that date until Jan. 21 1920, when the Supreme Council met for the last time. Even then the work of the peace settlement was incomplete. What remained to be done was partly delegated to a council of ambassadors at Paris, partly left to the Premiers of the principal Powers, who continued to meet in consultation at irregular intervals during 1920 and 1921. The Conference separated before the Hungarians had decided to sign their treaty, and before the terms of the partition of the Ottoman Empire were finally agreed upon. It left the Adriatic question in such a state that 10 months elapsed before Italy and Yugoslavia could compose their differences. The total sum to be demanded from Germany in the name of reparation had not yet been settled, nor had the principal Powers finally agreed in what proportions this sum should be divided between them. But the events of 1920 showed that most, if not all, of these questions could be arranged without the cumbrous mechanism of a conference. An even more momentous uncertainty, the problem of the future attitude of the United States towards the treaties, w,ould obviously be solved at Washington and not at Paris. But the most urgent difficulties of the transition from war to peace had been met, so far as diplomacy could meet them, before the Conference was six months old; and, after the German treaty had been signed, the doings of the statesmen at Paris no longer excited the same interest as before. The most important of these statesmen, except the French Premier, M. Georges Clemen- ceau, soon made their exit. In the last days of June 1919 Mr. Wilson returned to the United States, Mr. Lloyd George to London. Sig. Orlando had fallen from power before the signing of the treaty, and his successor, Signer Nitti, abstained from visiting Paris. In July Mr. Lansing, the American Secretary of State, withdrew, leaving Mr. Polk, his under-secretary, to act for him. In Sept., after the signing of the Austrian treaty, Mr. Balfour departed and Sir Eyre Crowe became the chief British plenipotentiary. By June 28 the main outlines of the new map of Europe were drawn; the principles which were to govern all the treaties had been laid down; Germany had been rendered powerless for evil, and the Austro-Hungarian Mon- archy had ceased to exist.
The Secret Treaties and the Pre-Armistice Terms. The Allied and Associated Powers entered the Conference with a load of previous commitments. 1 The three chief European Allies had to consider many secret undertakings given at critical periods of the war. In April 1915 France and Great Britain had pur- chased Italy's cooperation by the Treaty of London, which gave very definite pledges regarding Istria, Dalmatia, Cisalpine Tyrol, the Dodecanese and Adalia. In May 1916 France and Great Britain had mapped out their future spheres of influence in the Ottoman Empire; and in 1917 there had been consequential arrangements with Italy. In Aug. 1916 all three Powers had given pledges to Rumania regarding her claims on Hungarian territory, pledges which Rumania at least did not regard as invalidated by her subsequent Treaty (of Bucharest, May 1918) with the Central Powers. In Feb. 1917 all three had agreed with Japan to uphold her claims on Shantung. Finally there were agreements of a less definite character with Serbia and with Greece. It remained to be seen how far these compacts could be reconciled with each other and with the views of the United States, who had not endorsed any of them and was officially unaware of them up to the opening of the Conference. There remained the pre-Armistice terms which were binding on all the parties to the Conference, and which indisputably must prevail wherever they came into conflict with treaties of prior date. Drafted at Washington, on the basis of a separate correspondence between Mr. Wilson and the German Government, they had nevertheless been considered and adopted (with certain amend- ments) by the Supreme War Council of the Allies as the founda- tion of the future peace. This meant that (with the exceptions which they or Mr. Wilson had specified in Oct. and Nov. 1918) the Allies were bound to impose no terms which clashed with
'For the preliminaries leading to the Armistice of Nov. n 1918, see under WORLD WAR. See also, for points unsettled at the Peace Conference, SILESIA and other appropriate headings.
Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points (of Jan. 8 1918), his Four Prin- ciples (of Feb. n), his Four Ends (of July 4) and his Five Particulars (of Sept. 27).
This peculiar obligation was the outcome of an offer, made by Germany on Oct. 4 1918, " to accept the programme set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of Jan. 8 1918, and his later pronouncements, especially his speech of Sept. 27," as a basis for peace negotiations. A similar offer was made by the Austro-Hungarian Government on Oct. 7. From Germany the President required, as a condi- tion precedent to negotiations, that " the military masters and monarchical autocrats of Germany " should be irrevocably deposed. To Austria-Hungary he intimated that in one par- ticular he could no longer stand by the Fourteen Points. It was no longer sufficient that the Czechoslovaks and the Yugo- slavs should be guaranteed autonomy within the Austro- Hungarian state. These peoples must now decide what action on the part of Austria-Hungary would satisfy their aspirations. A republican Germany and a partition of Austria-Hungary were thus indicated as fundamental conditions of the peace. The Central Empires accepted the fiat; and the European Allies then agreed to make peace with Germany " on the terms of peace laid down in the President's Address to Congress and the principles enunciated in his subsequent addresses," with two qualifications. They reserved judgment on the second of the Fourteen Points " relating to what is commonly known as the freedom of the seas." They pointed out that, in their opinion, the President's demand for the " restoration " of territories invaded by Germany should be understood to include " com- pensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea and from the air." The President accepted explicitly this meaning of " restoration," and accepted ex silentio the de- murrer as to the " freedom of the seas." After the Conference had begun, he stated to some American journalists (Feb. 14 1919) that the freedom of the seas was no longer needed, as in future (with a League of Nations in existence) there would be no neutrals. It will be noted that the reply of the Allies to the President only committed them with regard to the German treaty. The armistices signed by Austria (Nov. 3 1918) and Hungary (Nov. 13) were unconditional, and the Italian Govern- ment afterwards held that neither of these countries was en- titled to the benefit of the Wilsonian terms. But the legal point was not pressed by the Allies in general, even against Bulgaria and Turkey with whom Mr. Wilson had not negotiated at all. The general view was that Germany had negotiated on behalf of both herself and her Allies; and indeed the Wilsonian terms which Germany accepted made explicit references both to Austria-Hungary and to Turkey.
Purport of the Wilsonian Terms. The general principles contained in Mr. Wilson's manifestoes were not all of the kind that a Peace Conference could enforce or promote. Some were principles of international morality; others could hardly be realized in a world which was still convulsed by national and racial animosities, by the sense of intolerable wrongs and of crushing disillusionments. The time was not yet ripe for in- sisting that the victors, equally with the vanquished, should abstain from " private international understandings of any kind," should throw down all " economic barriers " and should guarantee " equality of trade conditions " (most favoured nation treatment) to their former enemies. Still less could the Allies agree at that date to give " adequate guarantees " that their armaments should be " reduced to the lowest point con- sistent with domestic safety " within any definite period of time. It was easier for the Allies to accept some other prin- ciples which made a strong appeal to the moral sense of man- kind: as, for instance, that nations ought to be governed in their foreign policy by the rules of private honour and by respect for the common law of civilized society; that " every part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case, and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent"; and that "no
