Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 12.djvu/447

NOTES. 427 satisfied themselves that giving time raised strictly a legal defence, that it was a simple breach of contract. Manley v. Boycott, 2 E. & B. 46 (1853). The decisions and the doctrine of this period form the basis of the present rule in New Jersey and Maryland. Yates v. Donaldson, 5 Md. 389. In England, however, when the statute allowing equitable pleas at law took away the motive for searching out legal reasons for equitable defences, the courts speedily reverted to the original idea, and declared that the implied contract was pure fiction, that the defence was granted solely on the ground that it would be unjust for the creditor to take advantage of the surety's legal liability. Pooley v. Harradine, 7 E. & B. 431 (1857); Greenough v. McClelland, 2 E. & E. 424. This fact, and the fact that American courts almost unanimously have reached the same conclusion, give strong ground for believing the New Jersey posi- tion to be mistaken. This belief is made almost a certainty by a consid- eration of the long line of cases which, both in England and America, have held that although the creditor first learns of the suretyship relation after he has received the obligation, and therefore after the contract is complete, yet he can do nothing inconsistent with the surety's remedies without discharging him from hability. Rouse v. Bradford Banking Co. [1894], App. Cas. 586; Colgrove v. Tollman, 67 N. Y. 95. The defence then is equitable, and it would be theoretically correct to refuse to allow it in any case at law. But, as it is settled that it is admissible in one case, it seems illogical not to permit it in all. Contempt of Court. — The law concerning contempt of court is, from the nature of the offence, curiously vague and difficult to classify. A court has the power to punish summarily any person who interferes with its administration of the law. The power is absolute, not subject to re- view, limited only by the discretion of the court itself. The classification usually made of contempts in and contempts out of court seems of no value. Bishop, Criminal Law, 7th edit.. Vol. II., § 261. All that can be done is to enumerate various instances of acts which are contempts and show in general with what functions of justice they interfere. The usual form of contempt is obstructing the administrative machinery of a court. A breach of good order in the court room is contempt because it hampers the court in the carrying on of its business; insulting a judge, adverse criticisms of decisions, inciting popular prejudice, Reg. v. Skipworth, 9 Q. B. D. 219, all are contempts as tending to bring the court into disre- pute and to lessen its dignity and power; disobedience of an order of the court is an obvious offence against its administration of justice. A different and less common class of contempts interferes with the work of the court in its strictly judicial functions; the ascertaining of law or fact. Tampering with witnesses or juries and the misconduct of juries or the court officers are serious impediments in the course of justice. A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, The Tele- gram Newspaper Co. v. The Commonwealth, The Gazette Co. v. The Com- monwealth, October Sitting, 1898, manuscript, points out a new offence of a like nature. It appears that one Loring suffered by the taking of land by a town, and an unfortunate newspaper published that "the town offered Loring $80 at the time of the taking, but he demanded $250 and, not get- ting it, went to law." A like statement appeared in another paper. Both were promptly fined for contempt, and their appeal was dismissed. No