ciples must necessarily be applied under the maxim: "Ubi eadem Ratio ibi idem Jus,"[1] the principle has been steadily, and from necessity of justice, wider and wider applied. "Like reasoning making like law."
It is not necessary to examine a multitude of cases, as the Supreme Court itself has thoroughly established this proposition in more than one decision unanimously arrived at. Reference to one of them, Spalding vs. Vilas,[2] must be sufficient to conclude this question. In that case the Postmaster General, not a Judge at all, reached and expressed an opinion in the course of his duty. He was under no necessity of such expression, but he did act in the performance of a duty entrusted to him. Alleged damage followed, and suit was brought against him. The Supreme Court, after examining the general cases applying to the Judiciary, inevitably reached the unanimous conclusion that for like reasons he must also be immune from suit, saying: "The allegation of malicious or corrupt motives could always be made, and if the motives could be inquired into Judges would be subjected to the same vexatious litigation upon such allegations, whether the motives had or had not any real existence. * * * The doctrine * * * has a deep root in the common law. It is to be found in the earliest judicial records, and it has been steadily maintained by an undisputed current of decisions. * * * It is essential in all Courts that the Judges who are appointed to administer the law should be permitted to administer it under the protection of the law, independently and freely, without favor and without fear. * * * How could a Judge so exercise his office if he were in daily and hourly fear of an action being brought against him,
