opposition as far as the first objective, which it reached at 6 -.20 A.M. but the 2nd Div. only attained it an hour and a half later, having had heavy fighting at Marcelcave. At 8:20 A.M. the advance was resumed, and again the ist Div. had the easier task, the German machine gunners putting up considerable resistance against the 2nd Division. Two brigades of the ist Cavalry Div. now passed through to the front, and drove far into the hostile territory, capturing Caix, and attaining the final objective, in conjunction with the Canadian infantry, which moved behind them clearing up the ground already passed over by the cavalry. By 5:35 P.M. the Canadian Corps had, with the exception already noted on its extreme right, carried out its appointed task; it had penetrated the enemy's defences to a depth of over 8 m., capturing 1 2 villages, over 6,000 prisoners and 1 60 guns.
The Australian Corps advanced between the Amiens-Chaulnes railway and the Somme against the 4ist, ijth and parts of the io8th and 43rd German Divs. The Australians had their 2nd and 3rd Divs. in first line and their 5th and 4th in support, the ist Div. being in reserve N. of the Somme; 168 tanks were attached to the corps. The corps was drawn up by its com- mander in such a manner as to necessitate a double " leap frog- ging " of its divisions, while equalizing the exertions demanded of them and the distances to be traversed by them; and this complicated manoeuvre was carried out with entire success. The 2nd and 3rd Divs., assisted effectively by the tanks, carried Warfusee and Cerisy, and then relinquished the attack to the 5th and 4th Divs. which pushed forward beyond Baronvillers and Morcourt, despite heavy flanking fire from the German artillery on the N. bank of the Somme. On the second objective being reached at 10:30 A.M. a brigade of the ist Cavalry Div., with 1 6 whippet tanks, passed forward to Harbonnieres, and an armoured car battalion raced forward down the Amiens-Brie road, scattering death and destruction far to the E. in the enemy's back areas. Behind them the Australians, throwing back their left to face the enemy on the N. bank of the Somme, pushed forward their centre and right to the final objective, just W. of the line Vauvillers-Proyart, where they found the cavalry held up. In the space of under six hours, between this opening of their attack at 6:20 A.M. and the attainment of the above line about midday, the Australian Corps had occupied seven villages, and taken over 8,000 prisoners, 173 guns and much other booty too numerous to mention.
On the N. of the Somme the operations of the III. Corps had not, however, met with the expected measure of success. It had been intended to advance with the s8th, i8th and i2th Divs. to a river from the line W. of Etinehem to W. of Morlancourt, thus securing the left flank of the main attack S. of the Somme; 34 tanks were detailed off to assist this attack. The programme of attack was disarranged by a partial advance of the enemy on Aug. 6 which forced back the i8th Div., and from the first mo- ment difficulties were met with. Sailly Laurette was carried after stiff fighting by the s8th Div. and eventually the first objective was reached along the whole corps front. The further advance of the s8th Div. broke down against the resistance of the enemy holding the Chipilly spur and the i8th Div., which succeeded for a time in gaining ground farther to the N., were counter-attacked and forced to fall back. The enemy on the III. Corps front was not surprised, and fought well, and the attacking infantry were unable to find much support from the tanks, for which the ground was unsuitable in many places; 2,400 prisoners were taken by the III. Corps, together with 40 guns. , The results of what had undoubtedly been the most successful day's battle waged hitherto by the British army in the World War, and one of the finest British victories of all time, were the complete defeat of n German by n British divs., a gain of ground to an average depth of 6 to 7 m. on a front of 8, and the capture of close on 17,000 prisoners, 373 guns, several thousand machine-guns, and quantities of ammunition and stores. Most important of all, the battle revealed to the enemy Higher Com- mand weaknesses hitherto unsuspected in their army, and destroyed the last hope of German victory. " It was," says
Ludendorff, " the black day of the German army in the war. It was the worst experience I had to go through. It marked the decline of our fighting strength and destroyed our hopes of a strategic improvement. To continue would be a gamble. The war would have to be ended."
Operations of I. French Army around Montdidier (Aug. 8-n). The plan of Gen. Fayolle, commanding the French reserve group of armies, involved not only the participation of Gen. Debeney's I. French Army in the British operations N. of Montdidier but a subsequent extension of the attack to the S. of that town by the right wing of that army and eventually as far as the Oise by the French III. Army (Gen. Humbert). Gen. Foch sanctioned this scheme on Aug. 3, and it was decided that the attack S. of Montdidier should take place on the pth and that of Humbert's army on the loth.
The French I. Army at this time held a line from the British right flank near Domart to Castel on the Avre and thence along the W. bank of that stream to Courcelles, S.E. of Montdidier, whence the French III. Army continued the line to the Oise. Debeney had under his command the XXXV., X., IX. and XXXI. Corps (in line in that order from right to left) and the II. Cavalry Corps in reserve, in all 12 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions. In face of him stood the 2 left divisions of the German LI. Corps, of von der Marwitz's II. Army, as far as Moreuil, and 7 divisions in line with 2 in reserve, belonging to Von Hutier's XVIII. Army, from Moreuil southwards. The enemy on this front had recently withdrawn his line behind the Avre as a result of several small French operations on the W. bank and was therefore well on the alert.
Debeney's plan for the forthcoming operations consisted first of an advance by his two left corps in the angle between the Luce and the Avre in conjunction with the British right, fol- lowed by the passage of the Avre and the Trois Doms and a rapid advance to the plateau around Hangest on both sides of Montdidier by his centre and right, and the capture of that place. The whole army was then to push forward astride the Avre in the direction of Roye.
This programme was carried out without a hitch. The French bombardment commenced at 4:20 A.M. on the 8th, the hour of the British attack, and the infantry and tanks of the XXXI. Corps debouched between the Luce and Moreuil at 5:5 A.M. The German LI. Corps on this part of the front, was, contrary to expectation, taken unawares and put up little resistance; many prisoners were captured while engaged in cutting corn in the fields. Moreuil was taken and the way cleared for the IX. Corps farther S., which about 9 A.M. began to cross the Avre on foot-bridges thrown under cover of darkness early that morning. Here there was stiff fighting, and it .was not till late in the day that the tanks were got across the river and cleared the way for the infantry, which at nightfall had reached the line Fresnoy- Plessier. Behind the IX. Corps, the X. was passing the Avre, and preparing for its S.E. advance on the morrow to encircle Montdidier from the N., while the XXXV. Corps was about to execute a similar manoeuvre from the south.
The second stage of the operations commenced early next morning, the pth. In order to secure the left of the X. Corps in its advance on Montdidier the XXXI. Corps attacked Hangest and occupied it about 1 1 A. M. The X. Corps, passing the Avre and the Trois Doms in its turn, took over the IX. Corps, and, assisted by the latter's artillery as well as its own, pushed forward to the E., meeting with considerable resistance, while the XXXV. Corps, debouching against Assainvillers at 4 P.M., took the enemy by surprise and advancing some 3 m., reached and cut the Montdidier-Roye road near Faverolles. The gar- rison of Montdidier, their retreat threatened from two sides, fell back hastily under cover of darkness by the road to Guer- bigny, leaving behind a rearguard which fell into the hands of the French X. Corps on their entry into the town on the morn- ing of the toth.
Debeney, urged by Foch in a personal letter " to push for- ward towards Roye and there join hands with the French III. Army " (which was due to open its attack between Courcelles
