important gains of ground but in the capture in a few days' fighting of more than 17,000 prisoners, with the slow bludgeon work of the Somme in which the British army in four and a half months had captured 38,000 Germans at a tremendous price, they began to think that they had at last discovered the man for whom they were looking so anxiously.
Operations in igif. On Nov. n 1916 Joffre assembled his second conference of commanders-in-chief to consider plans for the following year. It was agreed that the Germans were in great difficulties on the western front, and that the situation of the Allies was more favourable than it had ever been. The fighting strength of the British army had grown to about 1,200,000 men, and it was known that considerable further reinforcements would reach France during the first few months of the year. The fighting strength of the French army had been increased by the incorporation of native troops to about 2,600,000, so that, including the Belgians, the Allies disposed of about 3,900,000 men against about 2,500,000 Germans.
Joffre declared that the French army could maintain its strength for one more great battle, but that thereafter it must progressively decline, as France had no longer a sufficient number of men of military age to replace losses. He therefore warned Sir Douglas Haig that during the coming year the burden must fall more and more upon the British army, a position which the British commander-in-chief readily accepted. Germany had recently created a number of new divisions, some of which had been employed against Rumania, but it appeared probable that the transfer of these divisions to the western front would be delayed if Russia was able to be active on the eastern front, and of this the great improvement in the supply of munitions for the Russian army held out promise at this time. It was also agreed that, in view of the probable decline in strength of the French army later in the year and the promised reinforcement of the British army, the relative superiority of the Allies on the western front would be greater in the spring of 1917 than at any time which could be foreseen with certainty. For all these reasons it was decided to take the earliest possible opportunity of pressing the advantage won by the battle of the Somme, and of continu- ing the process of exhausting the enemy's reserves as prepara- tion for an effort which should be decisive. All the armies of the Entente were to be ready to attack in the first fortnight of Feb., the British army between the Vimy Ridge and Bapaume, the French armies between the Somme and the Oise; and the French attack was to be followed soon after by another in Champagne to the W. of Reims. It was further understood between Joffre and Haig that these attacks would, if necessary, be followed by further attacks by the British army in Flanders. During the winter the British army was to do its utmost to press the enemy on the Somme battlefield, and to prevent him from recovering from his embarrassment there.
The underlying ideas of this plan were primarily that the policy of exhausting the German reserves should be resumed at the earliest possible moment, and secondly that the utmost effort should be made to complete the work begun on the Somme. The commanders-in-chief believed the situation to be such that victory could be won in 1917, but they were under no illusion as to the possibility of ending the war by one great blow to be delivered in the spring. Joffre followed up the results of this conference by issuing general instructions embodying the decisions reached, and in these instructions he directed that the first British and French attacks, that is to say, those to be delivered between Vimy and Bapaume and between the Somme and the Oise, were to be ready by Feb. i.
No sooner were Joffre's plans completed than a series of intrigues against the French commander-in-chief came to a head. A number of officers of the French General Staff regarded with dismay a proposal to give more and more of the task of consum- mating victory to the British army and less and less to the French army. They found many supporters among the politi- cians in Paris, and these were reinforced by others, who feared that the " war of exhaustion " and the process of wearing down the enemy's reserves would end in exhausting France before it
exhausted Germany. The cry therefore went up that it was time to have a change in the Higher Command. Foch, whose bloody assaults upon the Vimy Ridge had not been forgotten, was held to be too much of a " hammer and tongs " fighter, and he was placed on half-pay, while the state of the defences of Verdun before the German attack began was brought up against Joffre. So he was given a marshal s baton and an honorific position in Paris, and Nivelle reigned in his stead.
The new commander-in-chief at orce made a drastic change in Joffre's policy and plans. He proposed to increase the weight of the French attack; and in order that he might obtain the French troops necessary he proposed that the British should relieve the French VI. and XX. Armies and extend their front S. across the Somme as far as the Amiens-Roye road. In return he proposed that Haig should modify his plans for keeping up the pressure on the Germans on the Somme battlefield during the winter, and that the date of the combined attacks should be! postponed until Mar. 15. This meant a delay of six weeks in launching the attacks planned by Jcffre, and the enemy would be given time to recover from the effects of the Somme. But it became clear, as Nivelle's plans developed, that there was to be an even more complete change of plan than this. He proposed to apply on a great scale the methods he had employed with such success at Verdun, and to return to the policy which had been discardsd after the failure in Champagne in 1915. He intended,: by skilful employment of a great mass of artillery, to overcome: the enemy's resistance in his front lines, and then to pour in tof the assault a great reserve which should break through the trench! harrier completely and so change the whole strategical position on the western front.
Early in Dec., 1916, there had been a change of Government in Great Britain, and Mr. Lloyd George had become Prime Minister. He had made up his mind that the Somme had been a costly failure, and was eagerly looking for some method of win- ning the war which should be speedier and less costly in life than that of a " war of exhaustion." He therefore welcomed a general who promised a short, sharp and decisive battle, which would be over, one way or the other, within a comparatively short time. So at a conference held at Calais at the end of Feb. 1917, it was agreed between the British and French Governments that the British army should be placed under the general direction of Nivelle for the forthcoming operations. This decision violated a fundamental principle of military organization. A general of division is-not, while still in command of his division, placed also in command of an army corps which includes other divisions, for the good and sufficient reason that if his attention is absorbed by the details of one unit or of one part of the front, he cannot simultaneously give proper attention to the other units or to other parts of the front. The right course would have been to have given Nivelle the general charge of the whole western front and to have appointed another commander-in-chief for the French army. The results of this mistake soon became apparent. On the last day of the Calais Conference news arrived from the British V. Army that there were signs of a German withdrawal in the valley of the Ancre. Some time before, the British airmen had discovered that a great new system of defensive work been constructed by the enemy covering Douai, Cambrai am) St. Quentin, the system which became known to the Allies as the Hindenburg line; and not long after the report from the Ancrc came in there were indications that the Germans were preparing to retire from the whole of the Somme battlefield into this line But Nivelle, not being in close touch with happenings on the British front, did not believe in a German retreat, and issuec to Haig orders which were not compatible with the changec situation, and in certain matters went far beyond the agreement reached in Calais. This led to friction, which was adjusted at r further conference in London. By then it had become apparent that the Germans were in retreat on the whole front betweer Arras and the Aisne near Vailly. The Germans, relieved fron' pressure on their front during the winter, had prepared for theit retreat systematically and brutally. The whole country which had been in their occupation W. of the Hindenburg line was
