words were sent. Ten years later, the volume of traffic had been
increased ten-fold. The war brought this up to some 26,000
words per day, or about 9,500,000 words per annum. Notwith-
standing the large capital cost of this line (2,000,000) it pro-
duced a gross profit of 94,000 for the year 1920, whilst its
reserve fund stood at nearly 1,107,000. To illustrate the high
strategic value of the line, during the war, if the Allies had hap-
pened to be even temporarily deprived of naval control, the
British Mediterranean cables would undoubtedly soon have been
cut, which would have meant that British inter-imperial tele-
graphic communication could only have been secured by means
of the All-British Pacific line. It had been felt for a long time
that, since the Imperial Pacific cable was laid as far back as 1902,
steps must be taken to duplicate it in order to provide against
complete breakdown, as well as for dealing with over-congestion.
In 1921, however, owing to the necessity for economy and to the
high cost of materials, it seemed probable that this duplication
would require to be limited, for the present, to the duplication of
the long, slow working, section in very deep water, i.e. the 3,458
n.m. between Bamfield (Vancouver) and Fanning I., which runs
into a depth of 3,400 fathoms (nearly 3! n.m.), and brings
down the resultant speed on the whole line to a low figure.
Perhaps nothing contributed more in the past to the leading commercial position of Britain than her enterprise in the matter of telegraph cables. Fortunately, too, she also recognized that the problem of Empire is largely a problem of communication. Arising out of the war to some extent, there has been a general demand for a great deal more inter-communication, not only be- tween different branches of the British Empire, but also between distant foreign countries. This demand must be met in the first place by a considerable addition to the world's cable system over and above those that were in operation previous to hostilities. The part of the British Empire which in 1921 was more especially badly served in the matter of telegraphic communication was the West Indies, where, largely owing to the nature of the sea bottom, the existing inter-insular lines (originally laid in 1870) were constantly breaking down. 1 But for "atmospherics" in these tropical regions, this would be an ideal case for " wireless." As it is, it would seem that an efficient air service would do most to improve prevailing shortcomings at any rate for mail purposes, the steamer service being also very deficient. From a world standpoint, however, probably the most acute need for additional cable facilities is in the Pacific Ocean, for, while the traffic over the N. Atlantic cables has been practically quadrupled since 19 13, Pacific cable traffic has increased nearly nine-fold.
The war also aroused the United States to her disadvantage in the matter of cable communication as compared with her trade rivals. Thus, on April 26 1921, the U.S. Senate passed a bill " to prevent unauthorized cable landings in the United States or any of its possessions." The bill gives the President sweeping author- ity also to issue, withhold and revoke licences as to cable landings, as well as for obtaining concessions for the United States in other parts of the world. Section 2 of the bill enables the President " to withhold or revoke such licence when satisfied such action will assist in obtaining for the landing or operation of cables in foreign countries or in maintaining the rights or interests of the United States." The President may grant such licence on such terms as will assure just and reasonable rates. The licence is not to give the licencee exclusive rights of landing or of operation, in the United States. The policy appears to be based chiefly upon con- siderations that shall guard against consolidation or amalgama- tion with other cable lines, while insisting upon reciprocal accom- modation for American corporations and companies in foreign territory. In 1920 the U.S. authorities refused to allow a cable laid for the Western Union Co. to be landed at a point on the coast of Florida on the ground that it was intended for connect- ing up, via Barbados, with the " Western Telegraph " system (at Maranham) of a British company. 2 The American Govern-
1 Report of the Royal Commission on Trade between Canada and the West Indies (Cd. 5369, 1910).
2 The prospects of trade with S. America are, in fact, so attractive that telegraphic communication therewith has been made a special
ment considered that allowing such a cable to be laid would have lent colour to the British company having sole rights of communi- cation between the United States and Brazil. As a matter of fact, another American company (All America Cables, Inc., of New York) 3 was also preparing to lay a cable to the Brazilian Coast, and it was thought by the U.S. Government that by acceding to the application of the Western Union Co., the claims to a monopoly being possibly established thereby might prevent the other cable being laid a cable greatly to the interests of American trade with Brazil. The United States had evidently determined to establish its own system of cables throughout the world, partly for high national reasons, but also with a view to developing trade, especially with S. America.
France also has shown a disposition to be increasingly active and enterprising in this matter; likewise Japan.
International Cable Conference, 1920-1. Probably no tele- graphic conference has ever been the scene of such acute disagree- ment on essential points as that which held sittings during parts of 1920 and 1921 at Washington. This was perhaps natural, when we remember (a) that Germany had been relieved of prac- tically all her cables, (ft) that the destiny of these cables was of first-rate importance to all the principal powers.
Soon after the confiscation of the German cables an agreement was entered into between Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, whereby these ex-German lines were to be severally distributed amongst them. The United States having come into the war some time later, it was proposed at the Conference, that these cables should, as a substituted arrangement, become the joint property of the five Allies.
The actual diversion of the German Atlantic cables was com- pleted by Great Britain in July 1917, and by France in Nov. 1917 in both instances after the United States had joined the Allies. The American view was, therefore, that neither of these appropriations of cables between the Azores (Portuguese possessions) and the United States could be justified, seeing that both the United States and Portugal were already allied with England and France in the vigorous prosecution of the war. Then again, no single section of the ex-German cable in the Pacific touched Japanese soil, but one landed on American territory (Guam). Thus it was argued that it was something of an anomaly that the Japanese should ever have seized the Ger- man cable system, to the great detriment of American trade with China and the Philippines and correspondingly to their own (Japanese) advantage.
There were probably few matters that could, in principle, be dealt with so suitably by the League of Nations as those associ- ated with international telegraphic communication. But that could only apply if, and when, the United States joined the League, or, on the other hand, in instances where America was in no way concerned. With ex-German islands and cables, how- ever, it was quite clear that the United States was very much concerned. Further, there was no nation whose interests wore liable to be so much affected by the mandate as regards Yap more especially in reference to the cable as the United States. The control of telegraphic communication between that island and China meant much to Japan. On the other hand, such an arrangement was regarded as contrary to American interests. In these circumstances, seeing that the United States was one of the "principal Allied and Associated Powers," the question was raised why such a mandate was ever granted to Japan without the assent of the United States. However, the Yap difficulty was eventually settled, so as to preserve American rights, at the Washington Conference in Dec. 1921 (see JAPAN; also WASHINGTON CONFERENCE).
consideration of recent years both in Britain as well as in the United States. Thus, in order to improve the then existing facilities, a cable was laid in 1910 by the Telegraph Construction & Mainte- nance Co. between St. Vincent, Ascension and Buenos Aires, these sections now forming a part of the Western Union Telegraph Co.'s system. In 1920, the same company laid a cable between Maran- ham and Barbados.
, a Formerly the Central & S. American Telegraph Co., with lines down the W. coast of the American continent.
