Bavarian and IX. Reserve Corps. But no success was obtained, although the divisions were mainly fresh ones. The work of attacking was hampered by the indistinct nature of the country and the endless maze of trenches. The British opposed the attack with fresh forces, and, particularly by 'the skillful use of their machine-guns, impeded the advance of the attacking force. North of the Scarpe the ist line divisions, after some insignificant successes at the start, met with strong British counter-attacks, which threw back the attackers for the most part to their starting positions. Only the two localities, Gravelle and Roeux, remained in German hands. The Command did not put in any reserves.
South of the stream the localities of Neuville and Ayette yielded to the bold assaults of the German divisions fighting in that quarter, but no decisive success was attained. The taking of several thousand prisoners, and heavy losses on the Allied side, were the only positive results of the Mars attack, which had failed for two reasons it was obviously on too narrow a front and had not been launched as a surprise.
The Supreme Command now gave up the VI. Army attack on the Loretto height, and ordered the XVII. Army, including its right wing, to stand on the defensive.
The extension of the attack S. of the Oise had no such wide operative aims. It was designed in the first place to protect the projecting left flank of the XVIII. Army and the road running behind it through La Fere-Chauny-Nayn, which was indispen- sable for bringing up drafts. To ensure this the Ailette line, which cut off the reentering angle between the XVIII. and VII. Armies, had to be won. The task was entrusted to the general commands of the VIII. Army Corps and the VIII. Reserve Corps under the leading of the 7th Higher Army Command. The attack was led from the N.E. in view of the difficult Oise crossing. The attacking force, on April 6, took the French who were apparently in no great strength obviously by sur- prise, and pushed through South Chauny and Amigny to Marizelle and Barisis railway station. On April 7, after a short preliminary bombardment, the attack was continued, and Pierremande and the Coucy Wood were reached with only slight opposition. On the 8th the VIII. Army Corps advanced to the Ailette, S. of Le Bac d'Arblincourt, and stormed Champs. The VIII. Reserve Corps captured Coucy le Chateau, and reached the road Coucy-Landricourt-Arizy at nightfall. Finally on the 9th the two corps won the Oise-Aisne Canal along the whole front.
In a 4-days' struggle the problem had been smoothly solved. The victors held 2,300 prisoners. The front had been consider- ably shortened, and the possibility of successful attacks even against French defenders had been established. (W. M.-Lo.)
III. THE BATTLE OF AMIENS, AUG. 8-22 1918
At the beginning of the fourth week in July, the German offensive on the Marne and in Champagne, which had been intended by their Higher Command as decisive, had been bril- liantly repulsed by an Allied counter-blow, which had not only thrown back the enemy over the Marne but was forcing him back to the Vesle. Gen. Foch was resolved to follow up the ad- vantage thus gained and assume the offensive on all his front as soon as possible ; but it was essential before so doing to clear the main railway lines running laterally behind his front, several of which were menaced or blocked by the enemy. The most important of these was the Paris-Amiens line, and it was there- fore decided that the first measure should be the freeing of this railway by a joint Franco-British attack on a wide front E. of Amiens. This operation was discussed first at a council of the four Allied commanders-in-chief, held at Bombon, near Melun, on July 24 1918 and further in a conference between Gen. Foch and Sir D. Haig on the 26th, and was finally embodied in a directive issued by the Allied Generalissimo on the 28th. It was therein laid down that the offensive should be conducted by the IV. British and I. French Armies, under the command of Field-Marshal Haig; that covered by the Somme, it should be pushed as far as possible in the direction of Roye, and that the road from Amiens to that place should be the dividing line
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between the two armies. The date fixed, at first Aug. 10, was later advanced to Aug. 8.
Preparation for the British Attack. An operation similar to that ordered had for some time been contemplated by the IV. Army, and preparations for it were therefore pressed on from July 26 onwards. At this date the army, under Gen. Rawlinson's command consisted of the Australian (Monash) and III. Corps (Butler), (8 infantry divisions and one cavalry division), on the front Albert- Villers-Bretonneux. By the date of the attack it had been reinforced by the Canadian Corps (Currie) (4 in- fantry divs., another Australian infantry div., and 2 cavalry divs.), while the artillery was brought up to a total of over 2,000 guns, the aircraft to 28 squadrons and the tanks to 456 machines, 96 being whippets. The difficulties of effecting the concentration of these masses of troops and material, while keeping it secret from the enemy, were successfully, overcome by means of elaborate precautions surpassing even those taken by the Germans before their spring and summer offensives. The cavalry, whippet tanks and part of the artillery were moved into the IV. Army area by road, the remainder (far the larger proportion) of the troops and material, being brought up in the period Aug. 1-8 in some 300 special trains. It was re- garded as of the utmost importance to keep secret the arrival of the Canadians; in order to deceive the enemy, the troops them- selves were deceived; Canadian units were sent from Arras into the trenches in Flanders, and the corps was actually brought into line, only a few hours before the attack, relieving the right of the Australian Corps, which had by Aug. i taken over the front from the French as far as the Amiens-Roye road. The precautionary measures taken were entirely successful in their object of ensuring that no warning of the attack should reach the enemy.
The front of the IV. Army attack extended from the Ancre S. of Albert to the Amiens-Roye road, a frontage of some 13 m.; three successive objectives were assigned, at distances, respec- tively of about 2-2, 3-5, and 6-8 m. from the original starting line, which would bring the army eventually on the line of the " Amiens outer defences," on the front Le Quesnel-Harbon- nieres-Morcourt. The country, open rolling downland, was favourable for the operations of all arms; the enemy's defences were not formidable. The hostile forces believed to be available to oppose the British, consisted of the LI., XI. and XIV. German Corps (seven divisions in first line and eight in support and reserve) belonging to Gen. v. der Marwitz's II. German Army.
By the morning of Aug. 8 all preparations for the battle had been successfully completed and the British forces were, all unsuspected by the enemy, about to enter on the first stage of their march to the Rhine.
The British Offensive on Aug. 8. Punctually at 4:20 A.M. on the morning of Aug. 8 the British infantry and tanks, under cover of a powerful barrage, debouched to the assault. Thick ground-mist veiled their advance from the eyes of the Germans, who were completely surprised and in an instant overwhelmed with little resistance. The Canadian Corps sector extended from the Amiens-Roye road to the Amiens-Chaulnes railway; 156 tanks cooperated in the attack of this corps. Opposed to them k was the ngth German Div., which was in process of being relieved by the nyth Division. The 3rd Canadian Div. on the right of the line, making light of the difficult task of debouching from a narrow bridgehead on the S. bank of the Luce river, set foot on the plateau between that stream and the Avre, captured Hangard and Demuin, and by noon had carried its front forward to the second objective, between Cayeux and Mezieres. Thence- forward the 3rd Cavalry Div. took up the advance, followed by the 4th Canadian Div.; the cavalry, after taking Beaucourt, were held up by machine-gun fire, and though the infantry when they arrived succeeded in pushing forward, it was not found possible to reach Le Quesnel, the final objective, which at fall of night was still strongly held by the enemy. The centre and left Canadian Div., and the ist and 2nd, attacked each on a front of one brigade, employing a separate brigade for each successive objective; the ist Div. met with little serious
