies during the various modern campaigns from the Napoleonic wars down to the outbreak of the World War can in a large measure be read the various histories of those wars. The starvation and neglect of the armies in the Crimea are well dealt with by Kinglake; but although Great Britain had been involved in a great number of minor wars, the authorities still seemed to lack the power of organizing our supply service upon a proper basis. To take only two campaigns to exemplify the fact:—the Egyptian War caused many complaints and grumblings as to the unsuitability or lack of proper food, and the heavy cost of the same, although at that period the improvement of the soldier's diet was greatly in advance of previous campaigns; S. Africa showed still more improvement, but owing to the lack of system it was a frequent complaint that the supplies on arrival at the front were in a rotten and putrid condition—there were many instances of their arriving in that condition at the base of operations at Cape Town or other ports. The cost was out of all proportion to what it should have been. Great fortunes were made by unprincipled contractors, and at the end of that war lengthy enquiry was held into many grave irregularities.
Shortly before the outbreak of the World War, some experiments in food values had been carried out in America, and under War Office orders similar experiments were carried out in England. A special committee was appointed by the War Office to go into the whole question, and to recommend a suitable “active service” diet for the soldier. The result of this committee's labours was that a very carefully balanced diet was got out, which would be not only palatable, but also would contain all the necessary calories or energy units sufficient to maintain the normal man exposed to the rigours of a bad climate on active service. The recommended daily ration for the soldier on active service was as follows:—
| Bread—1¼ lb. or biscuit 1 lb. or flour 1 lb. | ||
| Meat— | ||
| Fresh, if obtainable | 1¼ | lb. |
| Preserved | 1 | lb.“ |
| Bacon | 4 | oz. |
| Meat extract (part of iron ration) | 1 | oz.“ |
| Cheese | 3 | oz.“ |
| Fresh Vegetables, when available | 8 | oz.“ |
| Or peas, or beans, or potatoes, dried | 2 | oz.“ |
| Tea | ⅝ | oz.“ |
| Jam | 4 | oz.“ |
| Sugar | 3 | oz.“ |
| Salt | ½ | oz.“ |
| Mustard | 1⁄20 | oz.“ |
| Pepper | 1⁄35 | oz.“ |
| Limejuice | 1⁄320 | gal. |
| Rum[1] | 1⁄64 | gal.“ |
| Tobacco | 2 oz. a week. | |
This ration undoubtedly gave universal satisfaction. The only improvement that it contained over that supplied to troops in S. Africa was the addition of the 4 oz. of bacon and 3 oz. cheese; but the really great improvement was that the quality was invariably well maintained, and the soldier received the same with the utmost regularity.
During the last week in July 1914, the officers who were earmarked for the command of the eight great supply depots in the United Kingdom attended at the War Office under instructions which had been issued some few weeks earlier, and before the imminence of the outbreak of the war had ever occurred to anyone, in order that as a precautionary measure they might receive some general instructions as to the new method of feeding the army on mobilization, and in order that they might then visit the actual spot where they would be employed in the event of the necessity arising, so as to be thoroughly au fait with the whole position so far as they were concerned. This visit to the War Office was certainly well-timed, so that after the whole of their duties had been fully explained to them by Gen. Long, they at once proceeded to their war stations, and as a consequence, on Aug. 4 1914, they had already had some few days to work out their preparations locally.
On Aug. 5, so perfect were the supply arrangements, that many trains had already been loaded and were on their way to Newhaven; the necessary Supply Officers and personnel crossed on that day to France; and on Aug. 6, two days after the declaration of war, British supply ships were already steaming across the Channel, actually preceding the troops by some hours.
The Director of Supplies, Expeditionary Force, attended at the War Office the day following the declaration of war, when he received not only printed instructions, which had been most carefully prepared as regards his own duties, but copies of instructions for Supply Officers of base depots, rail depots, advance depots and for all Supply Officers doing duty with formations.
From the moment the Expeditionary Force left, the Director of Supplies Overseas was in close daily correspondence with the Director of Supplies at the War Office, so that, as a matter of fact, the latter officer kept his hand upon the feeding of the army down to the very smallest particular.
Under a good system it is comparatively easy to maintain an army when it is victoriously advancing, but the great test of war is the maintenance of an army in retreat. If proof were ever needed as to the perfection of the supply arrangements, it is in the fact that during the British retreat to the Marne, so far as the official records go, there was only one occasion when a division went a day without its food, and was compelled to fall back on the emergency ration, consisting of 1-lb. tin of preserved meat, 1 Ib. biscuit done up in a small linen bag and a grocery ration, and even on the one occasion when the division missed its daily supply of full rations, it was not the fault of the Supply Units of the Formation, but owing to bad staff work, as it was subsequently found that there were supply columns looking for this division on its right, on its left and even between it and the advancing Germans. When the forces in France were joined by divisions of native troops from India, there was a breakdown of the Indian Military Supply system; the War Office took up the duties, and never in its history had native troops been so well fed and looked after.
When it became necessary to send an expedition to the Dardanelles, and later on to Salonika, then to E. Africa, the supply system was expanded to meet requirements with apparent ease. The system, as laid down and provided for, continued in existence throughout the whole war in all theatres of operations, with the exception of Mesopotamia, which was under the Indian Government, and which, as is well known, hopelessly broke down; whereas Gen. Long's system remained in force from start to finish with but the very slightest modifications.
The business of supply being officially part of the quartermaster-general's department, at the head of which, during the World War, was the late Gen. Sir John Cowans, it must be recollected that, so far as the Expeditionary Force was concerned, Gen. Long's proposals had been agreed to during the earlier period when Gen. Sir Herbert Miles was quartermaster-general. As regards the general regulations for supply mobilization introduced by Gen. Long in 1913, Sir John Cowans was then quartermaster-general, but it is only right to say that there was not a single detail of the work which originated from him, and the greater bulk of it was carried through without even his knowing exactly what was being done. There are War Office minutes in existence, in which Gen. Cowans himself acknowledged that, so far as the supply system was concerned, during the first 20 months of the war—at the end of which Gen. Long, knowing that it was running smoothly, left the War Office—he had never in any way interfered therewith.
- ↑ At discretion of G.O.C. on recommendation of medical officer.
