Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 10.djvu/480

454 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. I a writ of certiorari to test the legality of an act by the board of trustees of a township in uniting highway districts. Dunham v. Cox, 69 N. W, Rep. 436 (Iowa). It is the general doctrine that a taxpayer may be recognized in equity to prevent mis- appropriation of public funds (2 Dillon, Mimic. Corp., 4th ed., § 922), and it is not confined to cases of cities. In New York, however, it is held that the public alone can complain. Roosevelt . Draper, 23 N. Y. 318. And see Croft v. Jackson Co., 5 Kan. 518. If the taxpayer can interfere in those cases, there would appear to be no reason why he cannot under circumstances like those in the principal case. And if he is recog- nized in equity, it would seem that he should be allowed to proceed by way oi certiorari. The case follows Collins v. Davis, 57 Iowa, 256. Persons — Divorce — Connivance. — The plaintiff, suspecting her husband of infidelity, and being desirous of obtaining a divorce, employed detectives to procure the necessary evidence. The detectives engaged a lewd woman to lure the husband into an act of adulteiy, and afterwards gave such information to the plaintiff that she was able to confront her husband in a compromising situation with this woman. Held, although the plaintiff did not authorize the employment of the woman, the facts are such as to warrant an inference of connivance sufficient to bar the plaintiff's right to a divorce. Dennis v. Dennis, 36 Atl. Rep. 34 (Conn.), The question involved in the above decision is largely one of fact, and the court simply sustains the finding of a single judge sitting without a jury. The case would be unimportant were it not for the proposition which the court lays down, to the effect that where a husband or wife hires a third person to procure evidence upon which to found an action for divorce, an inference of connivance will arise whenever the guilty acts are brought about by means of this third person. It is not uncommon for detec- tives to be employed as in the principal case, and the decision is apt to be followed as a precedent. Gower v. Gower, L. R. 2 P. & D. 428, is an authority in point. Persons — Liability of Father to Support Infant Child. — During the pendency of a petition for divorce the court issued a temporary injunction against the defendant, restraining him from interfering with the wife's custody of the child. While the injunction was in force, the plaintiff furnished the child with necessaries at the request of the mother. Held, the father is liable for necessaries so furnished. Shields v. O'Reilly, 36 Atl. Rep. 49 (Conn.). Assuming the legal obligation of the father to support the child, the decision seems right. The misconduct which deprives him of the right of custody will not excuse hina from the liability to support. Or even assuming that he owes no legal duty to the child, the support of the child is one of the necessaries of the wife for which the husband is liable. 2 Bish. Mar., Div., & Sep., § 1223. Bazeley v. Fordtr, L. R, 3 Q- ^^- 559- Pretzinger v. Prctzin^^er, 45 Ohio vSt. 452. Many decisions apparently opposed to the principal case go on the ground that where a final decree of divorce is granted, and the wife is given the custody of the children, liability of the husband for the support of the children will be enforced only by granting to the wife an allowance for that purpose under the divorce proceedings. Broiv v. Brightmati, 136 Mass. 187 ; Hall v. Green, 32 Atl. Rep. 796 (Me.) ; Brown v. Smith, 33 Atl. Rep. 466 (R. I.). Property — Deeds — Fraudulent Delivery by Escrowee. — A agreed to sell land to B, and placed the deed in C's hands to be delivered to B on payment of the purchase price. C delivered the deed before payment, and B mortgaged the land to D, who had no notice. Held, that A is esto])ped to set up his claim against a mortgagee who in good faith relied on the deed. Shurtz v. Cclvin, 45 N. E. Rep. 527 (Ohio). The essential point is the effect of the wrongful delivery on the legal title. On this there is great conflict of authority. Several courts hold such a deed absolutely void ; Everts v. Agnes, 6 Wis. 453 ; but the weight of authority is in agreement with the principal case that the legal title passes to the grantee, subject to the grantor's equitable right, which, however, he cannot set up against one who has relied on the deed. Blight v. Schenck, 10 Pa. St. 285; Quick v. Milligan, 108 Ind. 419. Property — Percolating Water. — A appropriated the water of a stream which was fed by percolation from a spring on B's land. B enlarged the basin of the spring and diverted the water. Held, that B may be enjoined from taking water from the spring. Brucning V. Dorr, At"} Pac. Rep. 290 (Cal.). The court recognizes the general rule that percolating water is not the subject of appropriation. Ry. Co. v. Diifour, 95 Cal. 615. But it agrees with the view of Strait V. Brotun, 16 Nev. 317, that one who appropriates the waters of a stream acquires a property right in the springs which feed it, even though the water reaches it by percola- tion. While it is doubtful if such a rule would be applied to cases of natural rights, it seems to be a reasonable application of the Western doctrine of appropriation.