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if they are done contrary to [human] laws, but are effected according to another order and cause more excellent than laws. Or if it happens that things of this kind are conformable to the mundane harmony and friendship, yet produce a conflict in parts through a certain sympathy. Or if the communication of good, which is beautifully imparted, is perverted by those that receive it to the contrary.
It is, necessary, however, to discuss these things particularly, and to show how they subsist, and what reason they possess. It is requisite, therefore, to understand that the universe is one animal; and that the parts in it are, indeed, separated by places, but through the possession of one nature hasten to each other.[1] The whole collective power, however, and the cause of mixture, spontaneously draws the,
- ↑ Agreeably to this, Plotinus, also, in Eunead iv. lib. iv. cap. 32, says, (
Greek characters) [Greek: pan touto to en, kai ôs zôon en zôon te ontos, kai eis en telountos, ouden outô porrô topou ôs mê engys einai tê tou enos zôou pros to sympathein psysei] i. e. "This universe is one, and is as one animal. But being an animal and completely effecting one thing, nothing in it is so distant in place as not to be near to the nature of the one animal, on account of its sympathy with the whole of itself."
