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Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 1.djvu/144

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opinion is that no perpetuity is created except as to a future limitation. The mere tying up of property, for however long or indefinite a period, is no perpetuity in itself, whatever may be the result as to subsequent limitations. (See Gray on Perpetuities.) It is, however, to be carefully considered, that a deed of property to certain persons in trust for a period beyond twenty-one years, or for an indefinite period, with limitation thereafter to the original owners, may possibly be attended with the danger of putting the absolute property in these managers, so that the subsequent limitation would be void, and the original owners or other persons could never recover it back.

There is a third general objection, applying to both classes of these trusts, and one which must be considered fatal in those States where it applies. This is, that the laws of several States specify expressly all objects for which legal trusts may be created, and forbid, expressly or by implication, all others. These States are New York, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, California, Dakota, North Carolina, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Kentucky, and Vermont. (American Statute Law, sect. 1703.) These allowable objects of trusts may be roughly stated to be for the selling of lands; for the receiving of the rents and profits of lands, and applying them to the use of any person for his life or any shorter time; for the accumulation of rents and profits for the time by law allowed; for the benefit of any person where the trust is fully expressed and clearly defined, subject to the limitation of the law against perpetuities (in Michigan and Wisconsin), and for public or charitable purposes. As none of the objects of the trusts treated of in this article would fall under these exceptions, any trust which carries property in any of these States would seem to be in that State void. But I have met lawyers who held a contrary opinion.

There is a fourth legal objection, which applies to the second variety only, which we have termed corporate trusts. This is, that they practically do away with the whole law regulating corporations, with all the safeguards regulating their corporate management, the control of their stock, and the exercise of their franchises, besides evading all the laws regulating their capitalization and consolidations.

It may seriously be questioned whether a quo warranto will not lie on relation to the attorney-general of the State to test by what