Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 3 "Philosophical Remains" (1883 ed.).djvu/481

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november 1856.
471

systems of philosophy. We have seen that in the natural world there is a wide discrepancy between the real and the apparent and that the physical sciences, paying but little heed to the apparent, and placing no trust in it, press forward to the ascertainment of the real. We have now to ask, Does this same distinction, this same discrepancy between what is real and what is merely apparent, hold good in the world of mind as well as in the world of matter? The answer to this question is important. Because if this distinction between the real and apparent does not hold good in the world of mind, if there be no difference between what we really think and what we only apparently think, between what we really know and what we apparently know, if there be no discrepancy between apparent thinking and real thinking, between apparent knowing and real knowing, there can be no science of metaphysics, no research into the nature of knowledge, because no such science or research would be required, just as no astronomy would be required if there were no difference between the real and the apparent movements and magnitudes of the stars. While, on the other hand, if in the world of thought there be the same relative difference between the real and the apparent which prevails in the natural universe, a science, the science of metaphysics, will be required to bring before us the facts of our own real thinking, and to correct and displace the facts of our own mere apparent thinking.