requisite notification).[1] Anyone who should have registered but who has not done so can be prosecuted and, in the case of non-US citizens, deported.
115. The UK has no equivalent legislation to FARA – which would clearly be valuable in countering Russian influence in the UK. The Director-General of MI5 explained that FARA-type legislative provisions would create:
… the basis therefore of being able to pursue under criminal means somebody not declaring, thereby being undercover. So if somebody was a Russian illegal, or something like that, today it is not an offence in any sense to be a covert agent of the Russian Intelligence Services in the UK – just to be that, to be in covert contact, to be pursuing a brief – unless you acquire damaging secrets and give them to your masters.[2]
116. We note that new powers to stop, question, search or detain any person entering the UK gained Royal Assent in February 2019; it is not necessary for there to be suspicion of engagement in hostile activity in order to use these powers.[3] This is a good first step, but more than a year on from the Prime Minister's commission there is still no sign of broader legislation being brought forward. The Home Secretary explained:
It is, by definition, a complex area. The Law Commission has been doing work in this area as well, quite rightly independently and they will be reporting back and I think it makes sense to take into account what they have got to say as well before we rush out some legislative proposal.[4]
117. We recognise the need to get legislation right. Nevertheless, it is very clear that the Official Secrets Act regime is not fit for purpose and the longer this goes unrectified, the longer the Intelligence Community's hands are tied. It is essential that there is a clear commitment to bring forward new legislation to replace it (and a timetable within which it will be introduced) that can be used by MI5 to defend the UK against agents of a hostile foreign power such as Russia.
118. In terms of tackling the criminal activities of Russian expatriates and those who enable such activities, Unexplained Wealth Orders came into force in January 2018 through the Criminal Finances Act 2017.[5] These require an individual with unexplained wealth in assets over £50,000 to provide information as to the legitimacy of these assets. Failure to respond or comply with the order may lead to a presumption that the assets are recoverable property in any subsequent civil recovery proceedings before the High Court.
119. The National Crime Agency (NCA) can obtain an Unexplained Wealth Order in relation to anyone who is either a Politically Exposed Person[6] from outside the European
- ↑ Title 18 of the United States Code (Crimes and Criminal Procedure), paragraph 951.
- ↑ Oral evidence – MI5, *** January 2019.
- ↑ The provisions in the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 are closely modelled on the 'Schedule 7 port stop' power under the Terrorism Act 2000.
- ↑ Oral evidence – Home Secretary, 31 January 2019.
- ↑ Contained in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, as amended by the Criminal Finances Act 2017.
- ↑ A Politically Exposed Person (PEP) is a term used in financial regulation to denote an individual who has been entrusted with a prominent public function. In the UK, this includes any foreign person who has held at any time in the preceding year a prominent public function outside the UK in a state or international institution: ambassadors; high-ranking military officers; Members of Parliament; members of the boards of central banks and members of supreme courts. PEP status also extends to relatives and close associates.
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