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curity arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will controul each other; at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.”
He thus clearly affirms the control of the states oyer the general government, which he traces to the division of the sovereign power under our political system, and by comparing this control to the veto, which the several departments in most of our constitutions respectively exercised over the acts of each other, clearly indicates it as his opinion, that the control between the state and general government is of the same character. Mr. Madison is still more explicit in his report already alluded to, he says: “The resolution having taken this view of the federal compact, proceeds to infer, ‘that in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers, not granted by the said compact, the states, who are parties thereto, have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them.’ It appears to your committee to be a plain principle, founded in common sense, illustrated by common practice, and essential to the nature of compacts, that where resort can be had to no tribunal superior to the authority of the parties, the parties themselves must be the rightful judges in the last resort, whether the bargain made has been pursued or violated. The Constitution of the United States, was formed by the sanction of the states, given by each in its sovereign capacity. It adds to the stability and dignity, as well as to the authority of the constitution, that it rests on this legitimate and solid foundation. The states then being parties to the constitutional compact, and in their sovereign capacity, it follows of necessity, that there can be no tribunal above their authority to decide in the last resort, whether the compact made by them be violated, and, consequently that as the parties to it, they must themselves decide in the last resort, such questions as may be of sufficient magnitude to regain their interposition.” To these the no less explicit opinion of Mr. Jefferson may be added, who in the Kentucky resolutions on the same subject, states that, “the government created by this compact was not made the exclusive, or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself, since that would have made its discretion and not the constitution the measure of its powers: but that as in all other cases of compact among parties, having no common judge, each party has one equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress.”
Time and experience confirmed his opinion on this all important point. This illustrious citizen, nearly a quarter of a
