with their Serbian comrades across the lines. It is probable that Savov did not aim at regular war, but hoped by a sudden shock to drive a wedge between Serbs and Greeks, seize the coveted districts of Macedonia and then hold them until the foreign intervention which he believed to be imminent should settle the dispute on a basis of " beati possidentes." This is borne out, not merely by captured despatches, but by the amaz- ing fact that when Putnik's forces everywhere held their own, Savov on July I telegraphed the order to stop hostilities. But the war so lightly begun could no longer be stopped. That afternoon the Serbian counter-offensive opened, and a proclama- tion of King Peter, prepared some weeks previously in Belgrade, with a blank space for insertion of the date, was issued to the troops. The desperate struggle which continued almost uninter- ruptedly from July I to 9 is known as the battle of the Bregal- nica (Bregalnitsa), though it actually extended over a much wider front. At its close the Bulgarians found themselves cut into two by the inaccessible Plaskovica Mts., and were obliged not merely to relax their hold upon the Vardar valley at Krivo- lak, but to abandon the whole Ovcepolje (Ovche Polye) district, the strategic key to central Macedonia.
It appears certain that the original attack took place without the knowledge of the Danev Cabinet and contrary to its unani- mous decision. 1 But that the premier was contemplating war at an early date is shown by his request that Vienna should ascertain whether the Turtucaia-Balcik (Balchik) line would buy Rumania's neutrality (June 28) and by his warning to the Rumanian minister that Serbian resistance would be over before Rumania could complete her mobilization (July i). That there were two parallel policies in Sofia is further shown by the fact that on the very day of the request to Vienna the Rumanian Government officially informed Bulgaria that it would not remain neutral in the event of war. During the mutual re- criminations that followed defeat, Dr. Danev publicly asserted (i) that Count Tarnowsky had already given assurances to King Ferdinand that Austro-Hungarian troops would re-occupy the Sanjak in the event of a Serbo-Bulgarian war, and (2) that on June 26 a treaty was signed between Austria-Hungary and Bul- garia, by which the latter bound herself, in the event of an Austro- Serbian or an Austro-Russian war, to mobilize enough troops to paralyse Serbia's action, while Austria-Hungary in her turn undertook to prevent, either by diplomatic or military action, any attack of Rumania upon Bulgaria in the event of the latter becoming involved in war with the allies, and even to intervene herself, should the war take a turn unfavourable to Bulgaria. These assertions have never been contradicted: the first co- incides with the known facts, but for the second documentary evidence is as yet lacking. The memorandum addressed by Radoslavov and Genadiev to King Ferdinand on July 6 advocating a close accord with Austria-Hungary as the sole hope of averting disaster neither proves nor disproves the ex- istence of an alliance, for they may well have written in igno- rance of a secret compact; but it should have served as an index to the attitude of those statesmen in 1915.
The Treaty of Bucharest. By July 17 the Serbs had forced back the Bulgarians at all points to the frontier of 1912, and could henceforth adopt a mainly defensive attitude; but on July 16 Rumania declared war and began to throw troops across the Danube, while on July 15 the Porte repudiated the provisions of the Treaty of London and ordered Enver Pasha to advance upon Adrianople.
The frantic appeals of Sofia to the Powers to enforce upon Turkey respect for a treaty concluded under their auspices were disregarded, and Western public opinion was not inclined to save Bulgaria from the consequences of her own act. At the same time the entry of two new combatants greatly complicated Austria-Hungary's designs of intervention. She was held back by both her allies Italy, who viewed with alarm the Balkan activities of any outside power and was determined to insist upon compensation, and Germany, who feared the loss of Rumania for the Triple Alliance, and the consequent derange-
1 Gesov, The Balkan League, p. 92.
ment of the military balance in Europe. William II. was further influenced by a triple personal motive the appeal of his brother- in-law King Constantine, old friendship for King Charles, and active dislike for King Ferdinand. This momentary divergence of view between Vienna and Berlin sealed Bulgaria's fate: though Vienna and St. Petersburg united to hold back Rumania from occupying Sofia or claiming the Ruscuk (Ruschuk) -Varna line. Bulgaria had no course left but to sign an armistice on July 31 and to open peace negotiations at Bucharest with her four Christian neighbours. This apparent emancipation of the smaller Powers from the European concert's control decided Austria-Hungary in favour of belated action against Serbia. But on Aug. 9 the Italian Government made it clear to Vienna that it would not recognize the casus foederis of the Triple Al- liance as applicable to such a case; 2 and the combined pressure of Rome and Berlin, coupled with the certainty of Russian aid to Serbia, again averted war at the last moment.
The Treaty of Bucharest, signed on Aug. 10, gave to Rumania the Turtucaia-Balcik line, deprived Bulgaria of almost all her conquests in Macedonia and left her to settle the fate of Thrace as best she could with Turkey. Serbia acquired all Macedonia to the W. of the Vardar, and to the E. the districts of Slip (Istib or Shtip) and Kocana; but at the last moment Bulgaria was left in possession of a dangerous salient at Strumnica (Stru- mitsa), which enabled her to threaten Serbia's only railway connexion with the Aegean. The new Serbo-Greek frontier had already been fixed by mutual agreement, and ran from Gjevgjeli (Gyevgyeli or Gevgeli) (30 m. N. of Salonika) to the S.E. corner of the Lake of Okhrida, leaving Fiorina and most of the Monastir-Salonika railway to the Greeks. The Treaty of Constantinople, which was concluded between Bulgaria and Turkey on Sept. 29 and deprived the former of the greater part of Thrace, did not directly concern Serbia; but the indiffer- ence shown by her and her new allies, and still more by Britain and Russia, to Turkey's violation of a treaty which was their joint work and indeed was morally binding upon them, was to be dearly paid for by Bulgaria's attitude in the World War.
The treaties marked a new orientation in the Near East. Slav cooperation was replaced by mutual hatred, which promptly threw defeated Bulgaria into the arms of Turkey and pre- disposed both for an alliance with Berlin; Rumania's ties with the Triple Alliance were sensibly loosened, while Greece was drawn in two directions by dynastic attractions and party rancours. The military balance had undoubtedly been altered to the disadvantage of the Triple Alliance, yet it was to William II. that King Charles addressed a cordial telegram on the con- clusion of peace, " which thanks to you remains definitive," and it was to the joint efforts of France and Germany that Greece owed Kavalla.
The Albanian Conflict. Austria-Hungary now concentrated her attention upon Albania, and thereby rendered still more acute the relations between Serbs and Albanians. In the past three decades the latter had been rapidly ousting the former from the historic territories of Kosovo, Prizren and Decani (Dechani), and now tried to justify present possession by a claim as autochthonous owners of the soil. The mountain- ous and inaccessible character of these borderlands and the extreme backwardness of their population made a guerrilla warfare almost inevitable; and the summons addressed to Belgrade by the Great Powers for the withdrawal of the Serbian troops (Aug. 19) was a signal for further trouble. Late in Sept. there was a formidable Albanian rising, and the insur- gents, aided by numerous bands from beyond the frontier and armed with foreign rifles, seized Dibra and even Okhrida, and forced Serbia to remobilize the Morava division and many of her reserves. In order to prevent fresh raids, the Serbs occupied certain strategic points in Albania, and this gave Austria-Hun- gary excuse for a sharp warning. Thus for the first fortnight of October there was once more acute friction between Vienna and Belgrade. At last Serbia accepted the inevitable and with-
2 The essential facts were first revealed by Signer Giolitti in the Italian Parliament in Dec. 1914.
