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which however the committee will not undertake to describe, as the living example of discord, hatred, and jealousy, threatening anarchy and dissolution, must impress on every beholder a more vivid picture, than what they could possibly draw. The continuance of this unhappy state must end in the loss of all affection, leaving the government to be sustained by force instead of patriotism. In fact to him who will duly reflect, it must be apparent, that where there are important, separate interests to preserve, there is no alternative but a veto or military force. If these deductions be correct as cannot be doubted, then under that state of moderation and security, followed by mutual kindness which must accompany the acknowledgment of the right, the necessity of exercising a veto would rarely exist; and the possibility of abuse on the part of the state, would almost be wholly removed. Its acknowledged existence would thus supercede its exercise. But suppose in this the committee to be mistaken, still there exists a sufficient remedy for the disease. As high as is the power of the states in their individual sovereign capacity, it is not the highest power known to our system. There is a still higher power, placed above all, by the express consent of all, the creating and preserving power, deposited in the hands of three fourths of the United States, which under the character of the amending power, can modify the whole system at pleasure, and to the final decision of which, it would be political heresy to object. Give then the veto to the states and admit its liability to abuse by them; and what is the effect, but to create the presumption against the constitutionality of the disputed powers exercised by the general government, which if the presumption be well founded must compel them to abandon it, but if not, the general government may remove it by invoking this high power to decide the question in the form of an amendment to the constitution. If the decision be favourable to the general government, a disputed constructive power, will be converted into a certain and express grant. On the other hand, if it be adverse, the refusing to grant will be tantamount to inhibiting its exercise; and thus in either case the controversy will be peaceably determined. Such is the sum of its effects. And ought not a sovereign state in protecting the minor and local interests of the country, to have a power to compel a decision? Without it, can the system itself exist? Let us examine the case. To compel the state to appeal against the acts of the general government, by proposing an amendment to the constitution, would be perfectly idle. The very complaint is that a majority of the states, through the general government by force of construction urge powers not delegated, and by their exercise, increase their wealth and power at
