spirited chase in which the driver was able to keep little more
than the semblance of order in his team, on the French side the
picture is one of an astonished and confused, but in no sense a
routed citizen-army, too clear-sighted to believe itself betrayed
and yet too ignorant of the ensemble to see where miscalculations ,
had led to disaster. In the hands of one who had specialized in
the art of inspiring confidence, whose silence even was imper-
turbable, and whose career had been spent not in technical
subtleties of operations but in varied branches of administration,
it had every chance of early recovery, provided that it was han-
dled according to a definite policy and not exposed to incidents.
This definite policy was laid down in a general order of Aug. 25,
which began with the phrase: " As it has proved impossible to
carry out the projected offensive, the next operations will be
regulated so as to constitute on the left, by means of the IV.
and V. Armies, the British army, and new forces from the eastern
front, a mass capable of resuming the offensive while the others
hold up the enemy for the required time." Following this cool
and convincing statement, the detail paragraphs prescribe a
retreat to the line Braye-sur-Somme-Ham for the British, to
Vermand-Moy for the offensive portion of the V. Army, to La
Fere-Laon-Craonne-St. Erme for the defensive wing of that
army, to the middle Aisne for the IV. Army and to the Argonne-
Verdun line for the III. " From this situation the offensive will
be resumed," said the order. On the left of this line a barrage
against cavalry inroads was to be formed between Picquigny
and the sea, and either between Domart and Corbie or between
Picquigny and Villers-Bretonneux there was to be formed a new
army, soon to be designated the VI., and composed, as regards
its staff and several of its divisions, of the troops which had just
defeated the left of the German Crown Prince as it sidled past
Etain. This was to be ready for action on Sept. 2, and the
direction of its offensive would be either St. Pol- Arras or Arras-
Bapaume, according to the position of the extreme right of the
Germans. The British would attack on Bertincourt or Le Cate-
let, according to the situation, the V. Army wing on Bohain.
The right of the V., the IV., and the III. were to defend the line
laid down and eventually to attack from it. To the I. and II.
Armies went the laconic instruction, " the role of these armies is,
to endure."
But the pressure of the German pursuit in its first freshness did not admit of the British coming to a halt on the line ordered, and when the elements of the new VI. Army began to assemble about Amiens the battle had passed far to the south of them. Similarly, with the V. Army, the battle of Guise, which may be considered as a section of the proposed general offensive, led to small results because the British element was wanting on its outer flank. The controversies which have arisen as to the rapid- ity of the British retirement from the battlefield of Le Cateau to behind the Oise need not here be discussed, for it is more than doubtful in any case whether the state of the French army, in its ensemble on Aug. 31, justified the risk of incurring final defeat. Be this as it may, Joffre put aside all temptations to exploit the local successes at Guise on the Meuse, and in a new general order of Sept. i laid down that the VI. Army and the British having insufficiently checked the enemy's turning movement, the whole system must pivot about its right continuing to retreat, until the left of the V. Army should be free from the menace of envelop- ment. Then the armies would take the offensive, this time utilizing the position of the III. Army, protected by Verdun on the N. and the Cote de Meuse on the E., to strike the chief blow. The position from which the offensive would be resumed was now well back from Paris, which was to be left to itself (though Joffre suggested that its troops might cooperate in the general offensive), the V. Army behind the upper Seine (Nogent), the de- tachment Foch (IX. Army) and the IV. Army behind the Aube and S. of Vitry, the III. Army, augmented by defence troops borrowed from the Cote de Meuse and possibly by troops from' the Lorraine front, N. of Bar-le-Duc. The British and the VI. Army were to constitute with Gallieni's local troops a Paris group which should hold the Seine from Melun to Juvisy, and the E. and N.E. fronts of Paris.
Thus was prepared the initial situation of the battle of the Marne. The scheme as outlined at first underwent many modi- fications, due to the ardent initiatives of Gallieni in Paris, and of Sarrail, commander of the III. Army, S. of Verdun, as well as to other causes. These are discussed in the article MARNE, BATTLE OF THE. Here it is not necessary to analyse too closely the form projected for the battle. Essentially, the fact to be retained by history is that a great army, in retreat after failure, could be energized, ordered to turn about, and launched to the attack, by a modern commander-in-chief whose influence must filter through a complex hierarchy before reaching the fighting soldier. Many had believed this to be an impossibility, and they were proved wrong. The operative scheme of the battle of the Marne and even its apparent barrenness of specific military results, are of insignificant importance compared with the fact that the bat- tle of the Marne was actually fought. (X.)
The " Race to the Sea" The establishment of the German defensive on the line of the Aisne, prolonged across the plain of Champagne, which ended the Marne battle, did not put an end to the Anglo-French offensive. The front between Compiegne and Verdun was stabilized here and there, but the battle of movement continued at the free extremity, that is, to the W. of Compiegne, and beyond. This new offensive has improperly been called the " Race to the Sea." In reality it was not a ques- tion of reaching the coast as quickly as possible, so as to obtain there an absolute protection against turning movements. If it had been so, the shortest line for the Allies, and the easiest to hold, would have been that of the Somme, from Compiegne to Montdidier and Amiens. To the estuary of the Somme, this line does not measure much more than 100 km., while the line from S. toN., which was that of the actual " Race to the Sea," ended N. of the Yser and was nearly double that length, presenting features of very various nature, among which some entirely lacked defensive value.
The truth is that the offensive, which was throughout the policy of the French Command, did not stop at the Marne vic- tory. On Sept. n, when the VI. Army (Maunoury) arrived at Compiegne, the Commander-in-Chief gave the order for this force to place immediately as many troops as possible on the right bank of the Oise. On Sept. 17 he indicated his plan by ordering the formation, on the left wing, of a force capable of parrying a flanking movement by the enemy as the best pre- caution to be taken. But Sir John French has stated that on the very next day (Sept. 18) General Joffre informed him that he was developing a new plan which aimed at attacking and enveloping the German right flank. The enemy, moreover, showed by his method of occupying the ground that the initiative no longer rested with him.
At the extreme end of the Allied line on the Oise the valley of the Aisne cleaves its way through a forest-clad massif, cutting it in two S. of the Aisne; the larger part of this mass consists of the forest of Compiegne and the northern part is the forest of Laigne. If the Germans, very skilled in turning forests to mili- tary account and manoeuvring in them, had retained any hope of resuming the offensive against the Allied left flank, they would have occupied the forest of Compiegne in order to make it the starting point of their turning movement and force the Allied left to retreat towards Paris. But they abandoned that front; nor did they retain the forest of Laigne, on the plateau to the N. of Attichy. The offensive impulse in the World War was thus on the side of the Allies and they kept it until the fatal day of Russia's defeat on the eastern front. Until that time every attack which resulted in the gain of ground came from the Allies, who, save for a few occasions, methodically pushed back the enemy from one entrenched position to another. The Germans had later to defend their right flank, more and more threatened as it became more and more prolonged. And, as the best way of arresting the progress of the Allies would have been to strike at their offensive, they tried without ceasing to outflank them, while they were resisting in front.
Thus the " Race to the Sea," viewed as a whole, consisted in establishing an offensive Allied flank against the German right,
