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DOES PRICE FIXING DESTROY LIBERTY?

mistake is in thinking it possible that there is no relief except by a liberty-destroying governmental interference. Every Political Economist knows that—except under monopolistic conditions—Freedom herself not only brings relief, meting out a proper punishment, if any punishment be deserved, but brings the only relief that, throughout the centuries, has ever proved effective. Chains and penalties but enhance prices to give the necessary inducement to face ignominy and danger.

The Spokane Company case^[1] affords another illustration of the impossibility of enforcing such a law except through injustice and short cuts. No adequate investigation of unjust, unreasonable and excessive prices can really be had; that a man bought at one price and sold at another, proves nothing in reference to prices. So far as observation goes, it has been the method universally adopted to establish in the cases before the court alleged profiteering.

Judge Rudkin seems as well to have misunderstood Mr. Justice Holmes' very valuable and clear^[2]

↑ United States vs. Spokane Co., 264 Fed. Rep. 209. 1920.
↑ Nash vs. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 1913, was a proceeding under the criminal sections of the Sherman Act. Nash, the president of the American Naval Stores Company, was indicted, together with other officials of the company, for alleged acts in restraint of trade dealing in turpentine and rosin. It was charged that the defendants bid down the price of the products so that competitors would be forced to sell at ruinous prices only, circulated false statements as to production and stocks on hand, established "closed ports" for purchasing, made tentative offers of large stores of the products to depress the market, fixed the price below the cost of production to drive competitors out of business, issued false warehouse receipts for turpentine and rosin, and were guilty of numeous other acts to accomplish the purpose stated. The defense was that the statute was so vague as to be inoperative on its criminal side, that the acts and things would not have constituted an offense if they had been done, and that such acts were too vaguely charged in the indictment. The Court, against the contentions of Nash, held that there was no constitutional difficulty in the way of enforcing the criminal part of the act, that the acts alleged if done

[1] United States vs. Spokane Co., 264 Fed. Rep. 209. 1920.

[p80-2] Nash vs. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 1913, was a proceeding under the criminal sections of the Sherman Act. Nash, the president of the American Naval Stores Company, was indicted, together with other officials of the company, for alleged acts in restraint of trade dealing in turpentine and rosin. It was charged that the defendants bid down the price of the products so that competitors would be forced to sell at ruinous prices only, circulated false statements as to production and stocks on hand, established "closed ports" for purchasing, made tentative offers of large stores of the products to depress the market, fixed the price below the cost of production to drive competitors out of business, issued false warehouse receipts for turpentine and rosin, and were guilty of numeous other acts to accomplish the purpose stated. The defense was that the statute was so vague as to be inoperative on its criminal side, that the acts and things would not have constituted an offense if they had been done, and that such acts were too vaguely charged in the indictment. The Court, against the contentions of Nash, held that there was no constitutional difficulty in the way of enforcing the criminal part of the act, that the acts alleged if done

[1]

[2]