sions and i Territorial division had reached France from England in January, while 3 more New Army divisions and 3 more Ter- ritorial divisions from England were to be in France before the end of May. The Dardanelles Expeditionary Force was being rapidly reorganized and refitted in Egypt by Sir A. Murray, and 2 British, 4 Australian, and i New Zealand divisions were expected to come from that country to the western front before the end of June. Haig had lost in Jan. one more division, which had gone to Salonika, but reinforcements would give him by the middle of the year an increase of no less than 15 divisions to his strength in Dec. 1915.
Both commanders-in-chief were agreed that the principles on which the plans of battle in 1915 had been drawn up required modification. It was seen that the analogy of the great siege did not hold, that something more was required than to blast a great breach in the enemy's lines and then to launch a great assault. The something more was the defeat of the enemy's reserves, which came up fresh and in good order to meet troops when the assault had been thrown into some confusion. It was agreed, therefore, that the first object of battle should be to draw in and exhaust the enemy's reserves, and that until that object had been achieved no decisive success could be expected. So long as the enemy continued to attack Verdun, it would, on this principle, be to the advantage of the French to endure these attacks pro- vided always that the enemy gained no success which would affect seriously the strategical position on the whole front, and provided that the exhaustion of the French man-power was not excessive. Joffre therefore proposed to fight defensively at Verdun as long as possible, but to be ready to strike back as soon as the situation there appeared to him too dangerous, or as soon as the French army was approaching the limits of endurance. He therefore asked Haig not only to relieve the French X. Army but to prepare to attack N. of the Somme on a front as wide as the resources of the British army would permit, and undertook to support that attack with a French attack S. of the river on a scale which would depend upon the effect of the battle of Verdun upon the French army.
The Germans had at this time arrived at a very similar theory of battle. The chief of their General Staff, Falkenhayn, has said that he believed the strain of the war upon France to be such that a break might occur if the strain could be increased. This was not an unduly optimistic appreciation of the position if it be remembered that in the previous May Joffre had told Kitchener that France had then reached the limits of her capacity to expand her military forces. Materially Falkenhayn was not far wrong, but he understood the psychology of his enemies no better than other Germans, and he failed to appreciate the spirit of France. The maxim of Verdun " on ne passera pas " became for France an inspiration as potent as the influ- ence of Jeanne d'Arc. The object of the Germans in the battle of Verdun was to bleed France white, while the object of the Allies during that period was to wear down the military power of Germany as the preparation for striking the coup de grace. So upon both sides the theory of the war of exhaustion developed.
During March, April and May the struggle for Verdun con- tinued, the Germans in their several attacks gaining sufficient ground to encourage them to make a new effort now on the right bank of the Meuse, now on the left. During all this fighting the reputation of two of the defenders of Verdun increased steadily, and in May General Petain succeeded to the command of the group of armies of the Centre, General Nivelle taking his place in command on the actual front of battle.
Between Jan. and July the British strength in bayonets and sabres grew from 450,000 to 660,000, and there was a more than corresponding increase in artillery and aircraft. This enabled Haig to fall in completely with Joffre's wishes, and as soon as the relief of the French X. Army was completed he set about prepar- ing for the great attack on the front N. of the Somme. The growth of the armies made necessary the creation of a IV. Army under the command of Sir Henry Rawlinson. The III. Army was now commanded by Sir E. Allenby, and Sir Charles Monro, who had gone out to supervise the evacuation of the Dardanelles,
returned to command the I. Army. British troops now held a continuous line from the Yser canal to the Somme, and were actively preparing to take upon themselves more of the brunt of the war on the western front, a burden of which nearly seven- eighths had hitherto fallen on their French comrades. This preparation entailed enormous labour, for it not only involve the accumulation of immense stores and piles of munitions oi all kinds on the selected front of attack, the construction ol miles of roads, railways and trenches and many other prelim-! inaries of a great attack in trench warfare, but also the comple- tion of the training of hitherto untried troops. The British arm\ was, in fact, in process of becoming a national army. The old regulars were now little more than a small leaven of the whole lump, and though the new troops arrived in France with consider- able knowledge of their duties as cavalrymen, infantrymen; gunners and airmen, they had had little opportunity of learning to work together as part of a great machine. The problem oi training was the more complicated because of the great varietj of new weapons and methods which had been developed sine the outbreak of war; and to teach each part of the army the] powers and limitations of every other part, and the whole to worlj together in combination, was a very heavy task. To this tasl^ Haig at once addressed himself, and formed behind the line: schools of instruction in every branch of trench and battle war fare, while careful arrangements were made for the training li attack of divisions when out of the line. All this busy worl behind the lines did not mean any cessation of activity on th< front, and during these months of preparation a long series o raids into the enemy's trenches were planned and executed, raid: which gave the new troops valuable experience and kept thd enemy on continual tenterhooks.
In the latter part of May the German Crown Prince redouble! his attacks on the Verdun front, and on the 2ist the Germans stormed the Mort Homme hill on the left bank of the Meuse- for which they had been struggling for weeks. Petain at ond called Joffre's attention to the gravity of the situation, anc pressed for an early beginning of the counter-offensive on th< Somme, but Joffre was anxious to give Haig as much time a| possible for the training of his troops, and made Petain emlun yet longer. Fire from the Mort Homme hill had long impe-dn German progress on the right bank of the Meuse, but with thi hill in their possession the enemy in the beginning of Jun began to press hard on that bank and on the 7th captured For Vaux. Thereupon Petain renewed his representation to Foch who in consultation with Haig decided that the battle of th Somme should begin on July i. The preliminary bombardmenj was begun a week earlier, on June 24, the day on which th Germans, after capturing Fort Thiaumont, stormed the villag of Fleury and attained the farthest point in their pr< towards Verdun. While this preliminary bombardment was i progress, a bombardment so intense that the guns could be 1 in England, no less than 70 raids were carried on the Britis front between Ypres and the Somme, and gas was disch; into the enemy's lines from 40 different points. The troops wliic were about to attack the German trenches from Gommecourt t the Somme included the flower of British manhood, and no nior splendid body of men has ever gone forward to battle. Britis aircraft had already gained the ascendancy over the enemy' airmen, and the British army was now well equipped wit machine-guns, trench mortars, bombs, gas-projectors, and a other new appliances which experience of trench warfare ha shown to be necessary; the tunnellers had proved themselves t be more than a match for the enemy's mines, and for the fir- time in the war there was a sufficiency of heavy and medium gun and an assurance of an adequate if not abundant supply c shells. Expectation therefore ran high.
The results of the first attack were a heavy disappointment The main attack was delivered by Rawlinson's IV. Army betwtr the Ancre and Maricourt, about a mile N. of the Somme, win T they joined hands with the French VI. Army commanded I> General Fayolle, who was to attack astride the river under th general direction of Foch. This main attack was combined wit
