nothing, and thanks to no man. It is not its importance, then, which confers upon truth its value in communication. The value of truth is measured by precisely the same standard which determines the value of wealth. This standard is in neither case the importance of the article; it is always its difficulty of attainment, its cost of production. Has labour been expended on its formation or acquisition: then the article, if a material commodity, has a value in exchange; if a truth, it has a value in communication. Has no labour been bestowed upon it, and has Nature herself furnished it to every human being in overflowing abundance: then the thing is altogether destitute of exchange-value, whether it be an article of matter or of mind; no man can, without impertinence, transmit or convey such a commodity to his neighbour. If this be the law on the subject (and we conceive that it must be so ruled) it settles the question as to the second mode of dealing with the problem of perception. It establishes the point that this method of treating the problem is not to be permitted.
The first and third modes of dealing with our problem remain to be considered. The first mode ignores the problem altogether; it refuses to have anything to do with it. Perhaps this mode is the best of the three. We will not say that it is not: it is at any rate preferable to the second. But once admit that philosophy is a legitimate occupation, and this mode must be set aside, for it is a negation of all philosophy. Everything depends upon this admis-
