FEEHAN
FEELING
maturity, or cut and fed green, then known as soiling-crops; or cut and stored in a silo, to remain juicy for winter feeding with dry feed, the material so stored being known as ensilage (q.v.). Animals in pasture need less of concentrated food than those on dry forage; but more can be fed from the same number of acres by giving the soiling-crops to stock under cover. Forage crops include corn, clover, alfalfa, cow-peas, rape, oats and millet. Sometimes more than one are sown together, as oats, peas and rape for hogs, or rape with wheat for pasturage after harvest. If the change from dry forage to green pasturage be too sudden, stock is liable to the trouble known as bloat, due to rapid fermentation of the food. See Henry's Feeds and Feeding, Jordan's Feeding of Animals and bulletins of Experimental Stations and the U. S. Dept. of Agriculture.
Feehan, Archbishop Patrick A., an American Roman Catholic prelate, was born in County Tip-perary, Ireland on Aug. 29, 1829, and educated at Castle Knock and Maynooth Colleges. Emigrating to the United States in 1852, he be-came pastor of a church at St. Louis and president of a church seminary at Ca-rondelet. In 1865 he was consecrated bishop of Nashyille, Tenn., and in 1880, when Chicago was made an archiepiscopal see, Bishop Feehan became its first archbishop. He died on July 12, 1902.
Feeling. This term is ambiguous, as it may refer to sensations of touch or to the general subjective sense of the pleasantness or unpleasantness of experience. It is in the latter meaning that the word is here used. Feeling is commonly contrasted with cognition, the latter giving the objective qualities of things, i. e.t their color, shape, size, causal relations, etc.; the former, the way in which they affect us. Traditional psychology has commonly distinguished between cognition, feeling and volition, as distinct powers or faculties of the mind; but to-day the tendency is to regard all consciousness as involving activity (see CHILD STUDY). Volition therefore is only a type of cognition. When attention is concentrated on a certain act, and one feels willing to do this act and is moreover aware of consent to its performance, the mental state is one of will. It follows that consciousness
ARCHBISHOP FEEHAN
has two fundamental phases, cognition and feeling, both of which have an important bearing on action. When consciousness involves relatively much feeling and little thought, impulsive, uncontrolled action follows; when the cognitive element increases in proportion, the activity comes under guidance, becomes voluntary. In any case the amount of feeling is a fair indication of the dynamic force of a state of consciousness.
The relation between feeling and cognition has been an interesting question in the history of psychology. Plato assumed that feeling is of two kinds: one dependent on bodily conditions, as the appetite, physical pleasure and pain; the other dependent on ideas, as social, aesthetic and moral feelings The former is base, the latter noble. This view is a common one and is retained by Herbart, who reserves the word feeling for the latter class and calls the former emotion; a terminology not preserved by modern psychology. According to Herbart education should strive to control or suppress the emotions, but the feelings should be encouraged, for from them springs interest (q. v.), the dynamic force of learning. Modern psychology finds no essential difference between physical and intellectual feelings, and ascribes to both the same general function in the life of the organism.
Three fundamental problems are involved in the recent psychology of feeling. The first concerns the classes of feeling, the second its conditions and the third its function. As regards classification all distinctions based on the nature of the object that rouses the feeling rather than upon its subjective effect are set aside. Social, ethical, aesthetic, sensuous and intellectual feelings are no longer thought to be distinct varieties. Wundt, the German psychologist, offers the most elaborate classification of pure feeling. He says that we may be affected in six ways, pleasantly or unpleasantly, with excitement or depression, or with strain or relaxation. Other psychologists reject all but the first two, claiming that excitement and depression, strain and relaxation are distinguishable only by means of the kind of sensations involved and are not classes of pure feeling. For instance, strain, they claim, tells us that our muscles are moving with difficulty and not how this motion affects us. It may be either pleasant or unpleasant.
As regards the conditions of feeling we again have much discussion and no certain agreement. It is generally recognized that sensations of ordinary intensity are usually agreeable, whereas those that are either very feeble or very intense are usually disagreeable. Professor Angell adds two other conditions which seem accurately stated and suggestive. He says that whenever the bodily tone is good, normal ex-
