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250 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. Judgment — Opening Default — Neglect of Attorney.— J7e/d, that a de- fault occasioned by the negligence and incompetence of the defendant's attorney may be opened. Gideon v. Dwyer, 40 N. Y. Supp. 1053. In most American jurisdictions the courts, exercising, at common law or by statute, a discretionary power over their own judgments, have refused to set aside a judgment on the sole ground of the neglect, carelessness, or mistake of the attorney, the act or omission of the attorney being regarded, on principles of agency, as the act or omission of the client. Black on Judgments, § 341. In a few States, however, and among them New York and North Carolina, the negligence of the attorney is held to be a sufficient reason for setting aside a judgment, provided the client himself waS not directly at fault. See Gioathney v. Savage, loi N. C. 103; Elston v. Sehilling, 7 Rob. (N. Y.) 74; Meacham v. Dudley, 6 Wend. 514. Justice certainly requires relief in some cases of default permitted through the negligence and incompetence of an attorney, but the New York courts seem to be somewhat too lenient. The principles they apply in this matter are indistinctly stated in Levy y. Joyce, i Bosw. 622. Jurisdiction — Action for Injury to Land. — Held, that an action will lie in one State to recover damages for injuries to land situated in another State. Little V. Chicago, St. P., M. dr' O. R. R. Co., 67 N. W. Rep. 846 (Minn.). The court in the above case acknowledge that their decision is opposed to over- whelming authority, both in the United States and in England, but they assert that such an action is in its nature transitory rather than local, and that the rule sus- tained by the authorities is "purely technical, and in practice often results in a total denial of justice." The House of Lords in a late case, British Soiith Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mozambique, [1893] -^PP- Cas. 602, reached a different conclusion from that of the Minnesota court. It was there held, overruling the previous decision of the Court of Appeal in [1892] 2 Q. B. 358, that an action of trespass to land sit- uated in a foreign country could not be maintained. The decision was rested on the ground, that as such an action might involve an inquiry into titles to land in foreign countries, no courts but those of such foreign country had jurisdiction. This result seems correct in principle, and certainly shows an almost universally accepted rule of law. Livingston v . Jefferson, i Brock. 203. Allin v. Lumber Co., 150 Mass. 560. Partnership — Entity Theory. — Petition to set aside a sale made by a partner- ship which owed the petitioner money, on the ground that some of the creditors were thereby preferred. Held, "that a partnership is a distinct entity, having its own prop- erty, debts, and credits ; and, for the purposes for which it is organized, it is a person, and as such is recognized by the law." Consequently it has a right to prefer its ci^edit- ors. Campbell v. Farmers' Bank, 68 N. W. Rep. 344 (Neb.). The sentence quoted from the opinion has become a catch phrase in the Nebraska courts, the judges making it the basis of their decisions. See Roop v. Herron, 15 Neb. 73 ; Deitrich v. Hutchinson, 20 Neb. 52 ; Richards v. Laveille, 44 Neb. 38. Such rea- soning will accomplish what the legislatures and courts of equity have been attempting for more than a century to effect, viz., the adaptation of law to the custom of mer- chants. It will be held that the firm owns the capital and may be sued by any partner, while the death of a partner will not necessitate a dissolution. The books will show whether property belongs to the firm, or is rented to it by a partner, and the firm credit- ors will have as large a share as a personal creditor of the assets of a partner. The courts are slowly recognizing the principle involved in this case. See Parsons on Part- nership, 4th ed., §§ 4 and 5. Partnership — Partner's Interest in Firm Property. — One of the members of a firm made an assignment for the benefit of creditors; his assignee sold the assign- ing partner's interest in the firm. Subsequently ihe old firm effected insurance on a building which had been partnership property. Held, notwithstanding the previous as- signment of the interest of one of the partners, the old firm remained the sole and uncon- ditional owners of the firm property.. Wood v. Insurance Co., 44 N. E. Rep. 80 (N. Y.). The decision follows logically from the mercantile conception of a partnership. " The property or effects of a partnership belong to the firm and not to the partners." Bank V. Carrollton R R., 11 Wall. 624. The partner's individual interest is an interest in the firm, not an interest in the firm's property. " One coming into the right of a partner comes into nothing more than interest in the partnership." Taylor v. Fields^ 4 Ves. Jun. 396. Hence, in the principal case the transferee of the assigning partner did not become a part owner of the firm property. Persons — Husband and Wife — Rights of Husband's Creditors. — An m- solvent debtor employed himself as an inventor. The patents which he obtained, he assigned to his wife for the benefit of a business which she carried on in her own name. A judgment creditor of the husband filed a bill to have such of the wife's property as