27. The spreading of disinformation (by which we mean the promotion of intentionally false, distorting or distracting narratives) and the running of 'influence campaigns' are separate but interlinked subjects. An influence campaign in relation to an election, for example, may use the spreading of disinformation, but may also encompass other tactics such as illicit funding, disruption of electoral mechanics or direct attacks on one of the campaigns (such as 'hack and leak'). Equally, the spreading of disinformation is not necessarily aimed at influencing any individual outcome; it can simply have broad objectives around creating an atmosphere of distrust or otherwise fracturing society.[1]
28. Russia's promotion of disinformation and its attempts at broader political influence overseas have been widely reported.[2] Examples include:
- use of state-owned traditional media: open source studies have shown serious distortions in the coverage provided by Russian state-owned international broadcasters such as RT and Sputnik;[3]
- 'bots' and 'trolls': open source studies have identified significant activity on social media;
- 'hack and leak': the US has publicly avowed that Russia conducted 'hack and leak' operations in relation to its presidential election in 2016, and it has been widely alleged that Russia was responsible for a similar attack on the French presidential election in 2017; and
- 'real life' political interference: it has been widely reported that Kremlin-linked entities have made 'soft loans' to the (then) Front National in France, seemingly at least in part as a reward for the party having supported Russia's annexation of Crimea,[4] and the GRU sponsored a failed coup in Montenegro in October 2016[5] – an astonishingly bold move in a country just a few months from its accession to NATO.
29. Russia may spread disinformation or seek to influence political events for a wide range of purposes, but all in support of its underlying foreign policy objectives:
- direct support of a pro-Russian narrative in relation to particular events (whilst some of the outright falsehoods which are put forward may not be widely believed,
- ↑ Promoting disinformation does not usually lead to any criminal or civil liability under UK law, but an influence campaign which interferes in a democratic process could (this is considered further in the Legislation section of this Report).
- ↑ We note that Russia's disinformation efforts against the West are dwarfed by those which the Russian state conducts against its own population.
- ↑ A survey of some such studies can be found in the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee's report Disinformation and 'Fake News', HC 1791, 18 February 2019. In the case of RT, Edward Lucas informed the Committee that the direct "impact of RT … is tiny … Any one time … there is an average of 1,300 people in this country watching RT … the real point of RT is it is a way of gaining legitimacy in elite circles and not least saying to MPs and Peers 'Here is [say] £2,000 in cash if you appear on our programme'" and Christopher Donnelly explained that "in the UK its main impact … is through social media output. It gets out its message on any serious activity that happens [on social media] within 20 minutes …" (oral evidence – 12 July 2018).
- ↑ ***
- ↑ Written evidence – HMG, 29 June 2018.
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