the ultimatum by marching on Teheran, and the Persians, recover- ing from their fond illusions, submitted. The failure of Shuster was disappointing. His selection was, perhaps, unfortunate, but, in any case, Russia would hardly have permitted him to succeed.
Bombardment of the Meshed Shrine, March IQI2. There were few acts more discreditable to Russia or more harmful to her true interests than the bombardment of the shrine of the Iman Riza, the chief centre of pilgrimage in Persia. The Russian consul-general at Meshed, who was determined to play a hostile rdle in Persia, had taken advantage of local disturbances to bring in a large Russian force under a major-general. There was no need for this, and the population, cowed by its arrival, was peaceful. This state of affairs, however, was not allowed to continue, as it meant no honours and no loot for the Russians. A notorious agent, provocateur was sent to the shrine, where he soon collected large crowds to listen to his incendiary speeches. This was all that was necessary and the shrine was bombarded by the Russians, nominally to expel the agitators. Actually they were taken away by night in a waggon under a Russian escort. Many innocent men and women were killed and wounded; the sacred tomb-chamber in which lie the remains of Persia's saint, close to those of Harun al Rashid, was repeatedly struck by the shell-fire; and the treasury, which contained the rich gifts of countless pilgrims, was removed, but was afterwards restored, although by no means intact. The outrage excited intense feeling in Persia and, to a lesser degree, throughout the Moslem world. It demonstrated beyond all doubt the sinister policy of Russia, and was the chief cause of the hatred with which the northern Power was regarded. In England the bombardment passed almost unnoticed, as it occurred simultaneously with the disaster to the " Titanic," which entirely absorbed public attention.
Persia in 1913. The year before the outbreak of the World War found Persia in a miserable plight. Russia was constantly strengthening her hold on the N. by seizing on, or creating, pre- texts for further intervention. Great Britain was bound by the Anglo-Russian Agreement to cooperate with the northern Power, but did her best to help Persia to maintain her independence, a task which native incapacity, intrigue and corruption rendered very difficult. In her sphere of influence in the S. she supported the organization and development of the Swedish gendarmerie by advances of money and by other means, and tried to secure capable governors for Pars and Kerman. The position in Pars, the storm-centre of southern Persia, remained thoroughly unsatis- factory. The Kashgai tribe, the most powerful in southern Per- sia, defied the governor-general and raided in Pars as did the Boir Ahmadis; the Khamseh Arabs raided the caravan routes in the Kerman province; and other tribes raided in the Pars, Yezd or Kerman provinces from time to time. It was generally realized that the evil was beyond the powers of the Persian Government to cure, but in pursuance of the British determination to avoid any increase of commitments a decision that was eminently sound action in the form of unsatisfactory palliatives was alone taken. Throughout this period, no Persian Cabinet would as- sume office without applying for a considerable advance of money from the two Powers. Money was given, the question of repay- ment was arranged, and there were practically no results. Much of the money was embezzled and the balance was spent to small advantage. The case of Capt. Eckford, who was killed by a raid- ing party of Boir Ahmadi tribesmen between Shiraz and Dasht-i- Arjan, is typical. The' governor-general of Pars, Mukhbir es Sultaneh, who played a sinister r61e in the World War, took ad- vantage of the incident to press for large sums of money, with which he proposed to raise a force of over 1,000 men, and expressed his confidence that he would be able to punish the Boir Ahma- dis and other evil-doers without difficulty. The Swedish gen- darmerie was already being organized in the province, but had the fatal defect from the point of view of a Persian governor-gen- eral that the money for their pay did not pass through his hands. At Teheran the Treasury was empty. A Cabinet bent on reform was being constituted with a programme which entailed a loan of about 5,500,000. Meanwhile, in order to support the governor- general of Pars in his unsuccessful attempts to restore order and punish the Boir Ahmadis, the British legation advanced a sum of 15,000 for three months and, later on, 100,000 for twelve and a half months. In Feb. 1913, the two Powers advanced Persia 400,000. The negotiations for a larger loan were connected with that of railway concessions of which some account is given below.
Salar ed Dauleh. Among the many difficulties of the Persian Government, that of Salar ed Dauleh was particularly irritating.
That troublesome prince had rebelled against his brother Mahom- med 'AH Shah, had been defeated and had been kept under honour- able arrest. When Mahommed 'AH Shah made a bid to regain the throne in 1911, Salar had, as mentioned above, organized a move- ment from the S.W. and proclaimed himself Shah but, again, had been decisively beaten. In 1912, the irrepressible prince reappeared on the scene and, after occupying Kurdistan, threatened Hamadan. Farman Farma, appointed governor-general of Kurdistan, held Kermanshah against him, inflicting a repulse which drove Salar to take to flight. He then proceeded to lead the life of a brigand chief, fomenting local troubles and blackmailing any wealthy landowner or merchant who was unfortunate enough to fall into his hands. After the. formation of the Cabinet of 'Ala es Sultaneh in 1913, it was decided to make terms with the prince who, mainly through Russian support, was nominated governor of Gilan. The regent realized the danger of appointing this " stormy petrel " to a post where he controlled the main route between Russia and the capital, and refused to sanction the appointment. The Russian Government, for a while, declined to permit it to be cancelled, but finally at the repeated request of the British, induced Salar to accept a pension and leave Persia. During the same period there was considerable anxiety as to the movements of the ex-Shah who, it was feared, was intending to make another bid for the throne, but the enquiries made by the British Government tended to show that there was no real cause for anxiety on the subject.
The Swedish Geiularmerie. The general condition of Persia is one of chronic anarchy which is more intense the nearer any particular locality may be to the powerful raiding tribes. This anarchy the Persian Government is impotent to stop until there is a radical change of character and a movement towards virility and honesty in the governing class. A study of the Blue Books from one point of view is a summary of outrages and of ineffectual measures taken for their punishment, the British minister making the best of an almost hopeless situation and staving off a total collapse by a ham I- to-mouth policy of doles, warnings and good advice. In view of the fact that Russia had organized a Persian Cossack brigade in the N., it would have been only befitting that Great Britain should organize a force for the restoration of order in the S., but so afraid of increased commitments was the British Foreign Office that it agreed to the Persian Government engaging Swedish officers for the formation of a gendarmerie and, in the summer of 191 1, a mission composed of 20 officers reached Persia under Col. Hjalmarson. The Swedes had no knowledge of the country, the Moslem people, the language or orien- tal intrigue. The Russians eyed their mission unfavourably and would have rejoiced at its failure. They considered that, if success- ful, the gendarmerie would certainly become a dangerous rival to the Cossack brigade, which was only nominally controlled by the Persian Government and was actually under the orders of the Russian legation. The Persian Cabinet, although anxious for die success of the gendarmerie, was generally apathetic and also irregular in making payments. The British legation, on the contrary, helped and supported the new force in every way, realizing that unless it succeeded in its very difficult task of restoring order, Persia might well break up into a number of robber-infested provinces. The Swedish officers who were drawn from the regular army, worked hard to train their men. At first, they enlisted the riff-raft" of Teheran but gradually recruited a better class of men. Their ignorance of how to deal with Moslems led them to make many mistakes, but this was after all only natural. Generally speaking, they made good progress at the capital and in its neighbourhood.
The British legation, which was watching the dwindling of trade in Fars and the increasing lack of law and order, constantly urged the necessity for sending a force of gendarmes to that province and, in Feb. 1913, the first detachment left for Shiraz. Col. Hjalmarson's scheme for Persia was to place 1,500 men as road guards in Fars supported by a mobile column of 1, 800 men. A contingent at Isfahan would form a link with headquarters at Teheran. He also intended to organize stations for the Qum-Sultanabad, for the Hamadan- Kermanshah, and the Samnan-Damghan routes. These schemes would require about 8,000 men and would bring up the number of instructors to twenty-eight. The cost would have been about 400,000 for the first year and, later on, considerably more. The problem of Fars was very difficult, owing both to the power and dis- position of the Kashgais, Boir Ahmadis and other tribesmen, and the rugged nature of the terrain. The Swedes made an unfortunate start at Bushire where they enlisted 168 men locally, many of them noted bad characters. These men, owing to two of their number being stripped naked and flogged, all resigned. Probably it was fortunate that they did so, for had they escorted a caravan of arms and ammunition to Shiraz, as was the original intention, it is hardly likely that it would have reached its destination with its contents intact. The gendarmerie marched into Fars and on the way made a success- ful attack on some Arab robbers, recovering a certain amount of looted property. Owing to the men belonging to N. Persia it was found impossible to take over the route near the coast, as the heat overpowered them, but they occupied it as far as Kazerun. At first the newcomers were not attacked, although the petty chiefs, who lived by blackmailing caravans, realized that if they remained their profits would cease. They were however afraid to move and the gendarmerie gradually established themselves and engaged a num-
