the Secretary of State, a potent cause of friction and misunderstand-
ing between India and England will be removed.
A similar rule should, the committee considered, regulate the relations of the Government of India to provincial Governments so far as reserved subjects are concerned. Where the provincial Government and Legislature are in agreement, their view should ordinarily be allowed to prevail. Over transferred subjects the con- trol of the governor-general should be restricted within the nar- rowest possible limits.
Lastly, the committee recommended that during the next ten years no changes of substance should be made in the constitution. At the end of that period the working of the constitution should be examined by a statutory commission. They suggested the appoint- ment of a financial commission to advise as to the principle on which contributions from the provincial Governments to the central Government should be adjusted. They attached the greatest im- portance to the formation in each province of a strong department of finance which would serve both sides of the Government alike. They ended a notable report by an emphatic repudiation of the suggestion that the proposed constitutional changes implied any condemnation of the present system of Government in India.
Government of India Act, igig. The bill on which the Joint Committee reported became law as The Government of India Act, 1919. It takes the form of amendments of the Government of India Act, and has been so drafted as to admit of being textu- ally incorporated into the principal Act. Its provisions are best studied in the Act of 1915 as now amended. As is usual with statutes relating to India, it left a great deal of the new constitu- tion to be worked out by rules. In indicating in their report the lines which the rules should follow, and subsequently when rules had been made by the Government of India and had been laid before Parliament by the Secretary of State in examining and reporting on them, the Joint Select Committee have largely controlled the ultimate form of the new constitution.
" Dyarchy." The distinctive feature of the new constitutional system is the introduction of dual government or " dyarchy " into the major provinces. But preparatory to that two other steps required to be taken. In the three provinces known as Presidencies the form of government was that of a governor in council. The new system necessitated that the provinces known as the United Provinces, the Punjab, Bihar and Orissa, the Central Provinces, and Assam, which had hitherto been governed by lieutenant-governors or chief commissioners, should be raised to the position of " Governor's Provinces " and given each a governor in council.
In making this change the Act altered in one particular the com- position of provincial executive councils. The maximum number of members is retained at four, but only one member (instead of two) must have been in the service of the Crown. Burma, the remaining major province, was left a lieutenant-governorship until a constitu- tibn adapted to its special needs could be devised. In the next place it was necessary to secure to the provinces a larger measure of in- dependence of the central Government and a more assured field of action. Though in practice they enjoyed considerable freedom in the management of their domestic affairs, the Government of India, in virtue of their statutory right of control and intervention and con- current powers of legislation, were always able, and were frequently compelled by their responsibility to the home authorities, to exercise powers both executive and legislative that cut across the considered action of the local Government. The same was the case with regard to provincial finance. The local Governments in practice were assigned by the central Government a very considerable share of the general revenues of India, but the main sources of the provincial income were not under their sole control and they were in theory little more than collecting and disbursing agents of the Government of India. They could not raise loans for provincial objects or impose additional taxation. The Act of 1919 does not in express terms enlarge the autonomy of provincial Governments, but it gives ample power to make statutory rules to that end and indicates the matters for which any such rules should make provision. This power has been exercised. The functions of the provincial Governments have been demarcated from those of the central Government by means of classified lists of " central " and provincial subjects. Some ac- count of the contents of these lists has already been given.
The provincial Governments have been allotted their own sources of revenue, the principle on which the allocation has been made being that revenues accruing in respect to subjects provincially ad- ministered go to the provincial Governments. Receipts on account of land revenue, stamps, excise, forests, belong to this category. The central Government by this arrangement loses the share of these revenues which it hitherto received , with the result that the revenues accruing in respect of subjects (such as customs, income tax, salt, opium) which it itself administers are insufficient for its requirements.
The provinces are therefore required to contribute annually fixed sums to the central Government, amounting in the aggregate to 983 lakhs (about 6,500,000). It is hoped that in time the central Govern- ment may be able to reduce, and possibly to remit altogether, these contributions. The provincial Governments are required to bank with the central Government. In cases of emergency a provincial Government may be required by the central Government, with the sanction of and on conditions approved by the Secretary of State, to pay to the central Government a contribution in excess of the prescribed amount. The central Government has also power in an emergency to require a provincial Government to reduce temporarily its drawings on its balances. Each province is also re- quired to maintain a famine fund of a prescribed amount. Subject to these exceptions and to the obtaining the sanction of the Secretary of State to certain classes of expenditure, the provincial Govern- ments may expend their revenues and balances as they think fit. They may also raise loans for certain specified purposes and on prescribed conditions on the security of provincial revenues. With regard to taxation certain taxes are scheduled which a provincial Legislative Council may impose by law without the previous sanction of the central Government.
Constitution of Provincial Governments. The field of pro- vincial autonomy having thus been demarcated and enlarged, the Act proceeds to introduce responsible government in an elementary and tentative form into the administration. It provides for the appointment by the governor of ministers, who must not be officials and who must be elected members of the Legislative Councils, to administer " transferred" subjects and to hold office during his pleasure; and it directs that ordinarily the governor shall be guided by their advice. The Act leaves it to rules to determine what "provincial" subjects shall be transferred to the administration of the governor acting with ministers, to regulate the extent and conditions of such transfer and to provide for the allocation of revenues or moneys for the purpose of such administration. Under this rule-making power an elaborate division of the functions of provincial Government into "reserved" subjects, which are administered by the governor in his executive council, and "transferred" subjects which are administered by the governor acting with ministers, has been made. Mention has been already made of the subjects placed respectively into the two categories. Law and order, administration of justice, police, are, as might be expected, among the reserved subjects. Of the subjects transferred to unofficial control education is perhaps the most critical. The rules with regard to the allocation of provincial revenues and balances as between reserved and transferred services adopt the "joint purse " plan recommended by the joint committees. Other rules create in each provincial Government a finance department and assign to it duties analogous to those discharged by the Treasury in England. It is controlled by a member of the executive council. It is responsible for seeing that proper finan- cial rules are framed and suitable accounts kept, it prepares the estimates, examines and reports on all proposals for the increase or reduction of taxation, lays the audit and appropriation reports before the public accounts committee, and generally acts as the financial conscience of the administration.
A minister holds office during the pleasure of the governor. In administering his department he is responsible to and should command the support of the Legislative Council. If he should fail to command it, he may see fit to resign, or the governor may replace him. The salary of a minister is the same as that of a member of the executive council, unless a smaller salary is fixed by vote of the Legislative Council. The number of ministers is at the discretion of the governor, but will probably vary from two to four. The ministers will be encouraged to act together as a ministry and also, as far as possible, in consultation and harmony with the official half of the Government, that is, the executive council. But each half is solely responsible for decisions on the subjects administered by it. The orders and proceedings of each part of the Government run in the name of the Govern- ment but also indicate from which part they emanate. In the Legislative Council one part of the Government is not bound to support the other by speech or vote, but should not oppose.
Provincial Legislative Councils. The new Legislative Councils are more than double the size of the late Councils and have a much larger majority of elected members. The method of election is
