New Construction.—Attention was at once given by the Shipping Controller to the need of construction, and a programme for standardized ships was laid down. The principle of standardization had already received practical recognition in June 1916, when the Standard Shipbuilding Co., to operate at Chepstow on the river Wye, was formed. This company received very powerful support, the capital being subscribed by, among other companies, the P. & O. and British India, New Zealand Shipping, Orient Steam Navigation, Federal Steam Navigation, Messrs. Furness, Withy & Co., the Shire Line, Messrs. A. Weir & Co., Messrs. Harris & Dixon, Messrs. Trinder, Anderson & Co., Messrs. Bethell, Gwyn & Co., and Messrs Birt, Potter & Hughes. Mr. James Caird, the head of Messrs. Turnbull, Martin & Co., was appointed chairman, and Mr. John Silley, managing director of R. & H. Green and Silley Weir, an old and famous shipbuilding firm, was appointed vice-chairman. In Aug. of that year this company acquired the engineering firm of Edward Finch & Co., Ltd., which had originally been formed to build Brunel's Bridge over the river Wye. In this yard three building slips were prepared, and at the beginning of 1916 two cargo steamers of 3,300 tons were being built there, in addition to a large number of smaller vessels. The first four slips for building steamers of up to 10,000 tons in the Standard Co.'s new yard were also being prepared. Difficulties had to be overcome in the way of securing sufficient labour and part of the scheme provided for the construction of a garden city. Early in 1917 much progress had been made with the provision of housing accommodation under licences from the Ministry of Munitions.
These yards were subsequently taken over by the Government. A great deal of money was spent upon them. Various difficulties arose, and the results of the work there were very disappointing. After the Armistice the great bulk of the property was sold to private interests.
On assuming office, Sir Joseph Maclay at once tackled the problem of shipbuilding, and appointed a committee to advise him on all matters connected with the acceleration of merchant ships under construction and nearing completion, and the general administration of a new merchant shipbuilding programme. This committee included Mr. (afterwards Sir) George J. Carter (of Messrs. Cammell, Laird & Co., Ltd.), president of the Shipbuilding Employers' Federation, as chairman; Mr. (afterwards Sir) W. S. Abell, (chief surveyor to Lloyd's Register of Shipping) ; Mr. (afterwards Sir) F. N. Henderson (of D. & W. Henderson & Co., Ltd.); Mr. James Marr (of J. L. Thompson & Sons, Ltd.); Mr. Summers Hunter (of the North-Eastern Marine Engineering Co., Ltd.); Mr. (afterwards Sir) C. J. O. Sanders (of the Marine Department, Board of Trade); and Mr. (afterwards Sir) W. Rowan Thomson (of Messrs. D. Rowan & Co., Ltd., president if the North-West (Clyde) Engineering Trades' Employers' Association); Mr. A. R. Duncan, secretary to the Shipbuilding Employers' Federation, who, as Sir Andrew Duncan was later appointed Coal Controller, was secretary to the new committee.
The last word in merchant shipbuilding then rested with the Admiralty, on the ground that it was necessary for the naval Authorities to determine what proportion of labour and material should be allotted to naval and merchant construction respectively. These proportions were dependent on the view held as to whether it was better to concentrate on the building of destroyers and other craft for the destruction of enemy submarines and for the protection of merchant vessels, or to build merchant ships. There was a great deal to be said for the theory that it was better to prevent ships being sunk than to build vessels to replace those destroyed. In May 1917 Sir Eric Geddes was appointed to the post of Navy Controller, and shortly afterwards, Maj.-Gen. A. S. Collard, director of inland waterways and docks, in the department of the director-general of movements and railways, was appointed deputy controller for auxiliary shipbuilding. The latter term was used to cover all merchant vessels. In July 1917, Sir Edward Carson was succeeded as First Lord of the Admiralty by Sir Eric Geddes, and Mr. (afterwards Sir) Alan Anderson became Navy Controller. The problem of merchant shipbuilding was at this time acute. The British shipping destroyed by the enemy in 1916 represented 1,498,000 tons, or nearly three times the production in British yards. This had fallen from the very poor total of 650,000 tons in 1913 to 541,000 tons in 1916. The peak in British shipbuilding had been reached in 1913, when 2,280,000 tons gross had been built, consisting of 1,920,000 tons of merchant vessels and 320,000 of warship tonnage calculated on a converted basis. It was to repeat such a production that the authorities at last aimed, the difficulties being enormously increased by the fact that large numbers of skilled men had been withdrawn from the shipbuilding industry for the fighting forces. The military authorities agreed to release such skilled men as could be spared, but as these were scattered over the various theatres of war, their return was very slow.
When responsibility for mercantile shipbuilding was transferred from the Ministry of Shipping to the Admiralty, some little friction arose between the new authorities responsible and the old Advisory Committee to the Shipping Controller, and in the autumn of 1918 a Shipbuilding Council to the Navy Controller was created, consisting of the members of the old Committee and advisers from the Admiralty. The position continued in some respects unsatisfactory, and in the spring of 1918, after an agitation for a more energetic merchant shipbuilding programme, Lord Pirrie was appointed Director-General of Merchant Shipbuilding, the official appointment being announced in the House of Commons on March 20 1918. He was regarded as the outstanding figure in British shipbuilding, and he was able to infuse energy into the shipbuilding programme. One of his first efforts was very greatly to improve the organization for the repair of damaged ships. Many vessels, after being torpedoed, managed to limp into ports, some of which, notably Falmouth, became seriously congested. A system of close and centralized control of the repairing facilities was organized, and much was done to make the damaged ships soon available again for service. The assistance of the United States in merchant construction had been earnestly invited. That country threw itself into the effort with immense fervour, and the height of the shipbuilding campaign was reached there in the summer of 1918. In June 1918, as responsibility for merchant shipbuilding now rested with the Department of the Controller-General, Sir Alan Anderson resigned from the position of Navy Controller. After the Armistice the responsibility for the completion of the merchant shipbuilding programme was transferred again to Sir Joseph Maclay, the Shipping Controller.
Financial results of the shipbuilding programme were described in the House of Commons on March 12 1921, by Col. Leslie Wilson, parliamentary secretary to the Ministry of Shipping. Colonel Wilson stated that the total cost of 228 ships built in the United Kingdom for the Government was £36,481,000, and that the ships were subsequently sold for £47,591,000, showing a total profit of £11,110,000. An agreement was entered into with the Government by Lord Inchcape, who undertook to distribute the ships to those British owners who desired them, in proportion to their losses. The agreement was made on the basis that no profit should accrue to him through the transaction. Outside the United Kingdom there were built for the British Government 122 ships, the vessels being built at much higher prices than those paid for the vessels constructed in the United Kingdom. The total cost of these vessels was £26,884,000, and the selling price was £18,289,000, showing a loss on the ships built abroad of £8,595,000. The net profit on 378 ships built and sold, excluding any allowance for depreciation, was £2,515,000. Colonel Wilson maintained that the Government would have been fully justified in taking depreciation into account, and, allowing 5% depreciation on 311 ships which were being worked, there would have been a net profit not of £2,515,000, but of £5,122,000. Again, but for the new ships it would have been necessary for the Government to try to charter neutral vessels, for which high rates of freight would have had to be paid. This would, it was estimated, have involved an additional expenditure of £27,000,000. There was no question that the Government acted wisely, at any rate from the financial point of view, in disposing of the ships when it did. They were offered to the ship-
