guns taking Ney s columns in flank on the march. The battle of the Alma, September 20, 1854, gives an example of the effect produced by the enfilade fire of a few guns. Two guns of Turner s battery boldly advanced to a knoll which had been left unguarded almost in the centre of the Russian position, took the Russian columns in flank, and with such effect as almost to decide the fortunes of the day. It has been explained that, in the early days of artillery tactics, guns had occasionally been massed, but usually with no clear aims as to their functions ; nor was this state of things altered until far into the Napoleonic era. It was at the camp of Boulogne in 1805 that a truer system of tactics was first practised, and it was at the battle of Friedland, on the 14th June 1807, that the first striking example of the effect of artillery when employed in masses was given. The Russians had crossed the river Alle and taken up position in front of the town of Friedlaud. Ney had been ordered by Napoleon to drive back the Russian left and occupy Friedland, but had met with a severe check, when the French artillery general Senarmont collected the divisional artillery of the 1st corps, and, dividing it into two batteries of 15 guns each, with a reserve of G gun?., placed a battery on each side of the road from Eylau, and by a converging and destructive fire of case broke the Russian columns, defeated all attempts on their part to resume the offensive, and finally drove the Russian left into the narrow
defile and re-entering bend of the river.At the battle of Wagram, Gth June 1809, Napoleon, pivoting on his left, advanced his right, turning the Austrian left, and attacked the centre with a mass of 100 guns. This imposing display of artillery power covered the French centre, and fixed the attention of the Austrian commander to the point, while the left was enabled to execute its turning movement. The French artillery, however, suffered excessively, the range being too short, and the want of mobility of the field batteries conspicuous.
The battle of Liitzen or Gross-Gorschen was fought between the allied Russians and Prussians and the French in May 1812. The former had 438 guns, the latter only 236. The allied artillery was not well handled, the fire being kept up in a dispersed and thriftless manner, the guns scattered between the infantry columns, and no powerful reserve being formed. Napoleon, reserving the artillery power he possessed, brought up a mass of 80 guns at the decisive moment, and with such effect that the allies gave ground and ultimately retreated.
The battle of Hanau, October 30, 1813, is a striking instance of an artillery fight. Napoleon was retreating from Erfurt after his defeat at Lcipsic. Wrede barred his retreat, holding the issues of the forest of Hanau. Wrede had formed a battery of GO guns, which for some time defeated all efforts of Napoleon to break out from the forest ; and it was only Drouet s skilful concentration of fire, from three gradually reinforced masses of artillery upon "Wrcde s large battery, that enabled Napoleon ultimately to win his way out.
For other illustrations of the use of artillery on the battle-field, the reader is referred to Taubert's work On the Use of Field Artillery, translated by Col. H. H. Maxwell, R.A., and Hohenhohe-Ingelfingen's treatise On the Employment of Field Artillery, translated by Capt Clarke, R.A.
In the Italian campaign of 1859 a close country prevented much use being made of artillery, but at Solferino both Austrians and French massed considerable numbers of guns, and a brilliant example of the use of artillery was presented on the plain of Medole. M Mahon having inclined to his left to support the attack on the Solferino heights, while Kiel was fully engaged with a superior Austrian force on his right, a gap was created between these two corps. To fill this a mass of 42 guns, supported by cavalry, formed on the plain of Medolo, and their fire frustrated all offensive attempts of the Austrians at this point. Rifled guns were employed by the French in this campaign, and without doubt contributed largely to their success.
In the struggle for supremacy of the two great German powers in 18GG, both combatants were armed with the new weapons, but their proper applications seem to have been totally misapprehended. The Prussian batteries were kept too much in rear of the other troops while on the march, and came into action at ranges which only a very exag gerated view of the powers of rifled guns could justify. At Trautenau, Nachod, and Skalitz their artillery played an unimportant part ; at Sadowa comparatively few of the vast number of their batteries came into effective action. The Austrian artillery had but little opportunity of dis playing superiority of management or tactical training, though its heroism and self-sacrifice in covering the retreat on the eve of Sadowa is worthy of mention.
Till, the campaign of 1870-71, the proper management and powerful effect of modern artillery was never thorouglily realised. The pungent criticism of certain anonymous writers on the 18GG campaign bore its fruits, and revolu tionised the system of artillery tactics. From the storming of the Spichern heights up to the capture of Le Mans the same tactical features were prominent on the victorious side. A battle was preluded by the bold advance of all available guns. The attack commenced with a concen trated fire of artillery, the moral, if not actual, effect of which enabled an offensive movement of infantry to be made with success, or at least kept the enemy in check till the flanking movements, so conspicuous in this war, were carried out. At Worth more than 100 guns were massed on the heights opposite Frb schwiller, and enabled a frontal attack to be made across the open valley of the Sauer. In the battles about Metz the massing of batteries was espe cially prominent. At Rezonville groups of 6 to 10 batteries acted in effective concert; at St Privat more than 200 guns cannonaded the French position for some hours. At Sedan the German guns were pushed forward regardless of escort, even in front of the advanced guards, and enclosed the ill- fated French army in what has been aptly described as a circle of fire.
In the Napoleonic wars guns were massed at the crisis of an engagement in order to strike a decisive blow, now they are assembled much earlier in order to render an attack possible. Modern artillery tactics may be summed up in a few words. The artillery of advanced guards is considerably increased, and the greater proportion of the corps and divisional guns march close to the head of the main columns. At the commencement of an engagement batteries are pushed to the front with great boldness, massed as much as possible, and concentrate their fire. Frequent change of position is deprecated, but guns must be kept within effective range, and their safety subordi nated to the success of the other troops. The contem poraneous action of the three arms is more common than it used to be.
In future wars it is doubtful whether the independent action of artillery will not be somewhat restrained. Me chanical contrivances may make the accurate finding of ranges possible, and the employment of shrapnel shell, with an efficient time-fuze, render artillery fire more destructive than it has hitherto been. The action of mitrailleurs will probably be important when their efficacy and sphere of employment are thoroughly comprehended. No great im provement in the range and accuracy of fire of guns can bo expected, as the practical limits of both have already been nearly reached. A few years may, however, witness the advent of a projectile power superior to gunpowder, and a shell more destructive than any at present in use. (See Guns and Gunnery.)
