infected by the contagion of excitement are so ineffectual that they heighten the defenders' moral, particularly when he sees his own machine-guns being more accurately employed.
The British army suffered less than others from reactions towards greater density of formations, because on the one hand it thought in terms of limited numbers whilst on the other it was constantly engaged in small wars and expeditions. Its members had less occasion for the effects of fire to fade from their memories. Nevertheless even in the British army during intervals of peace denser formations were adopted. The national bane was that of lines themselves, rather than of dense ones in particular. It was hardly till the middle of the World War that it was realized how slow of movement were the dense waves. Lines require long pauses to restore their dressing unless they are to dissolve in dis- order. Moreover, every infantry unit was trained to wait for its neighbour and avoid an exposed flank! Consequently the pace of the line became the pace of its slowest unit. The rolling bar- rage was often lost merely because one unit detained all the rest. But at last, instead of lines, platoons were utilized in depth, each part under the thumb of its own leader. Some control was thus retained, some cover turned to account and the section pressed forward without waiting to keep pace with others. Above all, it outflanked. It is to human nature, however, that the chief credit for introducing this power of manceuvre should be ascribed. The effects of fire enforced dispersion and wide intervals be- tween men, but it was poor human nature, feeling lonely and leaderless as a single peg in a long row, which instinctively sought companions and a leader and grouped itself with comrades under the nearest N.C.O. This it has always done, because it is human nature so to do whenever the unnatural mechanism of ranked lines breaks down under aimed fire.
The value of personal example which subdues fear is applicable only to a handful of men who feel the direct influence of a leader. They sense that they are under his eye and known to him per- sonally, and that any wavering will be remembered against them. Thus the group, if it is to have value, must be limited to some half-dozen men. In the turmoil of modern war small groups, not big ones, will keep together. Then each man yields to the leader's power of sweeping him on. Moreover each little group needs to form part of a team, to feel itself supported on its flanks and behind by similar groups acting in unison. Hence the importance of the platoon the tactical unit of battle to-day. For in battle men need some rock to which to hold fast the artilleryman has his gun, the aviator his aeroplane, infantry its platoon commander.
Human nature conquered the line formation before its break- ing up was officially sanctioned. Tradition held fast to her pre- war habit, but the need for a control which could not be obtained with the extended line helped to breach the ramparts of ortho- doxy. The group attained its final and complete recognition after its success against the German " pill-box " defence, in the dreary wastes of the Ypres salient in the autumn of 1917. Also the Germans in their 1918 offensive deliberately trained their infantry in similar groups with orders to penetrate everywhere by infiltration. British dispersion, enforced by new weapons and human nature, rendered penetration possible by attacking in- fantry groups termed "sections" in the British army between the posts or machine-gun " nests " of the defenders. By exploit- ing every initial penetration by sections and platoons, the com- mander on the spot attacked in front and flank simultaneously such posts of the enemy as opposed him in his own sector. This newly acquired power of manceuvre restored to infantry the master-key of victory, and retains for it still the role of " Queen of Battles " which the old stereotyped tactics were rapidly losing.
Infantry action in battle no longer resembles a wasteful bludgeon-fight or an incursion of the camp followers of other arms. It engages in a test of skill, a manreuvre combat in which is fulfilled the principle of surprise by striking from an unexpec- ted direction against an unguarded spot namely, the flank ex- posed by infiltration into the crevices of the defensive position. Its training should therefore be correspondingly perfected, on the basis of a doctrine of fire tactics founded upon penetration and manceuvre as exemplified in 1918.
The Principles of Manceuvre. The outstanding lesson gained from the new-won possession of infantry units the power of manoeuvre is that correct tactics can now be based on the fun- damental principles which govern the action of other independent bodies which manceuvre. The platoon is no longer fixed in a segment of the machine of battle, but is an independent moving part fighting its own small action. The principles upon which it fights may be compared to those which actuate a single indi- vidual engaged in a free fight with another man. As a personal combat is understood by all, whereas war is intelligible only to a few, let us for a moment examine the simplest form of fighting, promising that, owing to the concealment of the enemy and the " fog of war," the fight which typifies the infantry fire-fight is that between two men in the dark, wherein a man can only locate his enemy and find his way to his vital spot by actually touching and feeling him. In the first place a man in the dark must seek his enemy. To do this he will stretch out one arm to grope for him, keeping it supple and ready to guard himself from surprise. This may be termed the principle of the " protective formation." When his outstretched arm touches his enemy, he would rapidly feel his way to a vulnerable spot such as the latter's throat. This is the principle of " reconnaissance." The man would then seize his enemy firmly by the throat, holding him at arm's length so that the latter could neither strike back effectively nor wriggle away to avoid or parry a blow. This is the principle of " fixing." Then while his enemy's attention is absorbed by the menacing hand at his throat, with his other fist the man strikes his oppo- nent from an unexpected direction in an unguarded spot, de- livering out of the dark a knock-out blow. This illustrates the principle of " decisive manceuvre." Before his enemy can re- cover, the man follows up his advantage by rendering him power- less. This is the principle of immediate " exploitation " of success. To adopt for fire tactics these simple principles may prove a sure guide to local victory.
Protective Formation. Owing to the dispersion and conceal- ment necessitated by the deadliness of modern weapons, attack- ing infantry can only locate the enemy posts immediately in their path by actual attack touching and feeling them as did the man in the dark. Like him therefore, the infantry unit moves during the " approach march " and attacks with a portion the outstretched arm pushed ahead in the direction of the enemy. This portion is usually termed the advanced guard or forward body. The remainder of the unit, termed the main body or sup- port, follows close behind, ready to manceuvre, and by its mere presence protecting the flanks of the forward body. Hence if we speak of it as the " manceuvre body " its functions explain them- selves. To diminish the possibilities of surprise and loss from hostile fire, the platoon or company moves in a formation re- sembling a diamond or square, of which its sections form the points. The fire or fighting sections no longer move in an extended line. Instead each advances in the form of an arrowhead or in open file or single file with the section commander at the head, so that he may control and lead amid the noise and confusion of battle. To do this correctly he must be trained in peace-time or he will lose his platoon.
Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance is carried out by moving with scouts ahead, but within touch, in order, like the man in the dark, to touch and feel the enemy. It is their role to discover the best approach, to give timely warning of the enemy's nearness and to prevent the unit coming under surprise fire. All this may be done even in a set-piece attack behind a rolling barrage.
Fixing. The forward infantry press on unceasingly in order to find and penetrate any weak spots in his defence and to advance to the objectives assigned to them. If the forward body of a pla- toon is checked by an enemy post, it fixes it firmly by fire so that the enemy's attention is absorbed " by a menacing hand at his throat " whilst the manceuvre body works round his flank to deliver a surprise blow. This act of fixing can best be achieved by a combination of fire with movement. There must be the threat of the forward spring in order to fix the enemy's attention. Fire alone, from the hastily chosen halting places of an attacker, cannot be relied on to absorb the whole attention of a defender
