The 10th Cav. Div., encamped on the extreme right wing, was in the early morning hours surprised and routed. Gen. Schemua's attack, on the contrary, was carried out according to pro- gramme, and his group succeeded, by evening, in throwing back the whole of the XXV. Russian Corps beyond Zamosc, some portions of it being put to flight. A large number of prisoners and 20 guns, including some heavy pieces, were left in the hands of the Austro-Hungarians.
The combined attack on the right wing of the XIX. Russian Corps, however, met with no success, and its chances became smaller in proportion as the enemy fronts visibly gained by reen- forcements. Airmen's reports confirmed the approach of an enemy corps (the XVII.) from Grubieszow (Hyubieszow) and Krylow and also the direct approach from the N. (in the direction of Chelm) of enemy forces on all the lines of communication. These proved later to be the troops of the V. and XIII. Russian Corps. By evening on the same day the Austro-Hungarian isth Div. (VI. Corps) had after a short fight reached the neighbour- hood of Laszczow (Pukarzow). Acting on these various reports, the Command of the IV. Army ordered the right wing (in particu- lar the i sth Div.) to bend backwards and take up a frontal posi- tion to the N.E. on the line Laszczow-Posadow. This was done partly to enable the advancing group (Archduke Joseph Ferdi- nand's ipth Div.) to deliver a blow at the enemy's flank and rear.
But the day of Aug. 28 began with a surprise attack at dawn on the i sth Infantry Div., which was massed in the narrow space near Pukarzow. After a short and costly battle, in which the divisional commander and the chief of the general staff were killed, the division was routed and in its flight westward lost the greater part of its artillery irretrievably in a swamp. The enemy pursued, and came up with the flank and rear of the 27th Infan- try Div., but their progress was checked by the vigorous inter- vention of a brigadier, the position saved and the shattered remnants of the i5th Div. reassembled at Tomaszow. On other parts of the front the day was spent in fruitless fighting, though the enemy was at least prevented from breaking through, from the concentration area at Tarnawatka, by the now reassembled 26th Div., which unfortunately suffered heavy losses in the process. Certain portions of the II. Corps followed the enemy in his retreat northward, while others joined in the fighting on the I. Army's right wing; but the main body of the corps remained concentrated round Zamosc.
All these varying incidents notwithstanding, the fact re- mained that the IV. Army with all its groups had been brought up for the purpose of a uniform attack, and during the evening the Army Command issued orders for such an attack to be made by the whole army. This attack was based on the plan of battle drawn up on Aug. 25, in which the VI. Corps and the igth In- fantry Div. were to form the battle-front, while the IX. Corps (loth and 26th Divs.) was to envelop the enemy on the W. (especially in the Tarnawatka position) and the II. Corps to wheel from the N. on to the enemy's rear with two of its di- visions, using a third division (the 4th) to cover the manoeuvre. This cover in rear was to be made complete by the loth Cav. Div, which had been transferred from the I. Army to the IV. for the purpose. Lastly, the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's army group was to attack vigorously from the S. and to attempt an enveloping attack on the enemy's left flank. That is to say, there was to be a double enveloping attack by all portions of the IV. Army. On the evening of Aug. 28 reports had already come in of effective attacks by both the igth Div. and the Archduke's divisions. These were particularly valuable on ac- count of the surprising number of guns captured under fire, of which there were over fifty.
On August 29 this army group repeated its tactical successes and made a further ha'ul of 26 guns. But while the enemy was being continuously reenforced, the A-ustro-Hungarian troops, though fighting splendidly, were greatly exhausted by their marching and fighting achievements of the previous days, and therefore did not gain ground to the desired extent. As regards the remaining parts of the battle-front, the heavy persistent fighting in the area occupied by the XVII., VI. and IX. Corps
took on the character of a fixed battle broken by repeated enemy attacks, which were in particular directed against the reentrant formed by the VI. and IX. Corps. The intention was obviously to effect a breach in this joint and break up the IV. Army front. It did not succeed; but the battle was a very costly one, owing largely to the superiority of the Russian artillery, which in a stationary fire-fight made itself plainly felt. In the II. Corps the two divisions (i3th and 25th of Archduke Peter Ferdinand's army group), told off to attack in rear, commenced their wheel- ing manceuvres in a southerly direction. But their movements were not as rapid as could have been desired.
On the following day (Aug. 30), the fifth day of the battle, information came through from the Army Higher Command that according to an intercepted radiotelegram, a strong army body of the enemy's forces advancing from the E. had instructions to attack from Sokal the rear of the Austro-Hungarian right. This sounded unlikely, and in fact all that the IV. Army Com- mand did was to send the 6th Cav. Div. to the Solokija in the direction of Beiz (Belz). But undeniably the report, on becoming known (it penetrated also to the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's army group), did so far prejudice the advance that the desired wheel to the W. by this group did not take place. This was partly due, no doubt, to the fact that the enemy, realizing the magnitude of the danger which threatened him, reenforced his left wing more and more until he was able, the next day, actually to show once more a numerical superiority in artillery and this although 80 guns had been taken from him on this sector.
On this day, too, the XVII., VI. and IX. Corps fought some violent local battles on their own part of the front. The enemy confined himself this time to defensive tactics, in contrast to the two preceding days. From the N. a vehement blow was struck on the same day against the 4th Div. of the II. Corps by 2-2^ enemy divisions. But the troops of this division, reenforced by 3 Landwehr battalions, parried bravely all the thrusts of its more powerful enemy, who pushed forward as far as the Labunka, but, being apparently incapable of any further action, retired in the night of Aug. 31 in a northerly direction. The Archduke Peter Ferdinand's group (i3th and 25th Divs.) had now at last finished its wheel manoeuvre southwards, so that by the evening of the same day two divisions were able to deploy in rear of the enemy. One detachment on the left wing, commanded by Col. von Stohr, pushed forward as far as Perespa (on the Dub). On the same evening Gen. von Borocvic, commanding the VI. Corps, arranged for an attack to be delivered by the i5th Infantry Div. from the S. on the enemy position to the S. of Komarow. This attack, courageously executed and well prepared by concentric artillery fire, was successful. Large masses of the enemy (the XIX. and V. Corps) within the Komarow area were surrounded on three sides, the S., the W. and the North.
The enemy, being extremely brave, did not submit to his fate, but during the night of Aug. 31 concentrated 18-20 battalions and three battery groups with which to force a way of retreat, and meanwhile withdrew from the centre of his front detach- ments and also transport which were set to march along the Komarow-Tyszowice road in an easterly and later a northerly direction. Groups of infantry, artillery and army service corps from the Russian left army wing were similarly withdrawn and retreated towards Grubieszow and Krylow. Into the midst of these groups burst the 2nd Austro-Hungarian Div. after violent artillery preparation, and captured 20 guns. The reports of these actions on the enemy's line of retreat came in to the Army Com- mand in the course of the day (Aug. 31). On the morning of this day the attacking groups, mentioned above, which had been improvised on the Russian right wing, went forward against the Archduke Peter's front, which faced S., and subjected it to a rain of overwhelming artillery fire. But Col. von Stohr's detachment on the left wing still held the Russian outermost wing in a vice, even after the fire of a Cossack division in rear had made itself vigorously felt. Naturally the Austro-Hungarian gth Cav. Div., posted behind the Archduke Peter's front, found it hard to remain inactive. Moreover, the Archduke Peter had received a report early in the morning that an enemy column, three battalions
