had increased rapidly to a position more formidable than that previously engineered by the historic families and was in fact “undermining the foundations of the Prussian State.” As a counter-stroke to an organization which he realized was strengthened and to some extent led by the priests, Bismarck in 1872 undertook the Kulturkampf, hoping thereby to crush out the growing conception of Polish nationality. The Archbishop of Gnesen- Posen, the chief leader of the Roman Catholic party, was imprisoned, the liberty of the pulpit was denied, the use of the Polish language was prohibited in the schools and attempts were made to forbid its use at public meetings. The Kulturkampf was continued till 1885 and in spite of its failures Bismarck's policy seemed assured of success when Dinder was appointed Archbishop of Gnesen and the onslaught of the schools began.
The history of Prussian Poland in later years turns to a great extent upon the economic question. The industrial development of Germany had brought about a great immigration of Polish labourers to work as agriculturists in eastern Germany and as miners in Westphalia. Bismarck descried danger here and after unsuccessfully trying to prevent it by expelling the immigrants essayed to counteract it by further Germanization of Poland. The appointment of the Land Commission in 1886 with £5,000,000 to buy land from Poles in Posen and W. Prussia and sell it to German colonists was the first step in the policy of German colonization which was pursued till the outbreak of the war. It is true that under Caprivi the severity of the anti-Polish policy was relaxed, but under Prince Hohenlohe it was reinforced and in 1894 the Ostmarken Verein was founded to obtain the trade of the eastern provinces exclusively for Germans and undermine the Polish element. Under Count Bulow the culminating point was reached in 1908 when the compulsory expropriation bill was passed with the bill prohibiting the use of Polish at ordinary public meetings. More colonists were now introduced and the sale of their land to Poles was forbidden. There were signs all through of the failure of this policy, such as the strike of the school children in 1906 against the use of the German language in religious instruction, and these signs were multiplied in the economic sphere. For here the Poles, acting on the principle that they would be masters when they were “better, more educated and richer than the Germans,” had definitely set themselves to the task of defeating the Germans economically. The land that was bought for colonists was poor land and bought at high prices. The German colonists were boycotted to such an extent that they were forced to withdraw or become Polonized and the Polish position actually seemed to grow stronger as the legislation became more severe. The incorruptible Prussian official, the inexorable Prussian schoolmaster and the brutal Prussian drill sergeant had disciplined a talented people hitherto uncultured and rendered them capable of organizing and acting for themselves. By means of their cooperative societies which dealt with agriculture, finance, industry and commerce they obtained complete control of the resources of the country to the exclusion of the Germans and the Jews. They also founded unions of landowners, social, athletic and political associations. The heads of all these societies before the war formed a sort of secret Cabinet which exercised the chief power in Prussian Poland with a preponderating influence in the local Press, with power to control the supply of immigrant labour and secretly direct the boycott both of Ger- mans and of Jews. In fact when victory came the assumption of political supremacy was not the first but the last step to complete independence.
The success of the Poles of Prussia may have been one of the elements which led Pilsudski to put his money on the wrong horse at the beginning of the World War, believing that Germany would be obliged to make of Poland a buffer State against the eternal menace of the Russian Empire.
Austrian Poland.—The lot of the Poles in the Austrian Empire with its purely non-national basis was preferable to that under Prussia or Russia. In the former they had by fighting obtained a tolerable position. In the latter the severities were intermittent and could be mitigated by bribery. In Austria there was always a certain amount of bonhomie or Gemütlichkeit which made official harshness tolerable. The history, however, of Austrian Poland from 1863 to 1914 can be understood only by reference to certain governing facts, namely the imperialist opportunism of the monarchy and the racial problem presented by the rise of the Ruthenian movement in Galicia.
During the years immediately following the revolution of 1863, the Galician Poles, under the influence of bitter disillusionment, resolved to concentrate all their efforts not on recovering political unity with the boundaries of 1772, but on preserving and strengthening national unity within the Austrian Monarchy. German culture and the German language constituted the unifying and predominant force in the Habsburg Monarchy, but after the war of 1866 and under the constitution of 1867 Austrian Germans had to look for allies amongst the other nationalities. The Poles had to decide whether they would support the aims of the Federalist party with its disruptive tendencies or whether they would favour the German element and adhere to the Vienna Government. They followed the latter course and promised loyalty in return for practical concessions. Having 57 votes in the Reichsrat they were able to secure useful privileges for Galicia. In 1867 they obtained a special minister for Galicia in the Austrian Cabinet; a separate board for Galician education; the use of the Polish language in secondary schools; the use of Ruthenian being restricted to elementary schools; the use of Polish instead of German in administration and the law courts. In the following year Polish became the official language for the university of Cracow, whilst a year later it was enacted that Poles alone should be teachers in the universities of Cracow and Lemberg. From 1877 onwards the “Polish Club” in the Reichsrat became a governmental party and used all its influence to build up piecemeal the fabric of Polish autonomy in Galicia. On the whole the Poles did not use their power well. By the establishment of an academy of science at Cracow they did indeed encourage learning, but they did nothing to improve the economic condition of the people. The peasants remained ignorant and thetowns were neglected. No Polish middle class was created and hence the Jewish element predominated in trade and commerce. Galicia was rapidly Polonized but only at the expense of the Germans and the Ruthenians, and on their oppression of these last the history of Austrian Poland up to and after the war to a great extent depends.
The Ruthenians have been described by Prof. Alison Phillips as a compact body of 30,000,000 occupying the country “from the north-eastern district of Hungary across the Carpathians and E. Galicia” and eastwards as far as the Dnieper. They were then ruled partly by Russia and partly by Austria, but have always been claimed by the Russians as part of their race. Indeed little doubt was expressed on the subject till a movement was started about the middle of the 19th century by certain Ruthenian scholars, who set out to prove they had a right to a separate national existence. The real impetus of the movement was economic and arose from the discontent of the peasant with the oppression of their Russian and Polish landlords. It was some 20 years before the importance of the danger of the movement was realized. From the Polish point of view it was dangerous because it challenged their supremacy in “the annexed provinces” in Podolia, Volhynia and Eastern Galicia. From the Russian point of view it was disastrous because it threatened to break up the Russian Empire. In Galicia, where in addition to the language the Greek Uniat Church formed a strong bond of union, the movement prospered in spite of the Polish efforts to suppress it, which were at first supported by the Austrian Government. This support continued as long as Austria desired good relations with Russia, that is until in 1884 it was desired to weaken the Russian colossus. Then concessions were made to the Ukrainians and the result was that in 1891 Ukrainophil deputies appeared in the Reichsrat with the development of an Ukrainian State within the monarchy inscribed on their banner. This policy had the effect of promoting a reconciliation between Russia and the Galician Poles, who thought it better that the Galician Ruthenes should be absorbed by Russia than that a Ruthene State should be set up at the expense of both Russians and Poles. To retain their ascen-
