Confidential.
PROPAGANDA PEACE POLICY
The following conditions are indisputable:—
In no sense shall restoration or reparation in the case of Belgium be taken into consideration when adjusting any other claims arising from the war.
1. The complete restoration, territorial, economic and political, of Belgium.
2. The freeing of French territory, reconstruction of the invaded Provinces, compensation for all civilian losses and injuries.
3. The restoration to France of Alsace-Lorraine, not as a territorial acquisition or part of a war indemnity, but as reparation for the wrong done in 1871, when the inhabitants of the two Provinces, whose ancestors voluntarily chose French allegiance, were incorporated in Germany against their will.
4. Readjustment of the frontiers of Italy as nearly as possible along the lines of nationality.
5. The assurance to all the peoples of Austria-Hungary of their place amongst the free nations of the world and of their right to enter into union with their kindred beyond the present boundaries of Austria-Hungary.
6. The evacuation of all territory formerly included in the boundaries of the Russian Empire, the annulment of all treaties, contracts or agreements made with subjects, agents or representatives of enemy Powers since the revolution and affecting territory or interests formerly Russian, and cooperation of the Associated Powers in securing conditions under which the various nationalities of the former Empire of Russia shall determine their own form of Government.
7. The formation of an independent Polish State with access to the sea, which State shall include the territories inhabited by predominantly Polish populations, and the indemnification of Poland by the Powers responsible for the havoc wrought.
8. The abrogation of the Treaty of Bucharest, the evacuation and restoration of Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro, the Associated Powers to aid the Balkan States in settling finally the Balkan question on an equitable basis.
9. The removal, so far as is practicable, of Turkish dominion over all non-Turkish peoples.
10. The people of Schleswig shall be free to determine their own allegiance.
11. As reparation for the illegal submarine warfare waged by Germany and Austria-Hungary, these Powers shall be held liable to replace the merchant tonnage belonging to the Associated and neutral nations illegally damaged or destroyed.
12. The appointment of a tribunal before which there shall be brought for impartial justice individuals of any of the belligerents accused of offences against the laws of war or of humanity.
13. The former Colonial possessions of Germany, lost by her in consequence of her illegal aggression against Belgium, shall in no case be returned to Germany.
The following conditions of Peace are negotiable:—
1. The adjustment of claims for damage necessarily arising from the operations of war, and not included amongst the indisputable conditions.
2. The establishment, constitution and conditions of membership of a League of Free Nations for the purpose of preventing future wars and improving international relations.
3. The League of Free Nations shall be inspired by the resolve of the Associated Powers to create a world in which, when the conditions of the Peace have been carried out, there shall be opportunity and security for the legitimate development of all peoples.
The action taken thereon by the Enemy Propaganda Committee at Crewe House was as follows: At their suggestion Lord Northclifle made it the basis of an address to the United States officers in London on Oct. 22 1918. The Production Department of the Committee got to work on a series of pamphlets and leaflets dealing with the different points of the memorandum. The memorandum was sent to the French, Italian, and American members of the inter-Allied Body for Propaganda in enemy countries, with the request that they should take similar action on it to that taken by the British Policy Committee and bring it up for discussion at the next meeting of the inter-Allied body. Lastly they decided to prepare and give wide publicity to an article covering the whole ground of the memorandum, so that the policy could be presented in the same terms to the British people, to their Allies and to the enemy. The steps taken by Crewe House, and the corresponding action taken by other departments concerned, were reported and approved at a meeting of the Policy Committee at Crewe House on Oct. 28 1918, the last meeting actually held.
Events were moving swiftly, and Crewe House found that there was no time to carry out the original intention of cir- culating the general statement through one of the more important monthly periodicals. It was therefore decided to ask Lord Northcliffe to give the peace policy the wide and immediate publicity possible by the use of his name and by the sources of distribution at his command. He agreed at once, and so consummated the efforts of British propaganda. On Nov. 4 1918 an article under his name appeared in The Times and The Daily Mail, The Paris Daily Mail, and the leading papers in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, S. Africa, Newfoundland, India, the British Dependencies, the United States of America, S. America, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Japan and elsewhere, and very soon afterwards in Germany. The arrangements for this wide publicity were made personally by Lord Northcliffe, and the cost of cabling was borne by him. The final form of the article was due to him, but its substance represented the unanimous views of his advisory committee, the members of which he had selected, and over whose deliberations he had presided.
Allied Propaganda.—The principles and methods of propaganda have been so fully illustrated in the foregoing account of the British effort, that little would be gained by a detailed description of the operations of England's Allies. France went through a history much like that of Great Britain. In the earlier stages of the war, propaganda was conducted by a number of agencies, for the most part in extension of their normal functions. As the war proceeded, concentration and intensification were achieved, ending in the work being placed under the control of a single minister with a large staff. The control of home opinion was less difficult than in England, as it was already in the tradition of the Government to regulate the dissemination of information and of official views. As, however, a considerable part of the French population was in territory occupied by the Germans, there had to be an extensive distribution of propaganda through the army and by secret agents. An intensive campaign was conducted in Alsace and Lorraine, the services of distinguished Alsatians of French descent being employed with great success. Neutral opinion was influenced by special missions and by resident agents. Much care was given to French propaganda amongst the Allies. Distinguished civilians of British and American nationality were frequently invited to France, and given every opportunity of seeing the spirit in which France was making her prodigious effort and the enormous difficulties she had to face. French agents kept in close touch with British opinion of every class, and in every part of the Empire, not neglecting Ireland and Quebec. In one respect this branch of French propaganda was more far-seeing than most of the British work; it was not content with the actual problems of the war, but anticipated and prepared for many of the difficulties and possible causes of friction that might arise in the making even of a victorious peace. France early foresaw that, as German colonies were unlikely to be restored to Germany, it would be necessary for France and Britain to be in general agreement with regard to extra-European territories. The French effort to reach the enemy directly was on a smaller scale, but was similar to the work done by the British War Office. By exchange of views and materials a high degree of concord was reached.
Belgium was in the unfortunate position of being able to operate directly only in a very small part of her own territory. By direct effort, and with the willing coöperation of France and Britain, she was able to keep in close contact with her own people. The unmerited calamities which fell on Belgium secured her in advance the sympathy of neutral and Allied nations, so that special propaganda was unnecessary. Italy was rather a theatre for propaganda than a direct propagandist. She spoke with so many different voices that, except for a certain amount of direct propaganda addressed to the enemy, she was unable to explain her attitude very clearly either to neutrals or to Allies. On the other hand, she issued a series of magnificent photographic descriptions of her arduous campaigns, which explained well the immense difficulties of military operations on the Italian front, and the brilliant technical methods by which
