wife, and claims of wives against husbands because of that relation. As interests of personality a wife has claims to the society of her husband, quite apart from any economic advantage; to the affection of her husband, analogous to the legally recognized claim of the husband to the society and affection of the wife; and to the chastity and constancy of the husband as involving her self-respect and honour. These interests, however, are not yet recognized to their full extent and are not fully secured even in legal theory. The first and second are now protected by an action for alienating the hus- band's affections, which has come' to be allowed by the overwhelming weight of American authority. (Turner v. Heayrin, 182 Kentucky Reports, 65, 1918). The third is at most but partially recognized and indirectly secured ; but it should be said that the obvious inutility of the husband's means of redress, which should be applied by analogy to make the law logically complete, has had much to do with the apparent backwardness of the law on this subject. As an interest of substance the wife may claim to be secured in the marriage re- lation as an economically advantageous relation, providing her with support and shelter. Where the husband is enticed or induced to abandon his wife or to divert earnings which should be devoted to her support, the courts are coming to recognize this interest directly. (The wife's action was allowed in Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio State Reports, 327, 1912: it was denied in Brown v. Kistteman, 177 Indiana Reports, 692, 1912.) On the other hand in case of physical injury to, or abduction of, the husband, the wife is still usually denied an action, although the husband may recover in the converse case for " loss of service." No doubt there are practical difficulties here, arising in part from our mode of trial and of assessing damages. Yet the present state of the law, shaped by obsolete conceptions of the position of the wife in the household, is so out of accord with the present-day position of married women that legislative overhaul- ing in the near future is not unlikely. Regarding the claims of the wife against the husband, modern law everywhere has agreed to leave the interest of husband and wife respectively in the society and affection of the other without effective legal sanction as between the two. The claim of the wife to support was recognized fully and secured adequately at common law. Recent legislation setting up domestic relations courts and providing for criminal prosecution in case of non-support has only put more effective administrative ma- chinery behind existing legal duties of the husband. The most serious inequalities in this connexion were in the procedural difficul- ties encountered in enforcing the wife's legal rights. Domestic relations courts, which have had a considerable development in the U.S. in the last decade, are adapted especially to removing these obstacles (see Smith, Justice and the Poor, chap. 1 1 .). It should be noted also that modern legislation, although taking away from the husband all control over the wife's property and earnings and committing it solely to the wife, has left untouched the common-law duty of the husband to support the wife even if she has property and he has none. Some courts go so far as to allow a wife possessed of means who has supported herself out of her separate estate to sue the husband and obtain restitution of the amount thus contributed. (De Brauwere v. De Brauwere, 203 New York Reports, 460, 1911.) A few western states, however, now impose upon a wife of means and ability a duty of supporting an indigent and infirm husband, and allow an action by the husband to enforce this duty. (Hagert v. Hagert, 22 North Dakota Reports, 290, 1911.)
Disabilities of Married Women. Unmarried women of sound mind and lawful age were under no common-law disabilities. On the Other hand married women were without power to determine their own national character or legal domicile, following their husbands in these respects as a matter of law; were subject to serious dis- abilities with respect to ownership, use and enjoyment of property; were restricted in their power to sue in the courts; could not convey property; and had no power to contract. Some of these disabilities were rested on a fiction of the legal unity of husband and wife, de- rived from the position of the husband as guardian of the dependent members of the household in the old Germanic polity and reinforced by certain texts of Scripture, whose authority was decisive in the Middle Ages. Legislation began to abrogate these disabilities early in the igth century. But it was often far from comprehensive in its scope, and when sweeping provisions were enacted they were often interpreted narrowly because of the doctrine requiring strict con- struction of statutes in derogation of the common law. There has been a gradual but steady progress in the direction of removing all of these disabilities partly by legislation and partly by judicial decision, and many anomalies which resulted from halfway legislative measures or strict judicial interpretation were in the decade 1910-20 shaken, if not overthrown. With respect to separate domicile of married women and actions by wives against husbands, the social interest in the security of marriage and the family as social institu- tions of paramount importance has necessarily given the courts pause, since the doctrine that the wife's domicile depended on that of the husband, and that the one might not sue the other, seemed but corollaries of a legal recognition of the family as an entity. Yet when that entity is de facto dissolved, these doctrines amount to serious disabilities imposed upon one member. Accordingly in one way or another American courts now recognized the separate domicile of the wife substantially to the full extent of her individual interest in free self-assertion. (Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. Reports,
619, 1914.) So also with respect to actions by the wife against the husband. The older Married Women's Acts which in form merely removed disabilities as to property and contract, were long con- strued as not allowing such actions since they did not do so expressly, and a policy against aggravation of domestic troubles by dragging them into court was taken to be in the way. This sacrifice of the individual interests of the wife to the supposed exigencies of a social interest has now definitely given way, and conservative courts are allowing such actions even under statutes in terms dealing with property rights only. (Brown v. Brown, 88 Connecticut Reports, 42, 1914.) The more recent type of statute, providing that a married woman shall have the same legal existence and personality after marriage as before marriage, necessarily permits such litigation. (Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Oklahoma Reports, 124, 1914.) As to capacity to own, acquire, use and enjoy property, little remains of the old law, and there are but few jurisdictions where legislation might still accomplish anything. In one respect, however, improvement by judicial decision is still going forward. A number of states, by derivation directly or indirectly from Spanish law, have the institu- tion of " community property," in which with respect to certain property, and especially property acquired after marriage, husband and wife are treated legally as a sort of properly-owning entity. The older view was that the husband was the administering agent of this collectivity during their joint lives, and hence could dispose of it, alter its form and charge it with his personal debts; and that it could even be taken in execution for his wrongful acts. Recent decisions in some of these jurisdictions, recognizing the individual interest of the wife, hold that the community property is not liable for acts done by the husband outside of the reasonable scope of his authority as agent of the community. (Schramm v. Steelc, 97 Washington Reports, 309, 1917.) Yet even there a claim for an injury to the wife being an acquisition after marriage and community property, she is not allowed to sue therefore if her husband refuses to join. (Hynes v. Colman Dock Co., 108 Washington Reports, 642, 1919.) As to contractual capacity, little remains to be done any- where in order to give married women full beneficial powers of contracting in their own interest. Yet in more than one jurisdiction privileges which compensated for the older disabilities still remain in force in whole or in part and enable married women to escape from , contracts for which as persons of full capacity they ought to be held. ; This is especially true of contracts of suretyship, by which married women are very generally incapable of binding their separate property. (
Protection of Women in Industry. While American courts have been reluctant to give over, or to construe legislation as abrogating, common-law privileges or disabilities which protected married women when in a condition of legal dependence, they have also been reluc- tant to uphold legislation restricting freedom of contract on the part | of women in industry with respect to hours and conditions of labour I and minimum wage. When such statutes were first enacted, they > were held unconstitutional as being arbitrary and unreasonable interferences with liberty of contract by a court which had had no hesitation in keeping alive common-law disabilities, that had long ceased to secure any individual or social interest. That decision i has been overruled (Ritchie v. Wayman, 244 Illinois Reports, 509 1910), and it seems to be settled that legislation may take account of the facts of women's physical make-up and secure the social interest in a healthy womanhood by regulating the hours of labour of adult females. (Midler v. Oregon, 208 U.S. Reports, 412, 1908; Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. Reports 416, 1917.) But it is still a matter of con- , trpversy whether this may be carried to the extent of fixing a [ minimum wage for women employees. (Slettler v. O'llara, 243 U.S. I Reports, 629, 1917.) Curiously enough, the political and legal eman- cipation of women is urged as a reason against such legislation, as if the removal of political and legal disabilities had any relation to, or effect upon, the physical handicaps upon women in industry which are the occasion of these statutes.
Women on Juries. In 1917 California provided for the drawing of women upon juries. (Laws of 1917, p. 1283.) Since the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution provid- ing for women suffrage, 1920, it has been assumed that women are to sit upon juries everywhere. But in some jurisdictions, out of caution, it is felt that the courts should await express legislation, and in others courts have felt compelled to wait until court-houses and jury-rooms could be adjusted to the novel situation presented: by juries of men and women. The conditions under which juries are kept while deliberating upon verdicts and the accommodations for jurors in large cities, where many juries are sitting simultaneously for a great part of the year, are not adapted to the woman juror; and in many country court-houses things are even worse. If no other good results from service of women upon juries, the inevitable improvement of the physical conditions surrounding jury service will be a gain. On the other hand, the expense involved in this improvement and in provision for the custody of juries made up of men and women in important cases, where juries must be guarded closely from outside contact, leads many jurisdictions to hesitate. (R. Po.*)
WOMEN POLICE. In Sept. 1914 two distinct bodies of women police were formed in England, with the object of maintaining order amongst girls and young women in the new and exciting
