on Lassigny, and by nightfall the XXXIV. Corps was on the line Onvillers-Boulogne-La Neuville.
On the nth the XV. Corps on the right of the army was put into the attack directly against the front of the " Petite Suisse," while the XXXIV. continued to progress to the N. of it. The resistance of the XVIII. German Army, reinforced by an extra division, stiffened appreciably during the day, and all along the line there was hard fighting. Hostile machine gunners ensconced in the broken country made the advance slow and painful; every foot of ground had to be fought for and the French could only advance step by step. After a week's fighting, the " Petite Suisse " still remained partly in German hands, while the French left wing was not yet in possession of Lassigny. The German XVIII. Army which, as already mentioned, had brought back its right flank to Roye on the evening of the pth and was now also withdrawing its left along the Oise, fought stubbornly to secure time for the evacuation of its artillery and material Nevertheless the French III. Army made daily headway.
It was not, however, till the offensive by the French X. Army on the E. of the Oise threatened by its rapid progress to imperil the retreat of the Germans in the " Petite Suisse " that Hum- bert's troops could finally force them from their stronghold. On the morning of the 2ist the German XVIII. Army fell back all along the line; the French infantry occupied Lassigny and cleared the wooded highland and by the 22nd had reached the line of the Divette, where they were halted to regroup and pre- pare for a renewed advance.
In the thirteen days' fighting Humbert's 7 divisions had driven from their strong vantage ground 8 enemy divisions and had taken from them 5,000 prisoners and 100 guns.
General Results of the Battle of Amiens. The course and results of the fortnight's fighting between Aug. 8 and 22 may be summed up as follows: The three Allied armies engaged (IV. British, I. and III. French), with 32 divisions, had attacked and defeated the II. and XVIII. German Armies, in all 42 divisions. Of these 42 divisions 30 were originally in line or reserve at the moment of the attacks, and 12 were put in from other parts of the front, being drawn from seven different German armies, belonging to three different army groups. The Allies advanced to a depth of between 6 and 14 m. on a front of 47, taking a total of 40,000 prisoners, 600 guns, thousands of machine-guns, quantities of ammunition, materiel and stores of all kinds. A wide breach had been made in the German front, susceptible, as events showed, of being rapidly widened to either flank by further Allied attacks. A shattering blow had been dealt to the moral of the German army and the German Higher Command, from the effects of which neither was destined to recover. The Battle of Amiens was the first page in the story of the Allied victory of 1918. (X.)
IV. BATTLE OF BAPAUME-PERONNE, AUG. 2I-SEPT. 2
The first conception of the battle of Bapaume-Peronne was laid down in a directive from Marshal Foch to Field-Marshal Haig, written on Aug. 10 that is at the moment when the battle of Amiens had just been crowned with a brilliant success, and the enemy was retiring E. along the whole front from the Ancre to the Oise under the pressure of the British IV. and French I. and III. Armies. In this directive it was enjoined that " enterprises of the British III. Army in the general direction of Bapaume and Peronne should be prepared as soon as possible," while " the action of the British IV. Army should be pushed in the direction of Ham." Further instructions for the enlarge- ment of the battle towards the N. to take place simultaneously with its extension to the S. by the advance of the X. French Army between the Oise and the Aisne (timed for Aug. 20), were sent to Haig on the 12 and it was finally decided that the advance of the III. Army should commence on the 2ist and be followed by a general offensive on the front of that Army and the IV. Army two days later.
The general scheme of the operations between the Somme and the Scarpe was based, according to Lord Haig, on the following Considerations:
" The enemy did not seem prepared to meet an attack in this direc- tion and owing to the sucess of the IV. Army, he occupied a salient, the left flank of which was already threatened from the south. A further reason for my decision was that the ground N. of the Ancre river was not greatly damaged by shell fire and was suitable for the use of tanks. A successful attack between Albert and Arras in a S.E. direction would turn the line of the Sqmme S. of Pe"ronne and gave every promise of producing far-reaching results. It would be a step forward towards the strategic objective St. Quentin-Cambrai. This attack moreover would be rendered easier by the fact that we now held the commanding plateau S. ol Arras about Bucquoy and Ablainzeville, which in^he days of the old Somme fighting had lain well behind the enemy's lines. In consequence we were here either astride of or to the E. of the intricate systems of trench lines which in 1916, we had no choice but to attack frontally, and enjoyed advantages of observation which at that date had been denied us. It was arranged that on the morning of Aug. 21 a limited attack should be launched N. of the Ancre to gain the general line of the Arras-Albert railway, on which it was correctly assumed that the enemy's main line of resistance was sited. The day of Aug. 22 would then be used to get troops and guns into position on this front and to bring forward the left of the IV. Army between the Somme and the Ancre. The principal attack would then be delivered on Aug. 23 by the III. Army and the divisions of the IV. Army N. of the Somme, the remainder of the IV. Army assisting by pushing forward S. of the river to cover the flank of the main operation. Thereafter if success attended our efforts, the whole of both armies were to press forward with the greatest vigour and exploit to the full any advan- tage we might have gained.
The line of the British IV. Army at the date of the opening of the new battle on Aug. 21 ran from Fransart by Chilly, Proyart and Dernancourt to Albert. The right of this line as far as the Bray-Corbie road was held by the Australian Corps (Monash) with five divisions (from the right, 4th Canadian, 4th Australian, 32nd, sth Australian and 3rd Australian) in line and three (ist Canadian, ist Australian and 2nd Australian) in reserve. To the left of this the III. Corps (47th, i2th and i8th Divs. in line and s8th in reserve) continued the line to the army boundary northward of Albert on a front running along the W. bank of the Ancre as far as Beaucourt and thence W. of Puisieux, Bucquoy and Moyenneville to the Cojeul. The III. Army held the line in order from the S. with the V. Corps (Shute) with the 38th and 2 ist Divs. in line and the 1 7th in reserve, from N. of Albert to Beaucourt; the IV. Corps (Harper) with the 42nd, New Zealand and 37th Div. in line and the sth and 63rd in support, extending as far as opposite Ablainzeville; and the VI. Corps (Haldane) (2nd Guards, 56th and 52nd Divs. in front line, with the 3rd in rear), as far as the army boundary.
Facing these troops the German II. Army (v. Marwitz) held the front opposite the IV. British Army, from N. of Roye to N. of Albert. This army, after its battering on Aug. 8 and succeeding days, held its front with 16 divisions, retaining 7, mostly ex- hausted and reduced in numbers, in reserve. The XVII. Army (Otto v. Below) was on the right of the II. extending as far as Avion, S. of Lens. On the eve of the attack this army had n divisions in first line and 2 in reserve. Both of these armies, together with the IX., to the left of the II., belonged to the newly-formed Army Group of von Boehm, whose area of com- mand thus extended from N. of the Scarpe to the Aisne.
First Stage of III. Army's Advance (Aug. 21-26). The main attack on the front of the British III. and IV. Armies was timed for Aug. 23 and the two previous days were to be in some sense only a prelude. The operation to be undertaken on Aug. 21 consisted of an advance by the IV. and VI. Corps on a front of 9 m. from opposite Miraumont to Moyenneville, while the left division of the V. Corps secured the right flank of the attack along the Ancre. The general objective was to be the line of the Arras-Albert railway, the attainment of which involved a penetration of the hostile front to a depth of 2 to 3 miles.
The attacking infantry, supported by tanks and covered by a strong barrage, moved forward at 4:55 A.M. The enemy was fully aware of the probability of an offensive on his XVII. Army sector and had adopted his well-tried system of defence in depth, the positions forward of the railway being lightly held by weak forces. These were rapidly driven in along the whole front of attack, their task being rendered difficult both by thick mist and smoke thrown out to cover the advance of the assaulting infantry.
