would be the result, unless an act of determination took place in favour of some one of these actions; so that, between the undetermined power and the action itself, an act of determination always intervenes; and therefore the question comes to be, not, Whence comes man's undetermined power of choosing? but, Whence comes his act of particular choice or determination? Is it derivative? can it be traced out of him up into some foreign source? Then of course his liberty vanishes. Is it not derivative? Then his liberty stands good, but is no longer found to consist in a state of indetermination to several courses of action. It must be conceived of as an underived or absolutely self-grounded act of determination in favour of one.
Thus, then, the conception of liberty is reduced to some degree of distinctness and tangibility. If there be such a thing as human liberty it must be identical with an absolutely original or underived act; and the conception of the one of these must be the same as the conception of the other of them. But it is still our business to show in what way the conception of such an act is possible.
It is palpably impossible to conceive liberty, or an underived act, as arising out of man's natural or given existence. According to our very conception of this species of existence, all the activity put forth out of it is of a derivative or transmitted character. As we have already said, such kind of activity is not activity at all, but passivity. Not being originated
