turn would accelerate the process of their disintegration. The experiment, so far as Senor Urzaiz was concerned, proved a failure. A man with a strong will and little adaptability, he came into conflict with his chief and was dismissed before he had time to resign (Feb. 25). The union of the two branches of the party which this Cabinet consecrated was apparent. Apart from the underlying cleavage between the Garcia Prieto and the Ro- manones groups, the party showed further signs of division owing to the rising ambitions of Senor Alba, who by a clever use of the opportunities of his new office, made for himself an envi- able reputation of a bold democratic tax-legislator. His bill on war profits aroused the opposition of all the minorities except the socialist. Yet Count Romanones, with a fine political flair, backed his Finance Minister. The matter, however, was purely political, for the bill had not been passed when the Cortes was closed, a general railway strike having suddenly upset all Government plans on July 13. Count Romanones faced the conflict with an unusual luxury of precautions, constitutional guarantees were suspended in the whole peninsula, and martial law declared in Madrid. But the strike was over one week later, and the autumn session was too deeply occupied in the discussion of Senor Alba's ambitious budget schemes to think of the War Profits Bill. The discussion of these schemes dragged on till Dec. 19, when it was resolved to validate the old budget for the coming year, while the new one was i further discussed. The Government reappeared before the House on Jan. 19, but in the meantime Count Romanones had resigned and accepted office again with the same minis- try. This curious crisis (Jan. 9) was probably devised by the prime minister as a means to recover from the King the moral authority which some thought he had lost at the hands of the pro-German press, which accused him of drawing great profits as a business man from his foreign policy as a prime minister.
Count Romanones wore his neutrality with a difference, and, though the inheritor of Senor Date's policy, he did little to con- ceal his pro-Ally views. The natural development Res/srna- o f the war made every day more urgent the need of J?ma- defining a policy which would be something more nones. than a mere passive attitude. By Sept. 1916, Spain had lost more than 30,000 tons of shipping by torpedoing, and more than 50,000 in circumstances which were, to say the least, obscure. The shipping interests asked for Government help. A period of Government activity set in, during which Count Romanones was loyally seconded by Senor Gimeno, a pro-Ally Foreign Secretary, but the pro-German press countered by a fierce personal campaign against the weakest flank of the Govern- ment, the prime minister's industrial interests. On Jan. 31 Germany sent in a note establishing an " absolute blockade " of the Allied coasts. Count Romanones was committed to a policy which implied a firm answer to such a note. He gave it, for, though somewhat watered down by his pro-German col- leagues, the Spanish note of Feb. 6 signed by Senor Gimeno was a well-worded protest against German methods with neutral rights. But the prime minister was too shrewd a politi- cian not to realize that this firmness meant nothing unless backed with the will to fight if necessary, and that public opinion would not follow him so far. He therefore resolved to leave the Govern- ment there and then, at the top of the wave of his own policy. Other considerations of home policy were perhaps not altogether without effect on his decision. A dangerous social-political upheaval was taking place under his eyes. In March PoHf 1 /" an< ^ AprU> a serious strike situation developed in Upheaval. Madrid and Valladolid, which necessitated this second town being declared in a state of siege. In Barcelona, a military conflict, which was fundamentally to alter Spanish politics for years to come, was beginning to make itself felt. When on April 20 Count Romanones resigned, he took the easiest path. His fall, however, cost him the leader- ship of his party, the majority of which, somewhat frightened at his bold foreign policy, turned towards Senor Garcia Prieto, while Senor Alba consolidated a separate group. The new Ministry, under the premiership of Senor Garcia Prieto, was
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frankly neutralist, and Germany rightly interpreting the position felt freer to intensify its submarine campaign. But the Govern- ment had to concentrate on a far graver problem, the situation created by the so-called Committees of Defence. The artillery and engineer officers had been organized for years past into a Committee of Defence, the main object of which had been the maintenance of certain standards of professional honour and of certain rules of comradeship as to promotions, etc. The infantry officers had no such organization, their esprit de corps being less developed. But towards the middle of 1916, a system of infantry Committees of Defence had appeared, which soon evinced a tendency to claim authority over the army, and to interfere with the Government in such a manner that towards the end of the year, Count Romanones, then in office, insisted on their dissolution. Despite the reassuring reports of Gen. Alfau, Capt.-General of Barcelona, the headquarters of the organization, the system continued, a situation which was not altogether unconnected with Count Romanones' eagerness to resign in April 1917. General Aguilera, the War Secretary in Senor Garcia Prieto's administration which then took office, was frankly averse to the Committees, and ordered the leaders to be arrested. A reserve Junta had been prepared, which stepped into the shoes of the arrested officers, and the conflict was only aggravated. General Alfau was dismissed and General Marina sent in his stead. But meanwhile, probably owing to royal hints, a less disciplinarian line of action was taken, and the arrested men were released. It was known later that an ultimatum had been placed in the hands of Gen. Marina, with a time-limit of 12 hours (June i). Not unnaturally, the Govern- ment resigned. Count Romanones having refused to support any Liberal situation which would recognize the Com- mittees, Senor Dato was called to office, and on June DatoAxala 9 the Liberal party ended a short spell of office dur- Master. ing which its disintegration had rapidly advanced. Senor Date's Government capitulated before the Juntas and accepted their regulations in full.
This victory of a movement which, in its essence, was revolu- tionary, had an immense effect on immediate events as well as on the political evolution of the country. The revolutionary ferment was stimulated. A state of excitement and hope due to the plausible, high-spirited language of the Juntas spread over the revolutionary Left. The more responsible elements of advanced politics thought it necessary to give a lead to this popular spirit. Political manifestos asking for a renovation in Government and Constitution followed each other (Socialists June 12, Catalanists June 16, Left-Coalition June 16). All but three of the deputies and senators for Catalonia met on July 5 at Barcelona, and passed a resolution asking for an immediate meeting of the Cortes, and declaring that, should the Government refuse to comply with this request, a meeting of all the deputies and senators composing the Cortes would be called at Barcelona on July 19. The Government refused to recognize the right of the Catalan representatives to dictate its policy, and made it known that should the Assembly meet on the 1 9th it would be considered as rebellious and treated as such. The Assembly met, 13 senators and 55 deputies attending, including all the Socialist Republican and Reformist members of the Cortes, and, before the Civil Governor dissolved it by (formally) arresting one by one all its members, it voted con- clusions asking for a reform of the Constitution, and set up three commissions to prepare reports on reforms to be submitted to a second meeting to take place later. At one moment, it looked as if these 68 men would take the lead of the revolution- ary spirit which the bold action of the army officers had stirred in the country. But the mass of the Assembly was too dull, and no real leader manifested himself in it. Thus two attempts, one military, one middle-class, both directed against the evils of the old rtgime, failed through lack of coordination and mutual under- standing. A third attempt, and a third failure, was still to come. On Aug. 2 the railwaymen of the Northern railway announced a strike. Though at first the men appeared desirous of a settle- ment, neither the Government nor the company succeeded in
