tinuously for ten years immediately prior to the passing of the act, is not unconstitutional as giving citizens of the State privileges or immunities not given to those of other States (U. S. Const., art. 4, sec. 2). State v. Green, 14 N. E. Rep. 352 (Ind.); s. c. 37 Alb. L. J. 43.
Contract—Where Broken.—A press association doing business in London was sued in a contract by a patron in Dublin for negligently furnishing false news. The locality of the breach became material, and it was held that the contract was broken on the receipt of false news in Dublin, not on the delivery of it to the postal authorities in London. Gray v. Press Association, 2l Irish L. T. Rep. 73.
Equity Jurisdiction—Bill of Peace.—Plaintiff owned certain picnic grounds in the defendant village, which passed an ordinance of doubtful validity, punishing the keeping of public grounds for picnics or any purpose whereby disorderly people are congregated, as a nuisance. Seven prosecutions for violating the ordinance were instituted against the plaintiff. Under one he was convicted, and the other six were still pending. Held, equity will not enjoin the other prosecutions. Poyer v. Village of Desplaines, 37 Alb. L. J. 36 (Ill.). See supra, p. 255.
Evidence—Book Entries.—A material issue in a cause was whether the defendant’s bank clerk had turned over certain collateral notes to the teller. The books showed that the clerk had so done. He testified that he had examined the entries, that they were in his handwriting, and that it was the custom to hand over the collaterals as the entries indicated. He also testified under objection that he did not speak from recollection, but that he was led to think, from seeing the entry in his handwriting, that he turned over the collaterals. This testimony was allowed, the court saying that “these entries, being made contemporaneously with the act done, were original evidence,—part of the res gestæ; and although it was necessary to call the party who made them, he being alive, his failure to recollect the transaction does not impair its probative force, he having shown that he kept his books correctly . . . it is really immaterial whether he was able to do more than verify his entries, and prove his invariable custom.” Mathias v. 0’Neill, 6 S. W. Rep. 253 (Mo.).
It is not strictly correct to say that book entries are admissible because they are part of the res gestæ. They are admissible for reasons peculiar to themselves, whether they are part of the res gestæ or not. The error is due largely to the statements in 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, §§ 115–120.
Fraudulent Conveyances.—A chattel mortgage was executed by an insolvent, in ignorance of her financial situation, to an antecedent creditor. Held, that other creditors could not set the conveyance aside, either under a special statute of South Carolina or under the statute of Elizabeth. Wietz v. Potter, 32 Fed. Rep. 888.
Fraudulent Conveyance, by a Grantee back to his Fraudulent Grantor.—A purchased land, which in order to keep from his creditors he caused to be conveyed directly to B. B becoming indebted to C, to protect the land, conveyed it back to A. A, hoping to obtain a homestead exemption in part of the land. conveyed the rest back to B in trust for A’s wife (who had no notice of the fraud) in consideration of her giving up the right to dower in other lands. C filed a bill in equity to subject the land to his debt. Held, the conveyance was fraudulent as against C, for A had no right to a conveyance. The land is liable to C’s debt, with the exception of the portion conveyed in trust for A’s wife, she being a purchaser for value without notice. Keel v. Larkin, 3 So. Rep. 296 (Ala.).
Fraudulent Conveyances—Marriage Settlement.—Fraud cannot be presumed in an action to set aside a marriage settlement, but must be proved by clear and satisfactory evidence to have been concurred in by both parties; and this is so, irrespective of the amount of the husband’s indebtedness, and even though his whole estate is included in the settlement. Noble v. Davies, 4 S. E. Rep. 206 (Va.).
General Average—Passengers’ Baggage.—The libellant in an admiralty case seeks compensation for damage by water to his baggage, caused in putting out a fire in the compartment of an iron steam-ship where passengers’ baggage was stored. Held, that the damage to the baggage was a necessary sacrifice, because of a great and common danger, and the libellant was therefore entitled to compensation, although, if some one else’s property had alone been sacrificed, the baggage in