Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 10.djvu/290

264 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. The same may be said of Johnson v. Sellers.^ The plaintiff had contracted with the trustees of an educational institution to take charge of the same with his wife as co-principal. Some question having arisen as to the plaintiff's obligation to bring his wife wiih him, the defendant, a trustee of the institution, promised to give him twenty-five hundred dollars if he would do so, which he did, and they taught a prosperous school. There was no evidence that the performance was of any benefit or advantage to the defendant. The court, while admitting the doctrine that one of two parties to a contract may waive performance by the other, and agree to pay more for its fulfilment than the original contract called for, held that a promise by a third party to induce its performance, or rather to prevent its breach, was not supported by a valid consideration. The many cases of promises by the original promisor to pay an additional amount to the origi7ial promisee for merely performing hs original promise, do not furnish much light on either side of the question now under consideration. Those cases which hold that such second promise is binding, of which Munroe v. Perkins^ is a type, proceed upon the ground that the first contract was abandoned by the parties, and a new one mutually substituted therefor. On the other hand, the many authorities that deny the validity of such second promise, do so on the ground of public policy, or to prevent extortion, etc. Such are the promises to pay sailors extra wages, and witnesses, or officers of the law, extra fees, for merely doing a legal duty. See Harris v. Watson ; '^ Stilk v. Myrick ; * Bartlett v» Wyman ; ^ Collins v. Godefray ; ^ Dodge v. Stiles ; "^ Callaghan v. Hallett;^ and many others. Lookin'g at the subject in a practical light, is there any real objection to allowing a person of full age and sound mind, and in every way sni juris, to promise to pay for anything of value to him, and which he receives and enjoys in consequence of the promise, merely because some other person has promised to pay for what benefit he also received or expected to receive from the same transaction? If gain to the promisor merely can ever be a good consideration, there does not seem to be any legal difficulty in the way ; if not, there is. Edmtmd H. Bennett. Boston, December i, 1896. 1 33 Ala. 265 (1858). •* 6 Esp. 129; 2 Camp. 317 (1809). 7 26 Conn. 463 (1857). 2 9 Pick. 298. s 14 Johns. 260 (1817). ^ i Caines, 106 {1803). 8 I Teake, 102 (1791). ^ i B. & Ad. 950 (1830).