TABLE i. Exports of Ores.
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1904
1906
1908
Coal and Lignite . Gold (in kilogrammes) Silver " . . Black copper .... Lead Antimony .... Pyrites Cement ... . .
2,631,810 89 48 1,641 245 4,725
52,500
2,375,067 139 3 7,6i3 213 3,200
92,357
296,125 191 823 2,198 1,552 261 32,726 11,074
1910 a single copper mine (Bpr) exported ore to the value of over 8,000,000 francs, thus exceeding the total result of all the mines given above.
Foreign Trade. The progress of Serbian trade may best be gath- ered from the following Tables 2 and 3. In 1910 maize to the value
TABLE 2. Imports and Exports.
1905-7
(triennial)
1908-10
(triennial)
1909
1910
1911
Imports Exports .
6,821,000 9,004,000
9,196,000 10,626,000
2,941,403 3,719,270
3,387,826 3-935,521
(?) 4,676,640
TABLE 3. Distribution of Trade.
Imports from
Exports to
Germany . Austria-Hungary U.K. and Brit- ish Colonies . Turkey France Italy . Russia
1909. 1,154,068 711,894
303,409 194,224 141,460 93,800 77,294
1910. i,399,033 645-930
456,997 237,382 144,144 145,798 72,925
1909. 623,791 1,163,866
5,696 878,967 97,172 121,864 815
1910. 876,594 712,875
66,892
938,837 47,644 42,786
541
of over 21,400,000 francs was exported. The famous plum industry (known to the west only through German intermediaries) accounted in 1908 for the export of 49,042 tons of prunes (value 10,350,721 francs) and of 14,398 tons of plum jam (value 3,251,093 francs). The pig trade, upon which Serbia's prosperity very largely depended, having been injured by Austria-Hungary s tariff policy, a new system of slaughter-houses was established in Belgrade, and in 1911 the chief of these exported 9,751 tons of pork (68,047 head). By 1913 the amount exported had risen to 12,913 tons (100,776 head). Finance. On Jan. I 1913 the public debt amounted to 26,362,- 240. Table 4 shows how the budget balanced in the years before the war. In 1915 the budget was fixed at the same figure. From 1915 to 1918, owing to the conquest of the country, no proper budget was possible, the Government and army subsisting upon the subsidies of the Allied Powers.
TABLE 4. Finance.
Revenue Expenditure
Surplus
1909
1910 1911 1912
1913 1914
4,145,764 4,132,945 4,611,109 4,602,913 4,805,458 4,803,272 4,972,758 5,230,588 8,572,826
12,818 8,198 ' 2,186
Education. In 1909 there were only 1,296 elementary schools in Serbia with 2,584 teachers and 138,434^ pupils, and 20 secondary schools with 393 teachers and 7,317 pupils. In 1910-11 the univer- sity of Belgrade had 1,025 students. Only 27% of the pop. could read and write.
Army. After 1908 great efforts were made to increase the effi- ciency of the army. Organized under a system of obligatory serv- ice, the war strength in 1914 was estimated at 350,000 men, which, with the addition of -the Landsturm, could be raised to about 400,000. (See ARMY : Balkan Armies.)
POLITICAL HISTORY, 1909-18
The annexation of Bosnia by Austria-Hungary in 1908 marked a turning point in the history of Serbia. Henceforth public opinion, supported by prominent statesmen in every party, was practically unanimous in regarding a conflict with Austria- Hungary as sooner or later inevitable. This belief had at once a national and an economic basis: for Count Aehrenthal not merely supported the Hungarian policy of repressing Yugoslav national aspirations inside the Dual Monarchy, but obstructed Serbia's commercial development by tariff and frontier restric- tions, by a veto upon eithejr direct access to the sea or a common frontier with Montenegro, and by opposition to all idea of Balkan cooperation. Those Serbs who feared so unequal a conflict
and would have preferred a more conciliatory attitude towards Austria-Hungary, were reduced to silence by Aehrenthal's re- fusal to admit the international aspect of the problem or to consider the Serbian proposals for arbitration before the Hague Tribunal. Isolated in Europe and jealously shut off from her natural outlets on the Adriatic, Serbia was driven to seek new political and economic ties in the east and south. The policy of Aehrenthal inevitably strengthened the tendencies towards the creation of a Balkan League, and these were accelerated by the political unrest evoked throughout the Balkan Penin- sula by the Young Turk Revolution.
The Balkan League. The idea of a Balkan League was by no means new. It had been advocated as early as 1844 by the Serbian statesman Garasanin, and formed the subject of seri- ous negotiations between Prince Michael Obrenovic and the Bulgarian exiles of his day, and also between Kossuth, Prince Michael, and Prince Cuza of Rumania. The last serious overtures had been made in 1891 by the Greek premier Tri- coupis, and after their betrayal to the Porte by Stambulov the idea remained dormant for nearly 20 years. The speech of the Russian Foreign Minister Isvolski on Christmas Day 1908, advocating a league between Turkey and the three Balkan Slav States, inaugurated a new era of Russian activity in the Balkans, under the active direction of Tcharikov, the ambas- sador at Constantinople, and Hartwig, who rapidly acquired great influence as minister at Belgrade. In the spring of 1910 the kings of Bulgaria and Serbia paid successive visits to St. Petersburg and Constantinople, and Dr. Milovanovic, the Ser- bian Foreign Minister, was especially active in his endeavours to secure the adhesion of Turkey to a general Balkan League. His views were also shared by Venizelos, who came into power in Greece in October of the same year, and even to a lesser degree by Gesov, a Russophil, who became Bulgarian premier in March 1911. In view, however, of the increasingly chauvinistic attitude of the Young Turk regime in Macedonia and Albania, Venizelos considered it advisable to make overtures to Bulgaria, with a view to common defensive action against a possible Turkish attack. His initiative led to important secret negotia- tions, in which Mr. J. D.Bourchier, The Times correspondent, acted as intermediary. These preceded by at least five months the first conversations between Serbia and Bulgaria, which appear to have originated from an overture made by Rizov in Belgrade at the instance of King Ferdinand. 1 On Oct. n 1911 Gesov, on his return from the west, had a long discussion with Milovanovic in the train between Belgrade and Nish, and secret negotiations continued throughout the winter. The coming of age of Prince Boris of Bulgaria in Feb. 1912 was at- tended by the crown princes of Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Rumania, and this demonstration was widely regarded as a symbol of increasing cooperation between the Christian States of the peninsula. On March 13 1912 a secret treaty of alliance was concluded between Serbia and Bulgaria, and was supple- mented on May 12 by a military convention. On May 29 a similar treaty was concluded between Bulgaria and Greece. There was no actual treaty binding Serbia and Greece, while the Serbo-Montenegrin treaty, concluded as late as Sept. 1912, was less political than military and provided for separate though parallel action.
The Treaties. By the terms of the Serbo-Bulgarian agree- ment each State was bound to assist the other with all its forces, in the event of an attack by one or more States unspecified, and in particular in the event of any Great Power trying to annex any portion of Turkey's Balkan possessions. If internal troubles should arise in Turkey, either ally might initiate pro- posals for military action, and any point upon which agreement was not reached, should then be referred to Russia for decision. Special provision was made for possible conquests, Serbia rec- ognizing Bulgaria's rights over the territory lying east of the Rhodope Mountains and the Struma river, and Bulgaria simi- larly recognizing Serbia's rights north and west of the Sar (Shar) Mountains. The districts lying between these limits^
1 See Samouprava, Oct. 28 1913.
