Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/795

ACCELERATION PROVISIONS IN TIME PAPER 759 Bonds, which are redeemable at an earlier date at the option of the obligor.^^ Even if the maker has the option to pay in parts, the same result follows.^^ There is, indeed, an additional difl&culty here, for the paper is not surrendered after a part payment, and may be nego- tiated afterwards as if wholly unpaid. Although the cases do not raise this point, it seems, by analogous cases and the principles of this article, that a purchaser without actual notice of prior part payments can collect in full, unless they are indorsed on the instru- ment, just as he can if an accelerated payment in full was made.^^ Instruments payable "on or before" a fixed date at the option of the holder raise different questions from those subject to the maker's option. The holder cannot be deprived of his investment without his consent, so that its value is absolutely certain. Nevertheless, it has been held in Massachusetts ^^ that several of the other objec- Pac. 125 (191 2), statute prior to N. I. L., note gave discount for early pajonent; National Bank of Commerce v. Feeney, 12 S. D. 156, 80 N. W. 186 (1899), same. The Massachusetts law was changed by Stat, of 1888, c. 329: "No written promise to pay money shall be held not to be a promissory note, or not to be negotiable for the rea- son that the time of payment is imcertain: provided, that the money is payable at all events and at some time that must certainly come." Lowell Trust Co. v. Pratt, 183 Mass. 379, 67 N. E. 363 (1903). See also Union Cattle Co. v. International Trust Co., 149 Mass. 492, 21 N. E. 962 (1889), bonds. Massachusetts, Oklahoma, and South Dakota have adopted the N. I. L. The Oklahoma and South Dakota cases may rest on uncertainty of amount because of the discount; so also where interest is waived if payment is accelerated. Lamb v. Story, 45 Mich. 488, 8 N. W. 87 (1881); Story ». Lamb, 52 Mich. 525, 18 N. W. 248 (1884); or a premiimi must be paid, Chouteau v. Allen, 70 Mo. 290, 339 (1879). ^ Hughes Coimty v. Livingston, 104 Fed. 306 (C. C. A.' 8th, 1900). Where there are two possible dates of payment, as with Liberty Bonds, and there is a public an- nouncement of redemption at the earlier date, it is possible that the bonds would after- wards be overdue; but see note 27. ^ Bowie V. Hume, 13 App. D. C. 286, 309 (1898); Crocker v. Green, 54 Ga. 494 (1875); Lowell Trust Co. v. Pratt, 183 Mass. 379, 67 N. E. 363 (1903), see note 32; Fisher v. O'Hanlon, 93 Neb. 529, 141 N. W. 157 (1913, N. I. L.). Riker v. Sprague Mfg. Co., 14 R. I. 402 (1884), maker's option to pay not less than five per cent of principal on semiannual interest dates; Contra, Pierce v. Talbot, 213 Mass. 330, 100 N. E. 553 (1913) , semble, overlooking Stat, 1888, c. 329, and Lowell Trust Co. v. Pratt, supra; Bell v. Riggs, 34 Okla. 834, 845, 127 Pac. 427 (1912), under statute prior to N. I. L., raising objection that interest would stop on the portion paid. A provision that the advance pajnnents are not to be borrowed elsewhere does not impair negotiability. Lasher v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., 115 Iowa, 231, 88 N. W. 375 (1901); contra, Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Champlin, 11 Okla. 184, 65 Pac. 836 (1901). ^ See note 27, supra. " Mahoney v. Fitzpatrick, 133 Mass. 151 (1882), — "on demand or in three years";