with other communities. Any insignificant local incident may
then be the occasion of unbridled widespread agitation and
possibly disturbances of the peace. In 1913 the removal by the
Cawnpore municipal board of a building claimed by the Mahom-
medans to belong to a mosque was taken by them as an insult to
their faith and led to a serious riot (Aug. 3 1913). This was
followed by bitter press attacks on the Government for its
anti-Mahommedan policy. Lord Hardinge, to allay an agitation
which was growing serious, made an earnest appeal in his
Legislative Council (Sept. 17 1913) to Indian Mahommedans to
cultivate sanity of judgment and self-restraint and to rely on the
good-will of the British Government towards Turkey, and himself
visiting Cawnpore brought about a settlement over the heads of
the local authorities. This exceptional step may be held to have
justified itself by the appeasement that followed. The restora-
tion of peace in the Balkans further relaxed the tension. From
then onwards until the World War the state of Mahommedan
feeling in India gave little cause for anxiety.
The World War: India's E/ort.On the outbreak of the World War in Aug. 1914 Lord Hardinge's administration entered upon the third stage. He had won great popularity. The country as a whole was exceedingly quiet. Relations with Afghanistan and the frontier tribes were .good. The magnificent response made by India to the needs of the Empire is a matter of world history. " Nothing has moved me more," ran the King-Emperor's message delivered by the Viceroy to the Legislative Council on Sept. 8 1914, " than the passionate devotion to my throne expressed both by my Indian and English subjects and by feudatory princes and chiefs of India, and their prodigal offers of their lives and their resources in the cause of the realm." On the motion of an Indian member the Council unanimously affirmed their unswerving loyalty, promised unflinching support to the British Government, and offered on behalf of the people of India to share in the cost of the war. The Council reflected the general attitude of the country. In the hour of stress the deep-root edness of the British connexion and its indispensability to the safety of India were clearly realized. All thinking Indians saw that in this matter British and Indian interests were identical. The political leaders instinctively suspended their controversies with the Government and gave it their support. The martial classes eagerly responded to the call to arms. From the rulers of native states lavish offers of help poured in. They were recounted in the Viceroy 's telegram to the Secretary of State, dated Sept. 7 1914, which was read in both Houses of Parliament and circulated throughout the Empire. As a wonderful demonstration of loy- alty and generosity, its effect on popular feeling was immense.
With this confidence and enthusiasm were mingled some alarm and bewilderment. Trade came to a standstill. There were runs on the banks, withdrawals of deposits, encashment of currency notes and hoarding of coin. Timid Marwari traders of Calcutta closed their businesses and fled to Rajputana. In the remoter districts rumours of the collapse of the British raj disturbed the countryside. The Mahommedan peasantry in the Jhang district and in adjoining districts of the south-western Punjab raided and.burnt the houses of Hindus and moneylenders, and military force was required to restore order. In Bengal the revolutionary societies redoubled their criminal activities. In San Francisco and Vancouver an Indian revolution was openly preached to the Sikhs settled there, and numbers of them were incited to return to the Punjab to take part in a general rising. Their designs were detected, their plots to seize arsenals and tamper with the troops were frustrated, and a formidable con- spiracy was broken up by a vigilant local government having behind it the goodwill and help of the rural population. But for some months the Punjab was disturbed by murders, dacoities, and robberies and the reckless use of arms and explosives.
In India as a whole the situation was so satisfactory that the Indian Government was able to denude itself freely of its mili- tary resources to meet the insatiable demands of the home Government for troops and war material. Most of the British troops, the flower of the Indian army, the best of the artillery, and large quantities of ammunition were despatched to France
and other theatres of war. In Sept. 1914 a force of 70,0x30 men was sent to France. By the end of 1915 India's contribution amounted to nearly 80,000 British and 210,000 Indian officers and men. At one time the original British garrison was reduced to only 15,000 men. These were gradually supplemented by territorial and garrison troops from home, but throughout the war the British element in the army in India was dangerously below the defensive needs of the country. The expeditionary forces sent from India to France, Gallipoli, Egypt and East Africa passed on arrival to the control of the home Government, and the responsibility of the Indian Government for them was thereupon confined to replacing losses by fresh drafts and providing supplies.
Mesopotamian Expedition. It was otherwise with the ex- pedition sent to Mesopotamia. Until the spring of 1916 the home Government, though it initiated the expedition and directed the policy, left the control and management to the Government of India. In the judgment of the Mesopotamia Commission, this division of responsibility was unfortunate. The expedition at first had a very limited objective. It was sent to occupy Basra in the event of Turkey declaring war. Its scope was gradually enlarged and the strength of the force increased until by Sept. 1915 a series of successes brought it within striking distance of Bagdad. The circumstances in which Sir John Nixon sought and obtained permission to advance on Bagdad, the failure of the attack on the Turkish position at Ctesiphon, the disastrous retreat on Kut el Amara, and the capitulation of the besieged British force on April 29 1916 are narrated in the report of the Mesopotamian Commission. The report reflected severely on the Indian authorities and on the organization and equipment of the army in India, on the Secretary of State and his Advisers and on the Cabinet. But by the time the report was published (May 17 1917) Lord Hardinge was no longer Viceroy, the early defects of the expedition had been repaired, a series of defeats inflicted on the Turks, and Bagdad captured by Sir Stanley Maude. The inquiry had therefore no effect and was barren of results.
The entrance of Turkey into the war placed Indian Mahom- medans in a difficult position; but along with the rest of India they loyally rallied to the side of the Crown. Against a few prominent agitators only was it necessary to take action. The premier Mahommedan prince, the Nizam of Hyderabad, and the Begum of Bhopal, in addresses to their co-religionists, effectively stated the British case and exposed the falsity of the pretexts by which Enver Bey and his associates sought to justify the entrance of Turkey into the war. These addresses, and a declaration by the Government of India as to its attitude towards Islam in general and the Holy Places in particular, served greatly to maintain tranquillity.
War Measures of Indian Government. Among the many other important matters arising out of the war during Lord Hardinge's Government the following may be noted:
(l) Recruitment. The pre-war recruitment for the Indian army, which is on a voluntary basis, was about 15,000 men a year. In order to meet the needs of the armies in the field and to keep the units in India up to strength it had to be increased eightfold. The "task proved one of increasing difficulty, and required the closest cooperation between the military and civil authorities and the loyal support of the landowning classes. The races and castes from which serviceable recruits could be drawn were an insignificant minority of the vast population. Before long the Punjab, which furnished 50% of the fighting forces, showed signs of over-recruiting. (2) Supply of Stores and Munitions. India served as the basis of supplies for the Mesopotamian forehand for Indian troops employed elsewhere. It also furnished to the Allies essential materials of which they stood in need. The low development of Indian industries made State assistance and supervision, and in some cases control necessary. At a later stage Lord Chelmsford set up a central Muni- tions Board with branches in all provinces. It effected great econo- mies and did much to encourage the manufacture of supplies that formerly could only be obtained from abroad. (3) Regulation of Prices and Control of Export. Measures were taken to moderate the high prices of food grains, which were causing much distress and discontent among the poorer classes, and to prevent hoarding and profiteering. The Government obtained powers by Ordinance to take possession of stocks unreasonably withheld from the market. Private exports of wheat were prohibited, but the Government arranged to purchase for the United Kingdom considerable quantities
