THE ABSORPTION OF MEXICO 241
secure." On March 2, the outlook appeared more hopeful; on the third Benton and Webster are recorded as the leading opponents. The suspense came to an end, March 10, when the treaty was ratified at 10 p. m., 38 to 14, four senators not voting.
The reception of the treaty and its recommendation to the Senate clearly defined the position of the administration and tended to discourage the advocates of "all of Mexico." If Trist had returned as ordered and the war had been pro- longed, we should probably have acquired more territory, but how much more is of course uncertain. Calhoun in his opposition realized that every delay in bringing the war to a close would strengthen the expansion party and complicate the situation in ways that would contribute to advance their cause. ^ We can best realize the importance of the element of time in this matter and so appreciate the significance of Trist's unexpected action in securing a treaty if we remem- ber how long it took after the battle of Manila Bay for the final policy of acquiring all the Philippines to be developed. Trist's treaty arrived about four months after the news of the capture of Mexico City and it was at least four months and a half after the battle of Manila Bay before the present administration decided to demand all of the Philippines. Nor must we forget in this comparison that the formation and expression of public opinion through the agency of the press proceeds to-day at a much more rapid pace than fifty years ago.
In conclusion, then, in answer to the question how we escaped the annexation of all of Mexico in 1847-48, the fol- lowing reasons may be assigned: The growing realization that territorial expansion and the extension of slaver}- were so inextricably involved with each other that every acces-
1 As late as May 22, 1848, when it was still doubtful whether Mexico would ratify the Trist Treaty, Calhoun wrote his brother-in-law: "Should it not be ratified, there will be a great effort made to take the Whole." — Correspondence, pp. 755-56. Calhoun believed that it had been the intention of the administration " to conquer and annex the country." — Letter to the same, April 15, Correspon- dence, 751.
