Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 12.djvu/305

RECENT CASES. 285 the interest that has accrued within six years. Parr's Banking Co. v. Yates, [1898] 2 Q. 13. 460. The decision has an odd look, as the result is that in such a case a guarantor's liability may continue forever, without further action on his part. The argument for the decision is that defendant's undertaking really consists of two distinct parts, a guarantee of the principal advanced, and a guarantee of the payment of compound interest. On the latter promise a right of action would accrue for each instalment of interest as it became due. Hamilton v. Van Rensselaer, ^^ Barb. 117. It is hard to see why the guarantor's undertaking is any more separable into two parts than that of the party guaranteed. Yet if the latter's promise had been to repay the advance with simple interest at a stated rate, it appears he could not be held liable for interest after the principal had been barred by the statute. Hollisv. Palmer, 2 Bing. N. C. 713. It is at least fairly arguable, however, that where the interest is compound and each instalment as it accrues becomes a new principal, the rule should be different from that applied where the interest is simple. Torts — Malicious Interference with Contracts — Pleading. — The decla- ration alleged that the defendants induced one M. to break a contract with the plain- tiff, by false and malicious statements made for the purpose of depriving the plaintiff of the benefits of his contract. On demurrer, held, that the declaration is insufficient for not setting out the false statements. May v. Wood, 51 iSf. E. R. 191 (Mass.). Three justices dissenting. In an action for slander, the substance of the false statements must be set out in the declaration. Newell, Slander and Libel, 595 et seq. In the principal case the majority held that even in an action for maliciously inducing a person to break his contract, when false statements are alleged, they must be set forth in substance and proved. On the contrary, it is argued in the dissenting opinion that the gist of the action is the malicious injury withon/: justifiable cause, by inducing a person to break a contract, and therefore that the statements used for that purpose are immaterial whether true or false. See 8 Harv. Law Rev. i ; Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216 ; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555. It seems evident, therefore, that although the case turned on a question of pleading, the point on which the court really divided was a question of substantive law, the majority regarding the false statements in the declaration as the gist of the action, and the minority, the malicious injury by inducing a person to break a contract. While the decision does not expressly impeach the doctrine ol Lumley v. Gye,it clearly shows a disinclination to affirm it. See 1 1 Harvard Law Review, 449. Torts — Interference with Business — Trades Unions. — Defendants, offi- cers of a trade union, caused certain of their members to abandon the service of the plaintiff because he had not joined an association recognized by the defendants' society. //eld, that this was tortious conduct, and the defendants should be enjoined from further interference. Coons v. Chrystee, 53 N. Y. Supp. 668 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term, N. Y. Co.). The facts in this case are reported but briefly and insufficiently. It does not appear whether the workmen were caused to break a contract, or merely to exercise a right they had of leaving at any moment. If the former was the case, waiving the question of the form of remedy, the defendants' act was a tort, a contract right being a property right. Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216. If the latter was true, service terminable at will not being a property right, the defendants, according to the doctrine of Allen v. Flood, [189S] App. Cas. r, were liable only if the means used were unlawful — which does not appear to be the fact in this case. Before Allen v. Flood, supra, it was generally held that where one person intentionally caused pecuniary damage to another, a good cause of action was made out unless the former showed some ground of justification' Mogul Steamship Co.v . McGregor, [1892] App. Cas. 25. Competition was always regarded as a justification, and in the principal case there was competition, for the conflict between trades unions and employers is competition as much as is the struggle between indi- vidual parties for employment or trade. Holmes, J., in Vegelahn v. Gttnier, 167 Mass. 92. Torts — Landlord and Tenant — Overflowing Cistern. — On an upper floor of certain premises defendant constructed a cistern, from which plaintiff, who afterwards became tenant of a lower floor, received water. Defendant, used due care in employing a plumber to repair a leak in the cistern, but, through the negligence of the plumber, water escaped and damaged plaintiff's goods, //eld, that plaintiff cannot recover. Blake v. Woolf, [1898] 2 Q. B. 426. In Rylands v. Fletcher, L, R. 3 H. L. 360, the rule was laid down that " the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands, and collects and keeps there, anything likelv to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do so % prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape." In every case since there has been a manifest inclination to discover some-