strong, was approaching from the north. This report in no case a very alarming one was afterwards proved to be false, but it caused the group commander, already shaken by the powerful artillery fire, to order a retreat in other words a wheel to the west. This rearward wheel was carried out unmolested, but it opened to the enemy the line of retreat which had been com- pletely blocked. This was a tactical error which greatly influ- enced the outcome of the. battle. It was curious that, on both wings of the army, false reports of danger in the rear were able to upset a well-conceived scheme, one of which the greater part had already been put into effect, for surrounding the enemy.
The result of the fighting on Aug. 31 was the capture of Komarow, with the heavily fortified position on the heights around it and the repulse of the. enemy from all parts of the front except on the E. wing, where their strong position and very considerable forces enabled the Russians to cover the wheel and retreat of the army towards Chelm and Grubieszow. This wing maintained its position throughout Sept., when the pursuit was in full force along the remainder of the front, and in this way a series of rearguard actions took place. But during the night of Sept. 1-2 the last of the Russian detachments quitted the field, and fell back, in some cases in disorder, in the direction of Grubieszow.
The eight days' battle had ended in a complete victory for the Austro-Hungarian troops, but, owing to the events just described, the complete breakdown of the enemy, which was to be the out- come of the battle, did not follow. The number of guns captured was unusually large, amounting to 156, but very serious, too, were the losses suffered by the Austro-Hungarian troops, who had been almost entirely on the offensive, amounting in all to 40,000, including 8 generals and a number of senior officers.
With the Eastern Group (II. and III. Armies). In the mean- time events had taken a most unfortunate turn with the Eastern group of armies. At the beginning of operations the two great units, on forming up for deployment, had had about two infantry divisions available, to which were added six cavalry divisions that had been pushed forward up to and beyond the frontier of the empire. Since the middle of Aug. these mounted troops had been in sharp contact with the enemy's cavalry masses, which were being followed by infantry, and sections of the Austro- Hungarian cavalry at times took refuge between the heads of their own infantry division.
The task allotted to the two armies was, as has been stated, to hold off " by offensive operations " the enemy forces advancing from the E. until the I. and IV. Armies should have delivered their blow. This task was no easy one, since the enemy would obviously be in a position to develop a considerable superiority, particularly as two corps (the IV. and VII.) were still rolling up. The problem could be solved either offensively or defensively. The argument for the offensive was that the greater the space won towards the E. by these two covering armies, the greater would be the security of the two attacking armies (I. and IV.). The disadvantage it involved was the distance which the columns would put between themselves and the troops still on the way to the front in proportion as they pushed forward to the east. Above all there was the danger of the Austro-Hungarian troops being drawn into decisive battles against a more powerful enemy with practically no chance of success. If, on the other hand, a solution was sought in the defensive, a tactical advantage could be drawn from the excellent defensive fronts offered by the many parallel sectional lines (deep-cut streams and rivers) which traverse the Podolian land ridges, E. of Lemberg. These fronts were particu- larly suited to long-drawn-out battles, especially against an enemy inclined to be clumsy in attack, as the Russians undoubtedly were. But the Army Higher Command decided to solve the problem offensively, and the two armies (the III., XI. and XII. Corps and 2 Landwehr divisions) with a strength of 2 infantry divisions began their eastward advance on Aug. 24 accordingly. From the 26th onwards there was violent fighting on the Zlota Lipa and .at Zloczow. The Russians settled down at once in typical fashion to a defensive action, while the Austro^Hun- garians for their part failed to make their attack uniform along
the whole front. With such unfavourable tactical and numerical conditions, no amount of bravery could bring success, and both armies were forced to retreat on the evening of the 27th. But the retreat was checked at the Gnila Lipa after a day's march, and on Aug. 29 and 30 violent battles again took place at Glyn- jany, Przemyslany, and Bobrka. Here the VII. Corps, which had now been brought up, took part, but still no success was achieved. The losses were very heavy, especially in the XII. Corps (Gen. von Kb'vess), which lost nearly all its artillery. At the last mo- ment the Army Higher Command decided to give up the attempt to advance, to abandon Lemberg and the Dniester bridgehead at Mikolajow, and to withdraw the two armies behind the line of the Wereszyca. During these battles the Russians, after repulsing the attacks, had aimed especially at throwing their weight on to the Austro-Hungarian weak left wing, and thus to carry out an enveloping movement. This was in fact only possible after the crossing of the Bug basin, E. of Lemberg.
The costly fighting waged by the two covering armies had at least gained the time needed by the other armies (the I. and IV.) for their blow, but this object might have been attained by far less costly means. Eleven infantry divisions, reenforced by successive bodies of troops from the rear up to fifteen divisions, would, if placed in a strong defensive position on the Gnila Lipa, for instance have been able to offer a resistance which the Russians could not have broken without heavy sacrifices. These battles to the E. of Lemberg provided in fact the clearest possible illustration of the exaggeration of the offensive principle. They weakened considerably the fighting power of the troops, and the fact that they were able to take part in a leading battle a few days later only proved their excellent quality.
Operations Introductory to the Battle of Grodek-Rawa Ruska. After the close of these battles fronting eastwards, which coin- cided with the victory at Komarow, the Austro-Hungarian Army Higher Command was confronted with grave issues. It should be added that, although the battles fought by the I. Army in its advance on Lublin had had favourable and lasting results, the enemy's growing power of resistance was making itself felt. Two solutions of the problem were now possible: (a) To bring the II. and III. Armies once more into action and to let the IV. Army wheel against the N. flank of the Russian forces now pursuing the II. and III. Armies, thus bringing about a major decision in accordance with the proposed " Operation on the interior line "; (b) To withdraw all the armies to the now fully prepared line of the San, to defend this line and to seize any favourable oppor- tunity for renewing the attack.
As regards (a); this plan involved going on with the scheme of operations in accordance with the policy originally adopted, but at the same time ignoring the fact that one part of the prob- lem to be solved had already ended in failure. The Army Higher Command would also be bound to admit that the blow on the N., though successful, had not finally crushed the enemy. For the decisive moment that is, for the main battle, the I. Army would not be available at all and the IV. Army would be incomplete. For there was not, in the opinion of the Army Higher Command, much time to lose in other words, the initial operations must begin immediately. That being so, the IV. Army would have to give up the vigorous and effectual fighting pursuit of the defeated Russian army. And yet this was the one way in which this army could have been eliminated from the calculation for the time being. The topographical conditions for forcing a great tactical decision in the Grodek area were certainly favourable. A strong front might be formed protected by the line of the Wereszyca behind which the II. and III. Armies, unlucky up till now in their fighting, could receive such local reenforcements as would restore their full fighting power. But these conditions, again, were so obvious as to exclude any possible alternative plan of operations. To get into the right position for this, namely, " frontal defence on the part of the II. and III. Armies behind the Wereszyca, flank action and a blow from the N. on the part of the IV. Army," the IV. Army, at the close of the battle of Komarow, would have immediately ,to wheel and, to execute within a narrow .area a tricky manoeuvre such as only units specially trained in manceu-
