sians attacking from the N. (V. and XVIII. Russian Corps) both
the cavalry corps were brought into action. Although these
were units which had been greatly exhausted in the course of the
operations, they succeeded, with the help of the rearguard of
the XVII. and IX. Corps, in holding off the not very strong
enemy pressure. It was none the less necessary to place the
swampy line of the Sklo between themselves and the enemy as
soon as possible, so as to rule out any possibility of further con-
tact. But this meant crowding together all the divisions now
holding a front of about 50 km. into a defile only some 15 km.
wide. But although this manoeuvre could be executed without
such very great difficulty, the same could not be said when it
came to removing the second danger already alluded to the
blow from the IV. Russian Army which had now arrived at
the San. To do this, the area Laszki-Lazy-Krakowiec-Cho-
tyniec and that portion of the line of the Sklo which bor-
ders it would have to be barricaded off with all possible haste.
The IV. Army Command effected this by bringing up a weak
brigade by motor from the VI. Corps', which was posted near-
est to the only metalled road of communication within the zone
of march. A pivot was thus formed, in the course of Sept. 13,
from this brigade in conjunction with line of communication
posts and field troops. These were able to repulse all attacks
coming from the N., in particular one at Krakowiec on Sept.
13. These attacks, it is true, were made chiefly by cavalry,
with artillery, as the enemy had not grasped the opportunity
offered him of a decisive flank attack by strong forces.
In spite of this the II. Corps was kept in the Krakowiec area on Sept. 14, as a precaution. Under cover of this corps and the cavalry corps the armies carried out their retreat and crossed the San. It is true that from Sept. 13 onward the enemy's columns were active in their pursuit from the E. and made it infinitely difficult especially for the IV. Army to get the masses of trains brought back. Within the stretch N. of Przemysl up to and including Jaroslaw there were, including the temporary pontoon bridges, only six bridges over the San which were practicable. Even fewer were the permanent roads leading to them. It was therefore necessary to fall back on improvised roads. It has already been said that the great trains of supplies and material had been dispatched in good time to the W. and across the San ; but even so, the train units that are absolutely indispensable in battle (munitions, sanitary, technical and field supplies) and in addition the supply wagons (essential in view of the many days duration of the battle) formed a train mass many kilometres long. Out of these conditions arose the immediate danger of th.e sensible weakening of the troops' fighting power as a result of continual protective and rearguard battles and even the contin- gent danger of disorder and disbandment. The commander of the IV. Army, which was most exposed to these dangers, there- fore gave a plain order that no fighting in protection of the trains would be permitted. The trains were, if it became inevitable, to be given up, the teams having first been set free and the com- munications blocked.
In this manner the crossing of the San was achieved by all the army columns without a single fighting unit having suffered ssrious losses, such losses being confined to men unable to march, who succumbed because they were no longer equal to the fatigues of 25 days of operations and fighting at a stretch.
The crossing of the line of the San by all four armies brought to a close the first period of operations, which was marked by a continuous series of severe battles and difficult manoeuvres within the Lemberg area. The plan of an offensive operation on the interior line had led to no useful, lasting success. Conceived under the influence of the strategical conditions that had for- merly prevailed when tactical decisions were quickly reached, it was not suited to the present day when, even in fortunate cases, days weeks were spent in straining after victory; when the numerically weaker opponent could only seize the advantage of a momentarily favourable situation quickly enough if he were able to inflict an annihilating defeat on the isolated groups of the numerically stronger enemy forces during their concentric advance. But such success could only be attained under specially
favourable circumstances and through the perfect cooperation of all subordinate commanders. In this case these conditions did not exist; and, as the space separating the Russian groups was from the first not overwide, the double blow could not succeed in spite of great isolated successes. Only the manoeuvring skill of the Austro-Hungarian units, coupled with the hesitating advance of the Russian forces, enabled the Austro-Hungarians to escape unharmed from situations which might easily have led to the kind of disaster typical of an unsuccessful " operation on the interior line."
With such tremendous fighting power displayed on both sides the losses were enormous, telling with double intensity on the Austro-Hungarian as the weaker of the two armies. (A. K.)
II. THE SUMMER BATTLES OF 1915
The Battle of Grodek-Magierow, June 16-19 1915. After the break-through at Mosciska Lubaczow the Russians retired slow- ly, fighting as they went, to a position behind the Wereszyca on the heights of Magierow and Cieszanow, and behind the Tanew. In this naturally strong line of defence, which was continued to the left by the strong Dniester line facing the Southern and VII. Armies, they proposed to fight' a defensive battle to cover East Galicia and Lemberg. The continuous defeats of the last six weeks, resulting from the Austro-German spring offensive, ha already caused them heavy casualties, and the loss of East Galicia would exercise a disastrous effect on the prestige of the Entente, while the evacuation of hard-won territory could not fail to exercise a demoralizing influence on the Russian army, already greatly exhausted.
The strong position selected had therefore long been carefully prepared and fortified; the country, which had been the scene of operations in Aug. and Sept. 1914, was well known to both sides. The defences constructed by the Austrians around Lemberg at this period had been strengthened by the Russians, and a circle of more or less defensible works now surrounded the Galician capital on a circumference of some 30 miles. The Grodek- Magierow position was specially designed to secure it against the first rush of the enemy. It ran from the point d'appui of Mikolajow along the N. bank of the Dniester to Manasterzec, then along the E. bank of the Wereszyca to Cuniow and W. of that river to the heights of Janow, whence it ran by the heights S. of Rawa Ruska to Narol Miasto, and thence by the heights N. of the Tanew to the Vistula. Farther to the rear the Russians had provided for the possibility of a break-through by construct- ing a second position W. of the Rawa Ruska-Lemberg railway. This line, as yet incomplete, was connected with the ring of forts near the height of Lysa Gora, N.W. of Lemberg, and was continued thence W. of the Szczerek to the Dniester. ,
Early in June all the Austro-German troops between the Dniester and the Vistula (Austro-Hungarian II., German XI. and Austro-Hungarian IV. Armies) had been placed under Gen. von Mackensen. His intention was to direct the attack of the centre and southern wing of the XI. Army on Magierow and thence due E., passing N. of Lemberg. The strong left wing of the II. Army was to deliver an enveloping attack upon the forti- fied line Janow-Kommarno, while the IV. Army, although main- taining its position in the angle of the San and Vistula, was to press N. in conjunction with the XI. Army's left, and then to advance with its right on Rawa Ruska. On the Russian side there stood facing Mackensen's army group, which comprised in all the 4ist Infantry and 2 cavalry divisions, Gen. Lesch's III. and Gen. Brussilov's VIII. Armies, with same number of infantry divisions and 5 cavalry divisions.
On June 16 the Austro-Germans pressed the Russians hard along the whole line. The centre of the VIII. Russian Army offered a stubborn resistance to Bohm's centre and northern wing, while its left withdrew before his right early in the day. The Austro-Hungarian XVIII. Corps, in the course of the after- noon, stormed the Russian rearguard positions at Wolczuchy and Dobrzany, while parts of it penetrated into the part of the town of Grodek, which lies W. of the Wereszyca. On the north- ern front of the German XI. Army Brussilov's army on the
