Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 3 "Philosophical Remains" (1883 ed.).djvu/574

This philosophy gives itself out as the philosophy of the "absolute." The meaning of this word "absolute," then, is what must, first of all, be determined. It is nowhere explained by the system, or by any of its opponents or defenders. It may, indeed, be said that Hegel's whole philosophy is nothing but an explanation of the "absolute." But a definition of one word extending over a score of volumes is very apt to evaporate before it can be apprehended. The following is shorter. "The absolute," truth absolute, is whatever is true for intellect considered simply as intellect, and not considered as this or as that particular intellect; it is truth for all intellect, and not merely truth for some intellect; in other words, "the absolutes is truth for pure intellect, and not truth for modified intellect. An illustration will help to make plain this somewhat abstract definition. Suppose five intellects, each of them modified by the possession of one, and only one, of our five senses. One man merely sees, another merely tastes, another merely smells, another merely hears, and another merely touches; and suppose an apple presented to these five individuals. Each of them would apprehend only one sensation; but while the sensation in each case would be different, the one in each case would not be different. The man who saw the apple would see one sight, the man who tasted it would experience one taste, the man who heard it (when struck) would hear one sound, and so in regard to the others. The sensations would be peculiar to each intellect;