of interest in the technical side of their work or desire to im- prove their position by training or qualifying for work requiring more skill or responsibility; comparatively bad health; lack of care in dealing with machines, materials and tools supplied by the employer; lack of steadiness shown in the frequency with which they left their situations; their bad time-keeping and ir- regular attendance. It was also frequently given by employers as a reason against their employment that, where they were working with men, the men's output tended to decrease until it was no more than the women's. Excluding labouring work, they were said as a rule, when on men's work, to be worth two-thirds of a man, but where details were given the discrepancy appeared to be less. On some work light repetition work or work where skilful fingers were required they were universally acknowledged to be better than men, turning put more work and more contented. On more skilled work demanding more individual variation they were said to pro- duce from 40 % to 60 % of a man's output. These complaints were put forward as characteristic of women, but it seems possible that some at any rate were characteristic rather of the conditions under which women work in industry. The first contention that they lack the strength of men is of course true, though women are stronger than the pre-war employer with his underfed girls was apt to imagine. The progressive improvement that took place in the health and output of those employed under anything approaching reasonable conditions with regard to hours and lodgings showed the effect that good wages, good food and a certain amount of care will produce in even a few months. Moreover, a great deal of the work that men are now expected to do is not only too heavy for women but too heavy for men as well, and ought not to be imposed on any human being. The result of this is that men employed in- dustrially are more and not less adversely affected by the conditions of their work than women, though their health again is greatly superior to that of married women working in their homes the most suffering class in the community. But, obviously, women are not so suitable as men for heavy work and cannot be made so by any methods which can be foreseen. The most carefully planned schemes all ended by being prohibitive in cost. Another group of defects, their lack of discipline, their bad time-keeping and bad attendance, were really alleged against the married women hampered by household duties. Single women were as good time-keepers as men. If they changed their situations more often it was often due to preoccupations arising out of the war. They wanted to be near the hospital to which their brother or lover had been sent, or they wished to change from shells to aircraft work because their man had entered the air force. All this population of women was preoccupied : often too they had taken up work for the first time without much considering the wages paid and, as the pinch of the war made itself felt, found themselves obliged to go where they could earn enough to keep themselves.
Their lack of initiative and ambition was put down by the em- ployers as due to their knowledge that the work was temporary, and would be brought to an end either by the end of the war or by mar- riage. The trade unions frequently added that employers, for the same reason, would not be willing to give women a lengthy training. It is probably true that the majority of wage-earning women are so affected by the expectation of marriage that they are unwilling to expend mental effort on their work. But it should be remembered, on the one hand, that the wages of women before the war were so low as seriously to affect their vitality, and, on the other, that the experiment of offering them training in skilled work had never been made. They are perfectly ready to learn weaving, or the skilled work in the dressmaking and millinery trades. The experience of the war would seem to show that a minority of women would welcome it and benefit by it in other occupations. Another thing shown by the war is that apprenticeship periods for the skilled trades, though convenient both for masters and men as long as the school-leaving age remains where it is, are iar longer than is neces- sary to secure industrial efficiency. A skilled worker cannot be produced in six months, but that does not mean that his apprentice- ship must last for five or seven years. If anything were to occur which modified this period the increased employment of women on skilled work would become more feasible.
Lack of initiative, lack of care and lack of attention to detail are more fundamental charges. They are possibly true, though to what extent they are true can hardly be proved by the experiment made under war conditions. Most of the women had been Hying in cir- cumstances which precluded the development of initiative or a scientific thoroughness. Very few minds show initiative with regard to a totally unfamiliar technique so fenced about with terrors as engineering, so immemorially fixed as work on the land or so trivial as most clerical occupations. Nor, to put it mildly, was women's initiative encouraged during the war, though without it there would have been no women doctors and no women in the fighting services. And as those responsible for the education of naval officers know, this quality, like others, reacts to stimulation. What is certain is that in the strength and skill of its women the war showed that Great Britain possesses a valuable industrial resource, whose wider use under suitable conditions would benefit both the women themselves and the industries they entered. Before such conditions can be established, however, a number of problems must be faced, including
the determination of the proper ratio of a woman's wage to that of a man performing similar work. (A. B. W.)
UNITED STATES
In 1916 there were probably about 10,000,000 women wage earners in the United States, comprising about one-quarter of the total number of persons gainfully employed. In manu- facturing there were about 1,500,000, three-fourths of whom were in the food, textiles, tobacco and wearing-apparel industries, but very few in those industries producing implements of war. The first demands for women were met, as in England, by drawing seasoned workers from such industries as the lighter textiles, millinery, corset-making, domestic service, laundries, stores and offices. After the supply of seasoned workers was exhausted, efforts were turned toward securing women outside the wage-earning class. Married women, many of them former industrial workers, were urged to return to industry. Part-time work was offered and occasionally a day nursery was estab- lished. In one city an organized publicity campaign for new workers resulted, after the first 'two weeks, in a 50% increase in employed women and after the first four weeks in a 100% increase. It was estimated that about 4,000,000 women were employed in war trades and that 2,500,000 remained in the newer fields in 1919.
English experience taught the American authorities to keep the most skilled men at home where they could continue in their usual fields of work, but in attempting to supply the increased demand for workers two main problems arose; first, to secure women to fill routine or semi-skilled positions; second, to secure in those industries which were greatly swollen by war demands not only routine workers but also skilled employees. The demand for additional women in war industries was well illustrated by conditions in the iron and steel industry, where, in 1916, less than 4% of the employees were women. During the war in every branch of this industry the number of women ; employed increased, between the first and second draft, from 18% to over 200%. In the industry as a whole the increase j was nearly 70%, while the number of men increased only about 5% and in some branches actually decreased in numbers. In in plants making explosives only 73 women were reported in j 1914, whereas after the second draft, 25 plants employed nearly 12,000 women. In this industry women constituted about half the total employees. In the manufacture of hand grenades, about 19 out of every 20 were women. In one gas-mask plant with 12,000 employees, 8,500 were women.
Industries showing the largest per cent of increase in the number of women after the second draft were cars, steam and electric railways, automobiles, metal and metal products, lumber and its remanufacture, chemicals and allied products. Industries showing decrease in per cent of women employed were textiles, hat and cap making, tobacco and tobacco prod- ucts. Industries showing the greatest ratio of substitution were motor-cycles, bicycles and parts, cars, steam and electric railways, automobiles, airplanes, seaplanes and parts, ship and boat building, agricultural implements, lumber and its remanufac- ture and iron and steel; the latter industry substituted by far the largest number of women. In practically no case did all the different establishments in any industry employ women and an even smaller number substituted them for men. The practice of the employment and substitution of women was largely a matter determined by the individual establishment. In iron ! and steel, for example, out of 2,140 firms reporting after the ; second draft, only 1,011 employed women and only 430 sub- 1 stituted women for men.
Before the war women were employed in clerical work in con- nexion with the railways and as ticket sellers on a few street railways. One of the most striking war innovations was the employment of women in such positions as station agents, I ticket sellers, cleaners, section hands, and elevator operators, in connexion with the railways, and as conductors on the street ' railways. It is estimated that by Oct. 1918 there were over 100,000 women employed on the railways, and many large
