fitful mood of rebellion; the Siberian situation was far from being tranquil. Japan's natural path of aspirations was beset with sus- picions and misunderstandings. Never before in Japan's diplo- matic history was she burdened with weightier responsibilities.
Manchurian Question. Prior to the outbreak of the Russo- Japanese War, the growing international rivalry for spheres of influence in the Chinese Empire had convinced the interested Powers of the necessity of establishing the policy of the " open door " and equal opportunities for commerce and trade in that country. That principle was from time to time enunciated by Great Britain in the latter decades of the loth century, but it was reserved to Mr. John Hay, Secretary of State under President McKinley's administration, to make its definite pronouncement to the world. In Secretary Hay's Circular Note addressed to various Powers under date of July 3 1900, it was declared that the policy of the United States was to assure permanent safety and peace to China, to preserve Chinese territorial and adminis- trative entity, to protect all rights guaranteed to friendly Powers by treaty and international law, and to safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Empire. The doctrine was accepted in principle by Japan, Great Britain, Russia, France and Germany. Japan went so far as to conclude specific agreements for its execution with Rus- sia (July 30 1907) and France (June 6 1907). It was, however, understood that the spheres of influence already established Great Britain in the Yangtsze valley, Tibet, and Weihaiwei; Germany in Kiaochow; Russia in Manchuria and Mongolia; France in Yunnan were not to be prejudiced by the newly professed principle of commercial impartiality.
The Russo-Japanese War brought about the tenure by Japan in S. Manchuria of a similar position to that which the great Western Powers had held in other parts of China. But " because Manchuria had been the scene of the greatest war of modern times," the world's eye became fixed upon every act of Japan in that region in "an exceptionally rigorous scrutiny " and " the nations behaved as though they expected her to live up to a standard of almost ideal altitude." Meanwhile, China, for her part, fell into a mood of impatient irritation on account of the presumed encroachments upon her sovereignty, and the " rights- recovery campaign," clamorously conducted throughout that Empire, somewhat strained her relations with Japan in the early part of 1909 in respect of various questions in Manchuria. How- ever, in Aug. of that year, a series of agreements was reached between the two States by which all those outstanding problems were composed. Among the rest, Chinese sovereignty over Chientao was confirmed, and arrangements about railways, in- cluding that of the Antung-Mukden line, were effected.
From out of the blue, there came from America a proposal for the neutralization of the Manchurian railways in Jan. 1910. In the view of Mr. Philander C. Knox, Secretary of State, that was best calculated to further the principle of the " open door " by putting an end to the abnormal conditions obtaining in Manchu- ria. But Russia and Japan could not accede to the scheme, on the grounds that their established rights and interests ought to be respected and that they were by no means threatening the Chinese sovereignty or the " open door " principle. Great Brit- ain kept aloof, declaring that the question should be settled among the immediately interested Powers, namely, China, Japan and Russia. Nor was the proposal to the taste of China, who regarded it as a further encroachment upon her sovereignty. She replied that her treaty obligations with Japan and Russia precluded her from supporting the American idea. And the proposal fell through. Meanwhile, the Russo-Japanese negotia- tions as to their future attitude in Manchuria and Mongolia came to a satisfactory conclusion and a steadying element was added to the situation in the Far East in the form of an agreement be- tween Japan and Russia, signed at St. Petersburg on July 4 1910, under which they pledged themselves to maintain the status quo in Manchuria and to abstain from any unfriendly competition in the development of that region. The Russo-Japanese rapproche- ment was further solidified, in view of the World War, by the Convention of July 3 1916, which provided that each of the two
countries would not become a party to " any political arrange- ment or combination " directed against the other and that they would take counsel together for the necessary measures, " should the territorial rights or the special interests in the Far East of one of the High Contracting Parties be threatened." The agree- ment made greatly for the maintenance of good order in the Orient until the Russian Revolution brought about the drastic change of the whole situation.
Annexation of Korea. Japan had waged two wars, one against China and the other against Russia, in order to prevent Korea from becoming " a dagger pointed against Japan's heart." In June 1905 she established a protectorate over the Hermit King- dom so as to put a definite end to the wayward and suicidal diplo- macy of the Seoul courtiers, but the whole peninsula could not be cleansed of its inveterate political and social iniquities. The hopelessness of real reform under the existing regime had become manifest ; and the assassination of Prince Ito by a Korean, in Oct. 1909, was the climax.
The Tokyo Government thus came to the conclusion that " the responsibilities devolving upon Japan for the due adminis- tration of the country (Korea) cannot be justly fulfilled without the complete annexation of Korea to the Empire." The fusion was accomplished by a treaty concluded between the Govern- ments of Japan and Korea on Aug. 22 1910. It vvas decided that the ancient name of Chosen should be revived in lieu of Tai-Han and in future be officially used. Under the terms of the treaty, the Korean Imperial House was assured of high honours and dignities as well as a liberal grant for maintenance. Japan, at the same time, notified the foreign Powers concerned that their treaties with Korea, including those of extra-territoriality, were all annulled; but that, nevertheless, their vested rights and interests would be fully respected; that the tariffs in force in Korea would be maintained for 10 years; that cabotage would be permitted to foreign vessels for the same period; and that the port of Masanpo would be closed for naval reasons, but Shin Wiju or Gishu would be added to the open commercial ports.
The Anglo- Japanese Alliance. The general changes of situa- tion in the Orient after the Russo-Japanese War, notably the annexation of Korea to the Japanese Empire in 1910, impelled the British and the Japanese Governments to revise the Agree- ment of Alliance concluded in 1905. The negotiations in London between Sir Edward (afterward Visct.) Grey and Baron (after- ward Visct.) T. Kato ended in the renewal of the Alliance on July 13 1911. The important feature of the new agreement was the inclusion of an Article exempting either high contracting par- ty from the obligation to come to the armed assistance of the other when a general arbitration treaty was concluded between that other Power and a third party (Art. IV.). At that particular time a treaty of such a description was under negotiation be- tween the British and the American Governments, and it was with the particular object of excluding the United States from the application of the Alliance that Art. IV. was inserted. The proposed general arbitration treaty, however, failed to obtain the consent of the American Senate for its ratification, but the British and the Japanese Governments undertook on several occasions to make it clear that the spirit in which the Article was conceived had not on that account been altered in the least. The Alliance of 1911 was to last for 10 years, and, in the absence of a year's notice from either contracting party to terminate the agreement, it would automatically continue in existence, even after July 1921, until such denouncement was made. The World War, into which Japan readily entered on account of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, ended with the Treaty of Versailles which brought forth the League of Nations. The question was then mooted, though more academically than politically, whether the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would not be in contravention with the letter of the Covenant of the League, and on July 8 1920 the two high contracting parties addressed a joint note to the Secretary- General of the League to the purport that the Agreement of Alliance would in case of its renewal be made to conform to the Covenant in its form. The renewal of the Alliance was discussed at the British Imperial Conference in London in June 1921; and
