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THE SENTENCE AND RECANTATION.
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it belongs officially to the Congregation alone. The words are these: "But merely that the declaration made by his Holiness (fatta da nostra Signore), and published by the Holy Congregation of the Index, had been announced to you."

Undoubtedly Pope Paul V. wished the decree made and privately instigated it, as Urban VIII. did the sentence against Galileo; and in this sense the former may be attributed to the one and the latter to the other, and the condemnation of the Copernican theory to both. But in this they acted as private persons, and as such they were not (nor would they now be), according to theological rules, "infallible." The conditions which would have made the decree of the Congregation, or the sentence against Galileo, of dogmatic importance, were, as we have seen, wholly wanting. Both Popes had been too cautious to endanger this highest privilege of the papacy by involving their infallible authority in the decision of a scientific controversy; they therefore refrained from conferring their sanction, as heads of the Roman Catholic Church, on the measures taken, at their instigation, by the Congregation "to suppress the doctrine of the revolution of the earth." Thanks to this sagacious foresight, Roman Catholic posterity can say to this day, that Paul V. and Urban VIII. were in error "as men" about the Copernican system, but not "as Popes." For us there remains the singular deduction, that the sentence on Galileo rests again and again, even on the principles of the ecclesiastical court itself, on an illegal foundation.

After a brief mention of the rigid examination of 21st June, the sentence comes to formulate the judgment more particularly. According to this Galileo is, (1) "in the judgment of this Holy Office, vehemently suspected of heresy, namely, of having believed and held the doctrine which is false and contrary to the Sacred and Divine Scriptures . . . and that an opinion may be held and defended as probable